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5Historical and Structural Approaches in the Natural and Human Sciences
Preface
Ghosts of Plato and Aristotle, of Descartes, Newton, Kant and Wittgen-
stein speak to us, benevolent and admonishing. About natural sciences,
liberal arts, the humanities and philosophy. Reminding us of our cultural
heritage and social history. So what of the future?
The sciences and humanities evolve in two different and not always
easily reconcilable ways: by specialisation and broadening of their scopes.
Those dedicated to specialisation often accuse the ‘broadeners’ of funda-
mental shallowness. However, in many instances, innovation results from
unusual combinations of views and techniques originating in widely dif-
ferent domains. The essential breakthrough usually consists in the recog-
nition and solution of some (‘deep’) integration problem. From time to
time, a new area emerges and takes on a life of its own, as a truly independ-
ent discipline.
In the 21st century, both approaches will continue to be productive.
Unfortunately, ‘broadening’ research may be hampered by ‘traditional’
views and too rigid a set-up of research regimes. Among other things, one
may rightly question the customary distinction: humanities, natural sci-
ences, social sciences (sometimes referred to as the alpha, beta and gamma
disciplines). Such strictly compartmentalized nomenclature will always
lead to confusion in cases of more detailed interdisciplinary research. Irre-
spective of the names associated with emerging disciplines, the organiza-
tional links with established institutions may well have to differ radically
from current arrangements.
New departures require new views. That applies to research approach-
es in general and to governmental and institutional policies in particular.
All need open dialogues and critical self-assessment. In this connection,
the way we talk about arts and sciences has become of increasing impor-
tance.
The four essays in this book present a variety of illuminating and re-
freshing points of view on the problems in question. Many angles were
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further developed in the Sciences and Arts Debate held by the Hollandsche
Maatschappij der Wetenschappen (“Holland Society of Arts and Sciences”)
on 16th February 2002, triggered by the presentations of the authors and
the reviews by the invited discussants. The editors of this volume discuss
the conclusions (and highlights) in the first chapter and add a summary in
an epilogue. While not overly important as such, one must admit that the
traditional “Arts and Sciences” in the Society’s name and in the title of the
symposium may have constituted an appropriate label for 18th century
practices, but today are more properly covered by “Sciences and Humani-
ties”!
The inspiring help of the members of the Steering Committee and the
external reviewer, Professor Theo Kuipers, is gratefully acknowledged.
Preface
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1 The Sciences and Arts Debate
A review and some conclusions
Dr Peter A.J. Tindemans, Prof. Alexander A. Verrijn-Stuart
and Prof. Rob P.W. Visser
The 1999 Prize Competition of the Holland Society1  challenged partici-
pants to express innovative views of the Sciences and Arts. Formally, they
were asked to provide a meta-description such that newly emerging disci-
plines might be accommodated without the rigid categorization imposed
by traditional nomenclature schemes. This overall objective was para-
phrased as “indicating which elements might be helpful or, by contrast, obstruc-
tive in guiding scholarly endeavour in the 21st century”, possibly including “a
reasoned rejection of the classical distinction sciences/humanities and other re-
strictive classifications, replacing these by a more effective taxonomy”. Simply
put, how can we talk about esoteric or unexpected developments in con-
structive ways? How may scholars, administrators and politicians really
understand each other when entering largely unknown domains?
A well-known example of the nomenclature dilemma is the borderline
between physics and chemistry. Where do we position fundamental re-
search on chemical compounds? Are ‘quantum chemical’ studies physics
(because of their quantum mechanical formalisms), chemistry (because
one investigates chemical structures) or even applied mathematics (when
the study essentially depends on the ability to compute results mathemat-
ically)? Fortunately, the physicist active in this area will be able to publish
results in a journal on ‘chemical physics’, whereas the chemist will refer to
the subject as ‘physical chemistry’. Yet, in an era when all research is to be
justified financially, a chemistry department may – and often does – object
to new proposals if they cannot be classified strictly as ‘chemistry’, thus
stifling innovation from within.
More problematic are the options for naming various applications of
‘computing’ (or ‘computation’, using these terms in the general sense of
structuring abstractions such that they are capable of manipulation by
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computing machinery). Should research into ways of documenting art his-
torical subjects such that subject-characteristic searches may be per-
formed be called ‘art-historical informatics’ or ‘computational art history’?
Is it a special branch of ‘artificial intelligence’ or of ‘information science’?
Does it belong to the ‘humanities’, or is it a form of ‘software engineering’
normally positioned in the ‘sciences’?
The last example illustrates two further problems associated with one’s
natural desire for clear subdivisions. The first is the traditional grouping of
‘arts’ versus ‘sciences’, where the ‘arts’ may be understood as certain
branches of learning serving as intellectual instruments for more advanced stud-
ies (usually but not necessarily linked to human behaviour, cultural artifacts, or
societies) and the ‘sciences’ imply elements of empirical acquisition of gener-
alizable knowledge and, therefore, usually are given the epithet ‘natural’2.
In other words, the governing dichotomy is that of intellectual skills as
opposed to practical experimentation and observation. Although mathe-
matics typically represents intellectual structuring, it is traditionally
grouped with the sciences, even if given a special place. The over-simpli-
fied arts-sciences antithesis may facilitate classification (if something is
not in one class, then it is in the other) but does not do justice to the variety
of facets that jointly make up the character of some discipline.
A second, seemingly trivial, problem is associated with the names we
attach to various areas. When it is a noun from which an adjective may be
derived (chemistry – chemical) one may easily distinguish main and sub-
sidiary areas (physical chemistry is a specialization of chemistry, chemical
physics one of physics). On the other hand, the domain of ‘information’ –
which is complex anyway – causes no end of difficulty and confusion. The
French ‘informatique’ and German ‘Informatik’ have been translated by
the (contrived) English term ‘informatics’3. In none of these languages
does a suitable adjective exist. Thus, we may speak of ‘linguistic informat-
ics’, ‘legal informatics’, ‘medical informatics’ and so on, but we cannot
express the fact that the emphasis is mostly on the area denoted by the
adjective, whereas it should have been the opposite. The denotation ‘infor-
mational’ is just not on, though one begins to spot it here and there espe-
cially in referring to a new phase in human societies. Compounding this
situation is the historical claim to the terminology ‘Information Sciences’
as a modern extension or even full alternative of ‘Library Science’. On the
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other hand, ‘computational’ does work, even if it conjures up visions of
machinery and mostly fits natural science subjects. It is a pity that the
association with the essential characteristic ‘information’ cannot be ex-
pressed where it would be more appropriate.
These observations illustrate some evident problems of classification
and terminology. It would be rather farfetched to conclude that there
might well be areas that cannot be opened up because we have no proper
words for them4 . Anyway, mutual acceptance is a key element in the com-
munication between scholars – for dissemination and assessment of their
studies. It is also indispensable in the wider interaction between scientists
and society – for instance, to be recognised and funded. We must be able
to speak clearly about the sciences and arts. It is worthwhile investigating
the essence of understanding them.
The Prize Competition asked for a high-level analysis of the area, in
particular for an identification of features helpful or obstructive to innova-
tion, among them the role of various interest groups with their professed
and hidden agendas. The most direct question to be asked is “What is sci-
ence about?”, along with very general questions, such as “How do the sci-
ences and arts relate to society?” How do we talk about the area, how
should we subdivide it – if at all? What are the repercussions for academic
and research management, for governments? These questions are all part
of the overall problem.
The winning essayists have come up with an interesting range of is-
sues and problem aspects. Their views are often personal but always well
argued. The comments of the invited discussants intriguingly supplement
this variety.
It should be understood that throughout this introductory chapter, ‘science’
refers to the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities alike, unless
it is clearly stated that a more restricted use is intended.
The authors of the essays approached the question posed to them in differ-
ent ways and focused on various dimensions of science and the scientific
enterprise. Yet their answers make it clear that all these dimensions are
linked by necessity and point to 21st century science being different indeed
from what we have been used to.
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Rip shows convincingly that what we call science or scientific activities
are never free from historical contingencies. He puts perhaps less empha-
sis on a cognitive approach to what science is and will look like in the
coming decades than the others do. Nevertheless, it emerged clearly from
the discussion following his introduction that also for him subjecting one-
self to wide and ‘non-inner circle’ criticism – which implies that one
adopts rational principles – is crucial for claims of truth or validity. This
was indeed more or less taken for granted by van Benthem and Philipse,
who prove themselves to be traditional rationalists in a sense, yet point out
that the claims to validity and truth are not straightforward and rather
linked to the organisation of the production of knowledge. Philipse’s re-
sort to A.D. de Groot’s ‘Forum’ is reflected in van Benthem’s emphasis
that in an emerging area, such as information-and-cognition, ‘knowledge
producers’ of very different backgrounds and traditions, some of which are
not even bound to the traditional academic realm, all have to find and stake
out new claims for valid knowledge. McAllister does not use the sociologi-
cal categories and analyses of Rip but distinguishes two separate approach-
es to science, one seeking laws and structural regularities, the other focus-
ing on historical events and contingencies. As van Benthem did for the
case of information and cognition, he stakes out a wide claim: whereas the
first approach has traditionally been identified with the natural sciences,
and the other with the social sciences and humanities, in the future, every
field of science will only advance by a combination of the two. The distinc-
tion between different domains could then be based purely on their object
of inquiry. This kind of categorization, of course, is pragmatic and anyway
much more fluid than the rigid dichotomy of ‘nature’ versus ‘culture and
society’. It may, indeed, be too pragmatic a view, as Kornet and Elzinga
pointed out. The various objects of science and knowledge are ‘cognitively
distinct’. That is to say, they have characteristics (for instance, different
levels of organisational complexity) that make them amenable in different
degrees to the two research approaches. Or, as Elzinga put it: you cannot
ignore the way nature is organised.
Now what, in a nutshell, are the specific answers given by the various au-
thors to the question posed? In general, they touch upon three different
levels. One is about the cognitive structure of science, including its subdi-
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vision in disciplines (or ‘branches’ as the Encyclopaedia Britannica pro-
poses, referring to the underlying unity of science). A second one concen-
trates on the tools, the methods, the approaches to study the problems to
arrive at relevant, valid, or true statements. The third addresses the institu-
tional forms in the broadest sense – not just the organisations, but also
quality control mechanisms, the reward and degree conferral systems, fi-
nancial support schemes, for instance – that form the riverbed for the flow
of science. Of course, the levels are interrelated, but a large part of the
variety of the answers given derives from the different weights accorded to
them.
McAllister essentially leaves open the demarcation between individual
disciplines, or at a more aggregate level the natural sciences, the social
sciences and the humanities, and concentrates on the tools. He did not say
but might have said, as Rip did for the natural sciences, that the age of
disciplines is over. The future of every bit of science depends on the ability
to use all instruments from the toolbox, whether they have their origin in
and were even largely identified with the natural sciences on the one hand
and the social sciences and the humanities on the other. That such a
strong claim is not shared by everybody has already been mentioned when
reference was made to the comments by Kornet and Elzinga. Kornet ac-
cepts McAllister’s general tenets but points out that his overall framework
is insufficiently detailed. The extent to which ‘laws’ may be formulated,
that is, the ‘structural’ element is introduced, will vary widely between, say,
physics, biology and the human sciences. Modern multidisciplinary stud-
ies will benefit from McAllister’s integration of approaches, but one must
always be wary of oversimplification.
Rip in a sense makes a similar point but restricts himself to the natural
sciences. His overall argument is that science, as an organised way of
knowledge production, is not impervious to the way societies organise (i.e.
institutionalise) their productive and other activities in general. The model
of science – including part of its mechanisms to establish robustness –
which many scientists, but people outside science as well, have come to
adopt as the one and only representation of science is a particular, ‘path-
dependent’ result of the way the scientific enterprise evolved in the West-
ern world. The particular sequence of specific knowledge production
modes that characterised this Western model, from traditional knowledge
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to ‘natural history’-type of knowledge to ‘lab’ knowledge, is now seen to
have led to a situation that is no longer adequate to the ways and the inten-
sity with which knowledge has pervaded almost all walks of life. “Complex
reality strikes back at the laboratory,” to paraphrase Rip. His answer then
is a call for heterogeneity. One should not try to replace ‘Mode 1’ by ‘Mode
2’ (the well-known opposition introduced by Gibbons, Nowotny et al.5 ) but
use them both whenever appropriate. Provided adequate mechanisms are
found to test robustness – criticism must be a general characteristic of all
of these – one should also use the traditional, the ‘natural history’ and ‘lab’
approaches to knowledge production in combination. The resemblance of
the genome project to the ‘natural history’ approach is a striking example
in this context. Elzinga found himself in agreement on these observations
but suggested a refinement in using the names ‘craft’, ‘taxonomy’ and
’profession’ for these three stages, adding the ‘systemic’ stage to describe
the eclectic, heterogeneous approach that now seems the way forward.
Philipse equally is not bothered very much with the internal demarca-
tions in the scientific enterprise, nor for that matter with the tools it uses,
but concentrates on the cognitive structure and body that science is. Are
there arguments in the nature of how additions to this body of knowledge
occur that prevent it from growing indefinitely, or at least at the same pace
as in the past? In looking at science in the 21st century, he puts forward the
equivalent of the ‘limits to growth’ debate of the 1970s, when the focus
was on the finite world and its finite resources. The growth of science can-
not go on like this; there are diminishing returns as the economists would
say. Therefore, he stakes out for science a ‘steady state’ era, as Ziman and
others have called it6 , using science policy arguments rather than the
growth of our cognitive output. That does not lead him to a pessimistic
view on the importance of science. Indeed, looking at the way science will
impact the 21st century society, he claims that science is the underpinning
of two great endeavours of societies, the creation of wealth and the func-
tioning of our democracies: if only governments, industry, and the ordi-
nary citizen would do what they have to do. A late echo indeed of Spinoza’s
elegiac complaint to be found on the Spinozahouse in Rijnsburg: “Als alle
mensen waren goed en wijs; en deden daarbij wel; de aarde was een para-
dijs; nu is zij meest een hel”.7  Schnabel feels that Philipse’s argument
holds better for the natural sciences than for the humanities and even the
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social sciences. He also points out that an organizational change is mani-
festing itself, in that professional education and scientific endeavour are
moving apart. Thus, each will call on national resources, but the one in a
national context (understandably debatable) and the other in an interna-
tional context (not easily open to rationality).
Van Benthem winds up his argument with a plea similar to that of
Philipse: profound as the changes are that he sees and prophesizes for
science, its underlying Enlightenment ideals may have lost their appeal
but not their value. Being the only one to tackle the issue of the demarca-
tion of disciplines or areas head on, he uses the concreteness of his exam-
ple – the information and cognition sciences – to propose and indeed fore-
cast fundamental changes at all of the three levels mentioned before. The
scientific effort itself at the cognitive level (which should not lead here to a
regressio ad infinitum) will change so as to embrace the natural sciences,
humanities and social sciences. As with all profound paradigm shifts,
these should be accompanied by a new terminology. The tools of the trade
are not widely discussed by van Benthem, but it seems evident that the
same amalgam or eclectic combination advocated by Rip and McAllister
would have to be adopted. On the organisational level, van Benthem,
strongly supported by Devlin, sees a need for innovative organizational
forms as well as financial schemes to overcome the fragmentation that
stands in the way of further scientific and societal progress. The bounda-
ries of academia no longer matter strongly; the role scientists were used to
playing as the dominant class in the empire of knowledge will undergo
deep transformations.
The ensuing ‘Sciences and Arts Debate’ was a lively affair. As one might
expect, it answered few questions. Many must remain open. The following
are some of the views that were generally accepted.
– Disciplines will remain with us, but no longer as the primary basis for
research arrangements.
– Naming domains of heterogeneous scholastic enterprise may present
creative challenges, but reference to the constituents and the specific
tools will help explain what such innovations are about.
– Successful new departures – often embedded in and triggered by pri-
marily ‘engineering’ type organizations – will require the support of
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more than one sector of society. There should not just be an industrial
background or, conversely, exclusive government funding.
– Openness is what is most needed. Tribal behaviour, a characteristic of
many existing research establishments, is to be avoided.
– Funding should be given wisely. As one discussant said, “what re-
search needs is not just a budget, not just a focus, but both simultane-
ously”.
– It is also obvious that science – in the wider sense of including studies
in the humanities and social sciences – must be truly embedded in
society.
These views are characteristic of the emerging trends. They are empha-
sized in various degrees in the next four chapters. Each contains an essay
by a Prize Competition laureate followed by the written comments of the
discussant invited to review it. The chapter sequence is the same as in the
Debate. The final Epilogue sums it all up.
Notes
1 See Appendix (b).
2 By extension, there exist methodologically related fields, such as ‘life sciences’,
‘social sciences’, etc. The term ‘science’, of course, is also used in the general
sense of ‘body of facts or truths gained by systematic study’, as derived from the
Latin scientia = knowledge. Traditionally, arithmetic and geometry together with
music and astronomy constituted the medieval Quadrivium (or artes liberales);
consequently, the proper translation of ‘mathematics’ is ars mathematica.
3 The French and German terms are generally understood as equating to ‘computer
science’, whereas the English term ‘informatics’ is generally accepted as also
covering ‘management science’, ‘business computing’, ‘artificial intelligence’,
‘knowledge management’ and a number of specializations, such as ‘medical
informatics’.
4 Yet, this appears to be implied by the last line of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen”
(Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent – tr. C.K. Ogden)
5 See Rip’s essay in Chapter 4.
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6 See Rip’s essay in Chapter 4.
7 “If people all were good and wise / And always acted well, The earth would be a
paradise / But, now, is mostly hell”.
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2 Historical and Structural Approaches
in the Natural and Human Sciences
James W. McAllister
Abstract.  In developing their models of the world, the sciences
have traditionally drawn on two general approaches. One regards
the world as the result of historical events and contingencies,
whereas the other portrays it as the consequence of systematic
constraints and regularities. The comparative merits of these
approaches have been the subject of a long debate in intellectual
history. This debate has been conducted in different contexts and
terms, however, so its unity has hitherto not been appreciated.
The debate was pursued in one form in the nineteenth-century
German discussion of the methods of the human sciences;
in another form, it has been pursued in recent controversies about
the role of natural laws and historical contingency in the life
sciences. The aim of this essay is to demonstrate the continuity
of the debate between the two approaches over the past 150 years,
to study its evolution, and to draw lessons from it for new
resolutions of the outstanding issues.
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1 Introduction
How does the world come to have the structure that it has? Answering this
question is traditionally regarded as a central aim of the sciences. To tackle
it, the sciences have developed two fundamental and general approaches
which suggest the form that the answer should take. In one approach, the
structure of the world is a result of contingent historical events and pro-
cesses. In the other approach, it is a consequence of constraints and regu-
larities that are general and necessary. I shall call these the historical and
the structural approach, respectively.
Each of these approaches has impressive achievements to its credit.
Each appears natural and compelling in certain domains of inquiry. Our
view of art, for example, is based largely on the premise that artworks
spring from unpredictable human creativity, and that they can be fully
understood only by retracing the contingent evolution of the artist and of
society. Our modern understanding of the cosmos, by contrast, rests large-
ly on the assumption that laws of nature provide an invariant framework
within which the universe unfolds.
The two approaches have a long history. They can be discerned in the
philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. They are even more clearly visible in
the two world views that have most shaped modern Western culture: the
Enlightenment notion of a rationally ordered world and the Romantic ide-
al of the Promethean self-development of the individual.
The two approaches have various conceptual elements. Let us focus on
four: their metaphysical, epistemological, axiological, and methodological
elements. To begin with, the two approaches offer alternative metaphysi-
cal accounts of the world: in the historical approach, the world is a histori-
cal entity consisting primarily of occurrences, whereas the structural ap-
proach views the world primarily as a timeless system of rules or laws.
These metaphysical accounts have epistemological implications. To un-
derstand the world in the historical approach requires us to retrace histor-
ical events backward in time to ascertain how the world acquired the struc-
ture that it now exhibits. To understand the world in the structural ap-
proach, by contrast, involves grasping how the structure of the world is
determined by universal constraints. The axiological element pertains to
the intellectual aims and values that govern each approach: whereas the
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historical approach values complexity and particularity, the structural ap-
proach attributes higher worth to simplicity and generality. Lastly, the two
approaches have differing methodological implications. The historical ap-
proach calls for differentiation, concern for particulars, and historical sen-
sitivity, whereas the structural approach fosters holism, reductionism,
mathematization, abstraction, idealization, logicism, and a systematic
style of theorizing.
Critics may object that these two approaches are the endpoints of a
range of attitudes towards the world, and that any real scientific research
can and should draw on both. Whereas such a response sounds superfi-
cially plausible, it is a little too glib – at least at this point in our inquiry.
The strategy of combining the two approaches has proved, in intellectual
history, both less popular and more difficult to implement than one might
expect. Most thinkers who have addressed the topic have adopted a clear-
cut position in favour of one approach, excluding any reliance on the other.
Research programmes in which the two approaches are truly integrated
have rarely been formulated, as we shall see. As a result, most scientific
disciplines for most of their history have been dominated by one approach,
while the other approach has been restricted to an auxiliary or supplemen-
tary role at best. Before we can advocate combining the two approaches in
future scientific research, we must be certain that we have understood why
this strategy has had so little success in the past.
The tension between the historical and structural approaches has man-
ifested itself in a debate between their advocates that has endured through-
out intellectual history. This debate has aimed at resolving several ques-
tions: What is the nature of the difference between the two approaches?
Does one approach have a stronger claim to scientific status than the oth-
er? Are the classes of phenomena that can be understood by each approach
mutually exclusive, or do researchers in every field have a choice between
the approaches? What are the implications of the existence of two such
different approaches for the thesis of the ontological and methodological
unity of science? Do the two approaches lend themselves to integration
and, if so, how? Does any further approach exist on an equally fundamen-
tal level? The debate on these questions has been conducted in contexts
so varied that its underlying unity and continuity are masked. In the hu-
man sciences in the nineteenth century, for example, the debate focused
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on the tension between explanatory and interpretative perspectives. In the
present-day natural sciences, the debate addresses the relation between
law-based and evolutionary research programmes.
In this essay, we revisit some episodes of the debate over the past 150
years. The aims of this essay are to demonstrate the unity that underlies
the different manifestations of the debate; to explore some of its enduring
themes, which transcend domains of inquiry; to study the evolution of the
terms of the debate; and to suggest elements of a new resolution of it.
We begin in section 2 by reviewing the debate between interpretative
and explanatory perspectives in the human sciences in nineteenth-century
German culture. In section 3, we look at the continuation of that debate in
different terms among twentieth-century Anglo-American theorists of sci-
ence. Our attention then turns from theory to practice. In section 4, we
examine the interplay of the historical and structural approaches in histo-
riography and anthropology. In section 5, we investigate the debate be-
tween law-based and evolutionary research programmes in present-day
life science. In the final section, we draw some conclusions for the future
development of science.
2 Explanation and Interpretation in the Human Sciences
The first episode of the debate between the historical and the structural
approaches on which we focus unfolded in nineteenth-century Germany.
It pertained to the aims and methods of the human sciences and the differ-
ence between these disciplines and the natural sciences.1
The debate arose largely as a reaction to a perceived threat to the intel-
lectual legitimacy and specificity of the human sciences posed by Kantian-
ism and positivism. Immanuel Kant, at the close of the eighteenth century,
attributed a subsidiary place to the human sciences in his system. Kant
prescribed that, in order to count as a science, knowledge should satisfy
the requirements of necessity and generality. The paradigmatic science in
Kant’s eyes was Newtonian mechanics. Kant regarded historical knowl-
edge, by contrast, as contingent and arbitrary. Historical knowledge there-
fore does not constitute a science in Kant’s view: historical disciplines are
relatively inconsequential.
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The threat was intensified by positivism. Auguste Comte suggested in the
1830s that every scientific discipline begins by collecting facts and
progresses to formulating natural laws. On the strength of this account,
Comte proposed a hierarchy of the sciences in which he located, in de-
scending order, astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and “social
physics”, or sociology. This hierarchy has three dimensions. To begin
with, it contains a historical claim. Comte believed that the hierarchy re-
flected the times of origin and stages of development of the scientific disci-
plines. Astronomy has been practised the longest and has thus reached the
greatest degree of maturity; social science is in its infancy. Second, the
hierarchy is logical. The sciences that arose first are devoted to the sim-
plest and thus to the most general and abstract phenomena. Later sciences
study phenomena that are increasingly complex, specialised, and concrete.
Each science is founded on the knowledge of the preceding one and forms
the foundation of the succeeding one. Third, the hierarchy reflects the “rel-
ative perfection” of the sciences. Comte defined perfection in terms of
unity, abstraction, simplicity, universality, precision, and coordination of
facts. He declared that, whereas astronomy is precise and tightly organ-
ized, the sciences of organic phenomena – especially social physics –
could never be very exact or systematic. The perfection of a science was
closely connected to its use of natural laws: Comte considered that New-
ton’s law of gravitation had brought astronomy to the “highest philosoph-
ical perfection” that any science could hope to achieve.2
The human sciences in the mid-nineteenth century thus found them-
selves in a largely hostile intellectual climate. Kant – whose work enjoyed
enormous prestige, especially in Germany – had consigned the human
sciences to a secondary place on the epistemological scene. While promot-
ing the concept of a science of society, Comte had put forward a view of the
human sciences that was even more disparaging than that of Kant, al-
though philosophically less sophisticated and less influential. The mes-
sage for the practitioners of the human sciences was stark: whereas they
were probably barred from attaining full scientific status, any progress to-
wards that end would be achieved only by conforming as fully as possible
to the model of the natural sciences.
These limitations and prescriptions seemed incompatible with the
practice and richness of the human sciences in the mid-nineteenth centu-
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ry. The human sciences at that time were characterized largely by forms of
historicism, a doctrine that holds that historical epochs are radically dis-
tinct from one another and that historical phenomena must be studied
and evaluated in their own terms. Historicism contrasts with the assump-
tion which prevailed in the eighteenth century that human nature and so-
cial institutions are relatively unchanging. A form of historicism was also
entrenched in nineteenth-century German educational theory, which con-
ceived of education not as the enhancement of a universal capacity for ra-
tionality but as the development of an incomparable individual personality
or Bildung.3  The influence of historicism rendered the human sciences
unamenable to the approach typical of the natural sciences admired by
Kant and Comte.
History and economics provide good examples. One of the leading
figures of the mid-nineteenth-century German school of history was
Leopold von Ranke, whose work focussed mainly on the diplomatic and
military relations between the great powers in the modern period. Ranke’s
view of history emphasized the individuality of statesmen and thinkers
and the uniqueness of their ideas and acts, to the neglect of the collectivity.
His historiographic approach involved subjecting documents of state and
other primary sources to the interpretative and critical methods developed
by philologists. He argued that in order to develop an understanding of
history, one had to cultivate empathy with historical characters, putting
oneself in their mind and environment. He opposed the positivist view
that history must simply discover laws resembling those in the natural
sciences.4  Ranke came to be regarded as the founder of the science of
history and of objective historiography, but clearly these were a form of
science and of objectivity unlike those recognized by Kantianism and pos-
itivism.
Economics is an even more revealing case. Classical and neoclassical
economists had used an abstract axiomatic-deductive approach modelled
on the natural sciences. The historical school of economists in nineteenth-
century Germany rejected this. Gustav Schmoller, a leading exponent of
this school, emphasized the historical and changing nature of economic
and social phenomena against simplified and mechanistic views of the
laws of rational behaviour. Schmoller intended to free political economy
from false abstractions and to place it on a solid empirical foundation,
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based on detailed historical research. A contemporary of his, Carl Menger,
reasserted the necessity of applying the exact methods of the natural sci-
ences and abstract logical reasoning to political economy. This difference
of opinion led to the Methodenstreit, a dispute among German-speaking
economists that centred largely on the comparative merits of inductive and
deductive approaches.5
Scholars who valued and identified with the approaches typified by
Ranke and Schmoller were naturally reluctant to accept the view of the
human sciences put forward by Kant and Comte. They believed that the
human sciences constituted legitimate scientific disciplines with methods
that differed from those of the natural sciences. Theoreticians of the hu-
man sciences therefore worked to create a philosophical space for their
disciplines.
An early attempt to address these issues was made by Wilhelm Dilthey
in the 1880s. Dilthey believed that the solution was to be found in a strict
separation of the human sciences (or Geisteswissenschaften) from the natu-
ral sciences. Dilthey argued that the natural sciences are concerned with
explaining (erklären) natural events in terms of regularities, but that the
human sciences have an essentially different subject matter and content.
In his view, the human sciences are chiefly concerned with the study of the
human spirit or Geist and its acts. These acts are unique and freely chosen:
they can be understood only in terms of beliefs and intentions, and only
from the inside. He contrasted the freedom of the human spirit with the
lawfulness of nature. The practitioner of the human sciences is thus inter-
ested not in regularities, but in individualities, including individual histor-
ical protagonists, distinctive cultures, and historical epochs.
The human sciences therefore cannot conform to the aim of the natu-
ral sciences of seeking regularities and laws. Instead, they aim at the em-
pathetic reproduction and interpretative understanding of immediate,
lived experience. Our lived experience (Erleben or Erlebnis), Dilthey argued,
is an initially unanalyzed complex of sensations, memories, intentions,
evaluations, and the like. This lived experience is the ultimate subject mat-
ter of the human sciences. It is captured first in empathetic reproduction
or Nacherleben, and in a fuller form in imaginative interpretative under-
standing or Verstehen.
Expressed in such subjectivist, idealist and anti-naturalist terms, this
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sounds like a difficult task. It is rendered slightly easier by the fact that
Dilthey regards texts, artefacts, and institutions as objectified traces of the
human spirit. The life of the spirit can be reconstructed, in his opinion, by
interpreting these traces.6
Working along lines similar to Dilthey, Georg Simmel distinguished
the disciplines concerned with concrete reality (or Wirklichkeitswissenschaf-
ten) from the nomological sciences (or Gesetzeswissenschaften). The former
achieve understanding of past human behaviour and beliefs by means of
Verstehen, which Simmel interpreted chiefly as the historian’s ability to
identify with past actors. Simmel excluded that there could be invariant
laws in history. Simmel’s viewpoint was sophisticated in several respects,
however: he recognized that universal laws of nature represented an ideal
that the nomological sciences did not always attain, and that the historian
could legitimately make recourse to statistical regularities.7
Dilthey’s and Simmel’s strategy for opening a philosophical space for
the human sciences hinged on a demarcation of domains: they held that
the natural and human sciences differed primarily in subject matter. Wil-
helm Windelband found a distinction on such grounds unsystematic. He
criticized the conventional partition of the empirical disciplines into
Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. He cited psychology as an
example of a discipline that cannot be classified unambiguously as either a
natural or a human science: experimental psychology forms part of the
natural sciences, but Dilthey’s Geisteswissenschaften are also grounded on a
psychological science of a sort.
In the place of a distinction based on subject matter, Windelband pro-
posed one based on axiological and methodological criteria. In his view,
the empirical sciences are divided into two groups: the Gesetzeswissenschaf-
ten and the Ereigniswissenschaften. The former pursue nomothetic knowl-
edge of the general in the form of Gesetze or invariant laws. The natural
sciences belong to this group because they mostly have nomothetic aims;
but so too do economics and sociology. The Ereigniswissenschaften, by con-
trast, strive for idiographic knowledge of singular events or patterns. The
human sciences, Windelband argued, seek exhaustively to describe a sin-
gle event at a particular place and time. The historical disciplines usually
strive for the identification of Gestalten, representations of unique configu-
rations of particular events, conditions, or developments. The cognitive
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purpose of these disciplines is to reproduce and understand a form of hu-
man life in its unique actuality.
Windelband formulated his distinction between the natural and the
human sciences as follows:
The principle of classification is the formal property of the theoretical or cognitive
objectives of the science in question. One kind of science is an inquiry into general
laws. The other kind of science is an inquiry into specific historical facts. In the
language of formal logic, the objective of the first kind of science is the general,
apodictic judgment; the objective of the other kind of science is the singular, assertoric
proposition. Thus this distinction connects with the most important and crucial
relationship in the human understanding [ . . . ]: the relationship of the general to the
particular.8
While acknowledging that both the nomothetic and the idiographic ap-
proaches have strengths and weaknesses, Windelband was particularly
emphatic about the shortcomings of the nomothetic approach for under-
standing individual events in their full complexity. The natural sciences
deal in abstractions: they give us a world devoid of all sensuous qualities.
Empirical particulars are of interest not only to the extent that they can be
subsumed under general laws, but also if they form significant compo-
nents of a vital totality (Gesamtanschauung). Applying the nomothetic ap-
proach to human affairs yields no more than trivial generalities. In prac-
tice, historians rely mainly upon their informal insight and intuition into
human nature. Above all, as Windelband insisted, nomothetic knowledge
can never really account for the distinctive patterns of real events. For Win-
delband, the historically and individually given always contains an ineffa-
ble and undefinable component, which resists analysis into general cate-
gories. We experience this component as causelessness and individual
freedom. Human life is a rich fabric of historical connections, and we can
participate in it only if we understand its development. Our deepest con-
cerns and commitments, Windelband argued, direct our attention toward
the singular and the unique. Windelband envisaged historians bringing
back to life the persons and events of the past in their full individuality and
immediacy (Anschaulichkeit).
The most serious shortcoming in Windelband’s view of the idiographic
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approach is probably his assumption that our access to facts is direct and
not mediated by theories or standpoints. He is vulnerable to the challenge
that what the idiographic scientist tries to study is not an event, but only an
event as defined or described in a certain way. One can never exhaustively
describe or understand an event or a state of the world. To describe an
event at all, and even to claim uniqueness for it, we must first characterize
it in a way that picks out the aspects or features that interest us, or that we
want to contrast or understand. It is plausible to claim that this character-
ization depends on general categories, which draw upon a nomothetic ap-
proach.
Windelband’s approach to the natural and human sciences was en-
dorsed and further pursued by Heinrich Rickert.9  Rickert pointed out that
nomothetic and idiographic sciences differ not only in their goals, but also
in the conceptual tools that they use. Nomothetic sciences develop general
concepts, applicable to a wide range of events or objects, whereas idio-
graphic sciences formulate singular concepts, useful for depicting specif-
ic, unique configurations. Rickert also emphasized that the distinction be-
tween the nomothetic and the idiographic methods does not coincide with
the distinction between the natural and the human sciences: the idio-
graphic method is used also in the natural sciences, for example in Dar-
winian evolutionary theory, whereas nomothetic methods feature promi-
nently in human sciences such as psychology and economics.
The debate about the legitimacy and methods of the human sciences
reached a culmination in the work of Max Weber.10  Weber partly resolved
the tension between the explanatory and the interpretative perspectives
and the distinction between the natural and human sciences. He argued
that through the process of interpretative understanding of patterns of so-
cial action, practitioners of the human sciences arrive at a causal explana-
tion of sequences of action. Moreover, using “ideal types”, they could
progress from the study of unique events to cautious generalizations about
the common features of institutional patterns in social development.
Where other writers distinguished sharply between Verstehen in the hu-
man sciences and causal explanation in the natural sciences, Weber saw
Verstehen as a necessary part of causal explanations in social science,
which are however no less scientific than those of the natural sciences.
Weber resolved this tension largely by means of two concepts. To begin
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with, he developed a complex scheme known as “singular causal analysis”,
in which particular historical events are traced to their causally relevant
antecedents. In Weber’s account, singular causal analysis is performed by
means of probabilistic and counterfactual reasoning, not by using deduc-
tions from causal laws. He views history as a complex network of causal
relations among particulars, as a scene of alternate processes and possible
outcomes that are more or less probable, more or less strongly favoured by
relevant causes. The historian’s paradigmatic causal question is not
whether a particular event necessarily followed upon one or more anteced-
ent conditions, but why a certain historical path or outcome was what it
was, and not something else. A cause is not a sufficient condition for
the occurrence of the effect, but rather a factor that, in conjunction with
other background conditions, is comparatively likely to bring about one
outcome rather than alternatives. We explain aspects of the world by
means of probabilistic and counterfactual comparisons between what has
actually happened and what would have happened in the absence of appro-
priate causes.
Weber also contributed to the elaboration of the concept of Verstehen.
He regarded the interpretative process as an instance of singular causal anal-
ysis. Interpretation is performed by means of the hypothetical attribution of
rationality to historical agents. We begin by supposing that the relevant
agents rationally pursued appropriate ends. We thus tentatively attribute to
historical actors a form of instrumental rationality, as well as consistency in
motives and beliefs. At first, the rationality that we ascribe to past agents is
identical to our own rationality. When we encounter divergences between the
courses of action pursued by the historical agents and the behaviour that we
expect on the basis of our rationality, we adjust our model of the rationality of
the agents. Our aim is to construct a set of motives and beliefs that is adequate
to account for the agents’ actual behaviour.
The close connection between interpretation and explanation in We-
ber’s thought is further illustrated by his proposal of ideal types as heuris-
tic devices. Ideal types are simplifications or one-sided characterizations of
complex phenomena that can be hypothetically posited and compared
with the realities that they are intended to represent. Examples of ideal
types are models of rational action and patterns or processes attributable to
simple causes. In Weber’s view, ideal types allow us to ascribe selected
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elements of reality to specified causes, motives, or beliefs, and to make the
distinctions and counterfactual comparisons required for the construction
of adequate interpretations and explanations.
The debate about the methods of the human sciences in nineteenth-
century German culture produced imaginative and valuable results. Ac-
cording to the interpretative perspective developed in this debate, the chief
task of the practitioner of the human sciences is the interpretative or
hermeneutic understanding of cultural and social phenomena. Propo-
nents of this approach argue that it is futile to attempt to explain such
phenomena by identifying causal regularities; rather, they should be un-
derstood. The demand for understanding puts intentionality at centre-
stage: cultural phenomena are to be understood above all by reference to
the intentions, beliefs, and meanings of the agents involved. The empha-
sis on understanding also stresses the requirement to reconstruct cultural
manifestations internally and in their own terms, rather than by reference
to causes operating from without.
The interpretative approach has a number of strengths. Most notably, it
encourages a positive view of diversity, on both an individual and a cultural
level. It is sensitive to the differences between systems of thought and to
the advantages that these may offer to their users.
The interpretative perspective also exhibits important shortcomings or
vulnerabilities. The first concerns the centrality of texts. The interpretative
approach is intended to be applicable to cultural manifestations of all
kinds, including actions, artefacts, cultures, and historical epochs. In
many ways, however, its paradigmatic object is the text, conceived of as a
system of interrelated meanings. The term Verstehen has thereby come to
be used mainly to denote an imaginative penetration into historical texts.
This emphasis tends to reduce human culture and history to the produc-
tion and discussion of texts, obscuring the material aspects of human ex-
perience.
Second, the theory of Erleben and Verstehen prescribes that practition-
ers reproduce and relive the experiences embodied in texts and intuitively
identify with their authors. This injunction, however heuristically useful,
can degenerate into a subjectivist process of empathetic communion of
which the results cannot be validated or even imparted to others. The sci-
entific process thereby becomes unanalyzable and mysterious.
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Third, the concentration on historical texts and the worlds of their authors
risks elevating past thinkers into authorities that must be studied, subject-
ed to exegesis, and appreciated uncritically, rather than as fellow-contribu-
tors to a debate. Notwithstanding its openness towards individual and cul-
tural diversity, the interpretative tradition in the human sciences shows
some propensity for dogmatism and intellectual authoritarianism.
Fourth, the emphasis on the individuality of historical protagonists and
events does not aid understanding of the relationship between particulars
and aggregates, such as the membership of an individual in a group or
culture. It also renders the concept of change problematic. Since mechan-
ical causal processes are excluded from consideration, change can take the
form only of a teleological unfolding of preexisting potentialities or an
emanation of intellectual or spiritual forces. It is in many cases difficult to
conduct historical research against such a background.
A further problem affects, in different ways, every form of historicism.
If all world views are historically specific, we have no grounds for exempt-
ing our own values and beliefs from the contingent flow of historicity. This
tends to erode the basis of evaluative and prescriptive engagement with
practices different from our own, and to foster a relativist or laisser-faire
attitude towards questionable cultural manifestations.
3 The Dominance of the Explanatory Approach in Twentieth-
Century Anglo-American Theory of Science
The debate between the historical and structural approaches in nine-
teenth-century German culture ultimately achieved a solution, however
incomplete and provisional, with Weber. This solution consisted in recog-
nising that both explanation and Verstehen were legitimate aims of science.
The human sciences, which employed Verstehen, were thereby assured of
an intellectual space. The debate between the historical and structural ap-
proaches was joined again, on very different terms, in the twentieth-centu-
ry Anglo-American theory of science.
In this connection, the differences between analytical and continental
philosophy become very clear. Analytical philosophy places an emphasis
on logic, mathematics, and natural sciences. Continental philosophy identi-
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fies more strongly with social, historical, psychological, and literary stud-
ies, and recognizes Verstehen as a legitimate intellectual device. Twentieth-
century continental philosophy constitutes, in part, a continuation of the
nineteenth-century German debate on the methods and legitimacy of the
human sciences. Philosophers in this school, perhaps most notably Ed-
mund Husserl, tackle the problem of the abstractness and idealization of
the modern natural sciences with genuine insight and balance. Analytical
philosophy, by contrast, tends to take the success of the natural sciences as
a given and sees as its task to explain how this success is achieved. It is to
this tradition that we now turn.
C.P. Snow asserted in 1959 that the natural sciences and the humani-
ties constituted distinct cultures in modern society. He further claimed
that the humanities had acquired a dominant cultural position: whereas a
person lacking extensive knowledge of the humanities was not considered
cultured, he complained, an understanding of the natural sciences was not
a prerequisite for this status.11  Snow’s portrayal is gravely misleading. The
humanities may be more familiar to and be attributed higher cultural
worth by the educated public, and the classic image of the cultured person
may be centred on literary and artistic pursuits. In the academy, however,
the natural sciences achieved a dominant intellectual position over the
humanities decades before Snow wrote his essay, and they retain that posi-
tion today. Among practitioners of academic disciplines, the concept of
science and the standards of scientific knowledge and explanation are de-
fined by reference to the natural sciences. The humanities have encoun-
tered growing pressure to justify their claims to scientific status and the
specificity of their methods.
The dominant intellectual position of the natural sciences in twentieth-
century Anglo-American thought is illustrated by the tradition’s views on
the human sciences. Thinkers in this tradition argue typically that the
human sciences should adopt methods that closely resemble those of the
natural sciences. They focus on two clusters of concepts. The first is expla-
nation. According to many thinkers in the Anglo-American tradition, prac-
titioners of the human sciences should aim to explain events and phenom-
ena, primarily by reference to their causes. These thinkers acknowledge
that the causal factors underlying human affairs may be more complex
than those of natural phenomena. The explanations provided need not be
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mechanistic or monocausal: they may cite a variety of causal factors, in-
cluding long-term underlying causes, short-term precipitating causes,
trends, and contributing factors. Nonetheless, attention is focused on
causal explanation. Second, thinkers in this tradition draw on the concepts
of generalization, regularity, and law. Some argue that analysis of data on
cultural phenomena reveals historical regularities or transcultural gener-
alizations. Others maintain that the explanation of cultural phenomena
could be achieved by appeal to laws of human behaviour. Thinkers in this
tradition also envisage that the human sciences could be used, under ideal
conditions, to make predictions about human behaviour, analogous to pre-
dictions in the natural sciences. The explanatory approach, in most formu-
lations, is naturalist and shows distrust of the emphasis placed by the in-
terpretationist approach upon relations of meaning.12
The view that explanation can be found only in universal laws and reg-
ularities is associated most closely with Carl G. Hempel. According to his
influential deductive-nomological model of explanation, to explain an
event is to deduce the statement that it occurred from the conjunction of
one or more universal laws that cover the event and specific initial condi-
tions. Explaining an event is seen as inferring a statement describing the
event from a lawlike statement. Hempel believes that the deductive-nomo-
logical model – and its variant, the probabilistic-statistical model – are ap-
plicable as much to the human sciences as to the natural sciences. Hempel
believes that all accounts used to yield understanding in historiography,
for example, are reducible to the deductive-nomological model. This holds
for genetic and functional explanations, in Hempel’s view, as well as for
standard causal explanations. Hempel concludes:
The nature of understanding, in the sense in which explanation is meant to give us an
understanding of empirical phenomena, is basically the same in all areas of scientific
inquiry; and [ . . . ] the deductive and the probabilistic model of nomological
explanation accommodate vastly more than just the explanatory arguments of, say,
classical mechanics: in particular, they accord well also with the character of
explanations that deal with the influence of rational deliberation, of conscious and
subconscious motives, and of ideas and ideals on the shaping of historical events. In so
doing, our schemata exhibit, I think, one important aspect of the methodological
unity of all empirical science.13
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The agonized and painstaking nineteenth-century debate about the legiti-
macy and specificity of the human sciences is obliterated in this self-confi-
dent statement.
The attitude of the Anglo-American theory of science towards the hu-
man sciences was sketched by Adolf Grünbaum. He characterizes his in-
terlocutors succinctly:
Dilthey and his followers in the Geisteswissenschaften movement insist on the
methodological autonomy of psychology and the social sciences, claiming that
intelligent goal-seeking, which is so characteristic of man, calls for a method differing
toto genere from that of the physical sciences.
Grünbaum then reviews four objections to the claim that human behaviour
can be described and explained by appeal to causal laws. These are the argu-
ments that human individuals are unique, that human behaviour is too com-
plex, that human acts are directed at goals, and that causal laws of human
behaviour would eliminate human moral choices. He finds each of these
objections inadequate. He concludes that the study of human beings can and
should proceed through the search for causal laws, and that claims that the
human sciences are distinct from the natural sciences are unfounded:
Strictly empathic understanding may have great heuristic value and sometimes
aesthetic value as well. However, from the standpoint of achieving scientific
understanding and making the predictions which such mastery makes possible, the
empathic method in psychology and in history (Dilthey) is quite insufficient.14
Grünbaum hereby sidesteps any queries as to whether prediction and
mastery of phenomena are aims appropriate to all scientific disciplines
and to all approaches pursued in those disciplines.
Of course, Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth century also
contained alternative voices. Some theorists writing in English advocated a
historiographic approach very similar to that of the Verstehen tradition.
William Dray is the best known of these.15  Another partial exception is
represented by Karl R. Popper. Although Popper’s views are close to those
of Hempel on many issues, he believes that no laws of history exist.
Whereas historians rely implicitly on background laws of nature in their
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explanations, these are unavoidably trivial in content, Popper believes: the
historian is interested principally in the causal explanation of singular
events.16  J.J.C. Smart argued that there are no laws in biology, and that
biology is therefore a science of a fundamentally different kind from phys-
ics.17  Smart suggested that the world contains two classes of entities: natu-
ral kinds such as chemical elements, which lend themselves to description
by universal laws, and historical individuals such as the planet Mars,
which lend themselves to description only by singular statements and low-
level generalizations. We need sciences of both kinds in order to describe
entities of both sorts.18
Some writers in the Anglo-American tradition also accepted that his-
torical disciplines require suitable conceptual tools, including appropriate
models of explanation. According to the narrative model proposed by Tho-
mas A. Goudge, an explanation is a narrative that sets the explanandum
into context, conveying an understanding of how it came to pass.19  This
model of explanation appears to fit the practice in evolutionary biology,
economics, and other disciplines. In the narrative model, citing a law of
nature is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the success of
an explanation. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the natural
historical sciences routinely give accounts of events – the extinction of a
species or the formation of a volcano, for instance – that involve no laws
but constitute intuitively successful explanations. The narrative model of
explanation answers somewhat more closely to the concerns of the human
sciences than does the deductive-nomological one. The theory of the narra-
tive model given by Goudge and others is more rudimentary than nine-
teenth-century treatments of Verstehen, of course, and it is shorn of the
intentional dimension of the latter. However, it focuses attention on the
individuality and specificity of the event to be explained, and places it in a
historical context, unlike the deductive-nomological model.
Notwithstanding these alternative voices, the natural sciences remain
the paradigmatic scientific disciplines in the present-day Anglo-American
theory of science. The frustration thereby caused to practitioners of the
human sciences was well illustrated in the science wars, an acrimonious
dispute involving natural scientists, sociologists of science, researchers in
the humanities, and others that arose in the mid-1990s.20  As many natu-
ral scientists saw it, the science wars were provoked by persistent attacks
36 James W. McAllister
by literary and social theorists on the claims of the natural sciences to ob-
jectivity and rationality. Some critics of science may indeed have been
motivated by a wish to undermine the prestige of the natural sciences;
most, however, saw themselves as applying the standard tools of the cul-
tural and social sciences to the assumptions and methods of the natural
sciences.21
Both of the principal sides in the science wars were guilty of ignorance
and lack of comprehension. The sociologists and practitioners of the hu-
man sciences often exhibited inadequate understanding of the findings
and methods of the natural sciences. Through lack of expertise, they dis-
played a tendency to sweeping generalization and committed elementary
blunders that undermined their standpoint. The natural scientists, for
their part, showed equal ignorance of the specificity and traditions of the
human sciences, and a tendency to question the legitimacy of these disci-
plines on the grounds of their difference from the natural sciences.
Natural scientists often – justifiably – insist that outsiders gain exper-
tise in the technical aspects of their disciplines before discussing them.
However, they usually feel no reluctance to address issues in the human
sciences without gaining expertise in the approaches and methods specific
to those disciplines.
4 Diversity of Approaches in Historiography and
Anthropology
Let us now turn from theorists of science to the practice of scientists.
Whereas theorists of science often work from abstract first principles and
propose clear and coherent conceptual schemes for a discipline, practi-
tioners usually develop a variety of partly unanalyzed, context-specific
methods in a pragmatic and even opportunistic manner. Our aim is to
ascertain briefly how some of these methods relate to and embody the his-
torical and structural approaches discussed in the theoretical debates.
We start in this section with historiography and anthropology. These
disciplines exhibit a wide variety of approaches. We may tentatively ar-
range historiographic approaches along a spectrum depending on their
attitude towards generalization.
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At one extreme we find the genre of microhistory, an attempt to develop an
understanding of history through seemingly small, individual episodes.
Among the works that contributed to create this genre are Natalie Zemon
Davis’s The Return of Martin Guerre, a story of everyday life in the six-
teenth-century Pyrenees, and Carlo Ginzburg’s The Cheese and the Worms,
a reconstruction of the mental world of Menocchio, a sixteenth-century
Italian miller who was investigated by the Inquisition for his view that life
arises in the universe spontaneously like worms in cheese.22  In these
works, no person or event is regarded as typical or representative of any
class: the particular is not made to stand for the general.
A greater willingness to proceed from particular events to general
themes is shown by the Annales school. Members of this school combine
an interest in long-term historical trends with a concentration on depth
and the microcosm. The former is visible in Fernand Braudel’s The Medi-
terranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, which ap-
peared in 1949. The latter is evident in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s chron-
icle of the daily happenings in the village of Montaillou, in southern
France, inhabited by some 25 peasants, during a period of thirty years at
the beginning of the fourteenth century.23
An alternative strategy to bridge the gap between individual historical
events and general trends is followed by quantitative social history. This
genre sacrifices the qualitative aspects in order to study specific numerical
parameters of populations, such as family size, age at marriage, life expect-
ancy, and income.
At the other extreme of the spectrum of historiographic approaches, we
find attempts to capture what is described as a supreme principle, essence,
esprit or Geist of history. These attempts lead to a kind of philosophical
commentary or reflection on human history. In this approach, documen-
tation is subordinated to generality. It provides compact and broad formu-
lations and aims at unearthing the grand principles behind historical oc-
currences. Indeed, some authors in this tradition set out to describe hu-
mankind as a whole rather than individual peoples or cultures. It is
exemplified by the works of G.W.F. Hegel, who in his Philosophy of History
gives an account of history as the progression in what he called the con-
sciousness of freedom.24  Marxist historiography also pursues this style.
Historical materialism is an account of history that identifies an underly-
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ing structure in historical events: the dialectic between forces of produc-
tion (such as energy sources, machines, and production processes) and
relations of production (constituted mainly by the pattern of ownership of
the productive forces). This dialectic underlies and unifies the entirety of
human history. It yields, for example, a succession of social formations:
the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and bourgeois modes of production.
The extremes of this spectrum of historiographic approaches are rarely
combined in a single work. One partial exception is Voltaire’s Essai sur les
mœurs et l’esprit des nations, published in 1769. As its title hints, this work
contains the seeds of two approaches to historiography. In one respect,
Voltaire emphasizes the mœurs or customs of nations, which are variable,
particular, and plural. In the other, he emphasizes the esprit or spirit of
nations, which are unchanging and essential characteristics of peoples.25
A similar variety of approaches is found in twentieth-century anthro-
pology. At one extreme, we find structuralism, which Claude Levi-Strauss
introduced to anthropology, partly following the ideas of Ferdinand de
Saussure in linguistics. Structuralism advocates analyzing large-scale sys-
tems, ranging from human languages and cultural practices to folktales
and literary texts, by examining the relations and functions of the constitu-
ent elements of such systems.
Structuralism is characterized by its willingness to propound general
laws accounting for the underlying organizing patterns of phenomena. In
literary studies, for example, structuralism has been applied to the field of
narratology, or the study of narratives of all forms. Structuralist narratolo-
gists analyze the systematic features and functions of narratives, attempt-
ing to isolate a finite set of rules to account for the infinite set of real and
possible narratives. As a result of its demotion of the person, or subject,
structuralism is sometimes regarded as antihumanistic.
At the other extreme, we find functionalism, introduced by Bronislaw
Malinowski. This school stresses the purposive nature of institutions in
society. The purpose of an institution is derived from the particular culture
of that society, which is a unique whole. Institutions can therefore be un-
derstood only in terms of their own culture. It is impossible to establish
functional equivalence between institutions in different societies; even the
cross-cultural comparison of institutions is doomed to failure.26
Johan Galtung proposes a new view of the difference between idio-
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graphic and nomothetic approaches. In the view of Weber and others, as
we have seen, the two approaches arise from two alternative goals of sci-
ence, interpretation and explanation. Galtung suggests instead that the
choice between the two approaches is determined by the breadth of scope
– in Galtung’s phrase, the extent of the “contiguous space-time region” –
that the scientist wishes to treat.27  Galtung endorses Windelband’s and
Rickert’s view that idiographic and nomothetic science are complementa-
ry. As he puts it, idiographic science provides more realistic explanations
of the singular case, i.e., explanations that take into account a larger
number of relevant causal factors; nomothetic science, because it surveys a
larger scope, can develop categories that are meaningful in a wider context.
Thanks to this complementarity, the two approaches can collaborate:
nomothetic science can give idiographic science heuristic guides towards
particulars of theoretical interest, while idiographic science can provide
empirical data to test the hypotheses of nomothetic science.
The dominant research programme in anthropology today is generally
known as interpretive social science.28  One of its principal practitioners is
Clifford Geertz, who is concerned with reconstructing the mentalities and
conceptual frameworks of peoples as local and historically contingent cre-
ations. The “thick description” that Geertz advocates is description that
draws to the fullest possible extent on the categories in which the agents
themselves described and interpreted events and actions. Geertz mounts a
“critique of conceptions which reduce matters to uniformity, to homoge-
neity, to likemindedness, to consensus”, preferring instead to open things
up “to divergence and multiplicity, to the non-coincidence of kinds and
categories”.29
This brief survey of styles of work in historiography and anthropology
reveals the following. The practice of these disciplines is more highly var-
ied than the theorists of either the Verstehen school or Anglo-American
philosophy of science acknowledge. Nonetheless, the tension between the
historical and the structural approaches, and the difficulty of reconciling
the two approaches in a coherent manner, are clearly experienced by prac-
titioners. Most of the historians mentioned in this section adopt what I
have dubbed the historical approach. They show little proclivity to uncover
general and necessary constraints and regularities; although some are in-
terested in identifying historical trends, they regard these as being as con-
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tingent and particular as the events of which they consist. A minority of
writers – who perhaps cannot immediately be classed as professional his-
torians, but who are unmistakably engaged in a historiographic project –
see history as an unfolding of a grand scheme. These writers, including
Hegel and Marx, apply the structural approach to their subject. They feel
that to the extent that history exhibits any contingent events, these events
are what is least important and revealing about the human experience.
Regularity and necessity underlie the historical record.
What of anthropology? Some members of this discipline have been
willing to posit universal principles of human societies and cultures. How-
ever, the dominant anthropological stance today is antagonistic towards
such attempts. Instead, practitioners of interpretive social science adopt a
relativist attitude, wishing to achieve understanding of the experience of
persons and peoples, but not by explaining it. Integration of the historical
and structural approaches has not hitherto featured prominently on the
agenda of historiography and anthropology.
5 Historical and Structural Approaches in the Modern Life
Sciences
The natural sciences have acquired a dominant position in the present-day
system of the sciences, especially in Anglo-American culture, as we saw in
section 3; the human sciences have been allocated a subordinate position.
The approach is regarded as paradigmatic of the natural sciences, which
seeks to provide explanations of events on the basis of universal laws, and
is thus seen as defining scientific status. The approach typical of the hu-
man sciences, in which one seeks to attain interpretative understanding of
particulars, is compared unfavourably with the structural approach.
The dominance of the structural approach not only manifests itself in
the tension between the natural and the human sciences, but also affects rela-
tions within the family of the natural sciences. The natural sciences are not
all alike, as Windelband and other participants in the nineteenth-century
debate realized. Some natural sciences make more use of laws of nature
than others. The number of laws formulated by a natural science is often
taken as a measure of its status and degree of development. This tendency
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found its fullest expression in Comte’s hierarchy of the sciences, in which
astronomy and physics occupy the summit while lower levels contain in-
creasingly qualitative sciences. The same view is found strongly among
natural scientists themselves. The assumption is frequently voiced that a
genuine natural science is a law-formulating science, and that branches of
science in which few or no laws are formulated are either immature or
unsatisfactory.
In his inaugural lecture as professor of Natural Philosophy at the
University of Glasgow in 1846, for example, William Thomson (later
named Lord Kelvin) set out the scope of his subject matter:
In the study of external nature, the first stage is the description and classification of
facts observed with reference to the various kinds of matter of which the properties are
to be investigated; and this is the legitimate work of Natural History. The
establishment of general laws in any province of the material world, by induction from
the facts collected in natural history, may with like propriety be called Natural
Philosophy.30
Similarly, James Clerk Maxwell drew a distinction among three classes of
sciences: “abstract” sciences constituted by the various branches of mathe-
matics, “morphological and biological” sciences, and physical sciences, to
which he attributed a position intermediate between the other two classes.
About the morphological and biological sciences, Maxwell wrote:
Sciences of this kind are rich in facts, and will be well occupied for ages to come in the
co-ordination of these facts, though their cultivators may be cheered in the meantime
by the hope of the discovery of laws like those of the more abstract sciences, and may
indulge their fancy in the contemplation of a state of scientific knowledge when
maxims cast in the same mould as those which apply to our present ideas of dead
matter will regulate all our thoughts about living things.31
The positivist imagery of a hierarchy of the sciences endured in the twenti-
eth century. C.F.A. Pantin portrays the hierarchy as extending from “ex-
act” sciences at the top to “descriptive” sciences at the bottom:
In our everyday consideration of them, the sciences are apt to be taken as though they
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could be placed in a linear series. Mathematics and physics are at the top and the
others are arranged down the rungs of the ladder up which they are proceeding as they
become more exact – as in a dice-game. So-called descriptive science, such as
taxonomy, stand at the bottom, still waiting for a lucky throw.32
Notwithstanding the widely held view of disciplines steadily climbing the
ladder from historical particulars towards universal laws of nature, the
aims and methods of the natural sciences exhibit a great diversity. Of most
interest in this context is the interplay of and competition between the
historical and structural approaches in scientific disciplines. We need to
examine the extent to which this interplay falls short of integration, and
the reasons for this shortfall.
The interplay between historical and structural approaches emerges in
various sciences. One of these is cosmology. On the one hand, cosmolo-
gists have a strong sense of natural law and its role in the development of
the universe. On the other hand, the fact that we have empirical access to
just one universe turns cosmology to some degree into the study of a
unique historical individual. In the case of the universe, the distinction
between general and necessary features on the one hand and particular
and contingent features on the other becomes largely arbitrary. 33  The ten-
sion is perhaps greatest in the discussion of the initial conditions of the big
bang. In some theories, these are irreducible to laws of nature and must
simply be described as historical contingencies; in other theories, the ini-
tial conditions of the universe obtained necessarily. The tension between
these approaches is reflected in cosmological writings: cosmologists often
portray their discipline as the study of the effects of natural laws in the
broadest setting possible, but some accounts of the early universe are writ-
ten in a historical style, and resemble the biography of a historical person-
age.34
A second interesting case, on which we will focus in more detail, is
biology. The life sciences show great variety, including branches as diverse
as molecular biology and phylogenetic systematics. On the one hand, life
scientists have formulated a number of statements called “laws”, includ-
ing Mendel’s laws and the Hardy-Weinberg law in population genetics; on
the other hand, the phylogenetic tree has many characteristics of a histori-
cal individual.35
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In the life sciences, consequently, the interplay between the historical and
structural approaches is very evident. Organisms and their forms seem to
lend themselves to being studied both as the consequences of laws of nature
and as a historical phenomenon. This fact was apparent to one of the protag-
onists of the nineteenth-century German debate about the methods of the
Geisteswissenschaften, Windelband. He argued that organic nature can be both
nomothetically systematized and studied as a singular development:
The science of organic nature constitutes the classical example of this phenomenon of
transposition. As a taxonomy or a systematic science, it has a nomothetic character,
insofar as the invariable types of organisms which have been observed during the last
few thousand years may be represented as the nomological form of these organisms.
Consider, however, the subject matter of the biological sciences as evolutionary history
in which the entire sequence of terrestrial organisms is represented as a gradually
formative process of descent or transformation which develops in the course of time.
There is neither evidence nor even a likelihood that this same organic process has been
repeated on some other planet. In this case, the science of organic nature is an
idiographic or historical discipline.36
At first sight, one might expect biology therefore to be an especially fertile
terrain of cooperation between the historical and structural approaches.
The truth is that such cooperation has proved very difficult to implement.
As a result, some branches of the life sciences during certain historical
periods have applied the historical approach virtually exclusively, whereas
others have endorsed the structural approach.
In the twentieth century, the tension between the historical and structur-
al approaches has been strongest in accounts of the morphology of organ-
isms in evolutionary theory and developmental theory. The dominant ap-
proach towards morphology has been Darwinian evolutionary theory. In
the orthodox interpretation, Darwinian theory regards the diversification
of life forms as an irremediably contingent process, driven by random
mutations and natural selection. This view of morphology is defended to-
day by, for example, Stephen J. Gould, who argues that evolution would
yield very different outcomes if it were ever replicated under similar envi-
ronmental conditions. Gould proposes a thought experiment to establish
this conclusion:
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I call this experiment “replaying life’s tape”. You press the rewind button and, making
sure you thoroughly erase everything that actually happened, go back to any time and
place in the past – say, to the seas of the Burgess shale. Then let the tape run again and
see if the repetition looks at all like the original.37
Gould believes that every replay of the tape would yield an entirely differ-
ent but equally sensible outcome.
Alongside the classic Darwinian approach, there is a long tradition of
attempts to uncover systematic and structural principles underlying the
morphology of organisms. These attempts were pursued energetically in
Romantic biology, and achieved interesting results in the early twentieth
century at the hands of biologists such as D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson
and Anne Arber.38  As Thompson makes clear, he believes in the existence
of laws of biological form that largely account for the morphology of organ-
isms in the evolutionary record:
Cell and tissue, shell and bone, leaf and flower, are so many portions of matter, and it
is in obedience to the laws of physics that their particles have been moved, moulded,
and conformed [ . . . ]. Their problems of form are in the first instance mathematical
problems, their problems of growth are essential physical problems, and the
morphologist is, ipso facto, a student of physical science.39
In recent years, the structural approach has been defended by researchers
in the field of complexity studies, including Brian C. Goodwin and Stuart
A. Kauffman.40  Writers in this discipline are convinced of the existence of
deep structural laws that constrain the emergence and diversification of
life surprisingly tightly. They argue that the evolution of organisms, while
partly contingent, takes place in a field of possibilities constrained by fun-
damental laws of nature and by many higher-level morphological princi-
ples. These principles produce attractors in gene space, which powerfully
constrain and influence the development of species. As a result, the view
of evolution provided by Darwinian theory is no longer entirely adequate.
Goodwin challenges Gould’s interpretation of the “replaying life’s tape”
thought experiment:
Suppose you reran the Big Bang. What are the chances of getting the same periodic
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table of natural elements, the same ninety-two combinations of protons, neutrons,
and electrons? Pretty good, or so I’m led to believe. I think of a rerun of the Cambrian
explosion in the same way, not to the same extent perhaps, but as an image. If there
are dynamical attractors in the space of morphological possibilities, as I believe, then
a rerun of the Cambrian explosion would produce a world much more like the one we
know than Steve Gould says. It wouldn’t be identical to the one we know, but there
may be a lot of similarities.41
The historical and structural approaches cast the similarities of organisms
in different lights. In particular, the historical approach attributes eviden-
tial significance to the similarity of organisms that, on the structural ap-
proach, it does not have. For example, the similarity of fossil fauna and
flora in South America, Africa, India, Australia, and Antarctica is cited as
evidence for the theory of continental drift. This similarity offers evidential
support if organisms develop historically and contingently. If, on the other
hand, the morphology of organisms is determined to a large extent by
structural constraints, the similarity of fauna and flora on continents sepa-
rated by oceans loses much of its evidential weight in support of the theory
of continental drift.
The outside observer might conclude that both approaches to morpho-
logical form are partly valid: organisms are the product both of laws of
form and of natural selection. However, it has proved difficult to integrate
the historical and structural approaches in the life sciences without falling
into traditional oppositions, as the persistence of unproductive “nature
versus nurture” debates demonstrates. A more promising recent attempt
goes under the name of “developmental systems theory”. This approach
views ontogeny as contingent cycles of interaction among a varied set of
developmental resources, no one of which controls the process. These fac-
tors include DNA, cellular and organismic structure, and social and eco-
logical interactions.42
6 Conclusion: Classification and Integration
The history of the sciences exhibits an enduring debate between the histor-
ical and structural approaches. Each approach has an impressive record of
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accomplishment. Our historical survey may lead readers to the following
conclusions.
The universe is the product of two elements: a structural element and a
historical element. The structural element determines the set of physically
possible worlds within which the actual universe finds itself; the historical
element determines which of these physically possible worlds, and in what
order of succession, the universe comes to instantiate in its development.
The structural element may be identified with the fundamental laws of
nature, which impose constraints on the development of the universe and
determine what events and structures there may be. The historical ele-
ment may be identified with a path through this field of possibilities,
which determines which of the events and structures allowed by the laws
of nature become actual.
For example, the fundamental laws of nature determine which elemen-
tary particles may exist and thus determine that, for example, an iron atom
is a stable physical structure. However, they do not determine that an iron
atom comes to form part of a particular chemical structure: this is deter-
mined by the historical development of the universe.
An understanding of the universe requires knowledge of and reference
to both the structural and the historical elements determining its develop-
ment. The development of the universe would seem arbitrary and improba-
ble without full reference to the laws of nature that constrain its possibilities;
on the other hand, it would seem underdetermined and inexplicable without
reference to its historical trajectory. Together, the structural and historical
approaches are capable of giving a complete account of the universe.
These conclusions hold not only for the investigation of the universe in
its entirety, but for the study of all objects. The universe exhibits many
levels of organization, ranging from elementary particles to human socie-
ties and cultures. Each of these levels of organization has its own structur-
al principles, which in part are determined by the principles of lower levels
and in part arise as emergent properties. The principles on each level de-
termine the range of possibilities and provide attractors that influence the
organization of that level. Within the scope of these principles, historical
evolution determines the actual development that a system on a particular
level undergoes.43
Is the view of the world and of science sketched in the previous few
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paragraphs a realistic prospect or an utopia? Structural considerations
may encourage the belief that it is the former: historical experience sug-
gests that it may be the latter. On abstract grounds, the proposal that the
structural and historical approaches should collaborate in enriching our
understanding of the world and in furthering science sounds plausible
and sensible. An acquaintance with the history of ideas, on the other hand,
cautions that such integration has evaded scientists for the past 150 years.
Indeed, the present system of the sciences is to some extent the product of
the segregation of scholars into groups that practise one of the approaches
to the neglect of the other.
Is it worth redoubling our efforts to realize the integration of the histor-
ical and structural approaches? The endpoint is tantalizing: a new order-
ing of knowledge in which the identity of the present-day scientific disci-
plines will be subordinated to the integration of structural and historical
elements. In some disciplines, such as biology and the human sciences,
this will mean that the dominant historical approach will have to be
amended and new techniques developed to study structural elements; in
other disciplines, such as physics, it will necessitate a re-evaluation of the
role of historical development within the existing structuralist framework,
from which the temporal dimension has hitherto been largely banned.
This development will have particular consequences for the demarca-
tion of the natural and the human sciences. If it is true that structural
elements underpin and constrain creativity in the arts, then no university
programme in the human sciences will be complete without a study of the
physical, physiological, and evolutionary context in which an art form de-
velops. This study will have to reveal what range of possibilities is open to
that art form, before the historical study can explore which part of that
range has actually been exploited. The study of the human sciences will
thus come to acquire some traits associated with the natural sciences.
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1 For an introduction to the German debate on the human sciences leading up to
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McAllister (1997).
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21 On the discipline of social studies of science, see Fuller (1994); Fuller (2000).
22 Davis (1983); Ginzburg (1983). On the genre of microhistory, see also Levi (1991).
23 Le Roy Ladurie (1978).
24 Hegel (1837).
25 On these two approaches in historiography and their origins, see Kroeber and
Kluckhohn (1952), pp. 145-146.
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26 Goldschmidt (1966); Berry (1969).
27 Galtung (1967).
28 For an introduction to interpretive social science, see Rabinow and Sullivan
(1988); Scott and Keates (2001). See also Little (1990).
29 Geertz (1998), p. 107. See also Geertz (1973), esp. pp. 3-32; Geertz (1983).
30 Quoted from S. P. Thompson (1910), vol. 1, p. 240. On the placing of natural
history at the bottom of the hierarchy of the sciences, see Brush (1978).
31 Maxwell (1885), p. 2.
32 Pantin (1968), p. 24.
33 For discussion of the implications of the uniqueness of the universe for
cosmology, see McCrea (1970).
34 Weinberg (1977).
35 For a discussion of laws in population genetics, see Ruse (1977), pp. 89-113.
Further defences of the existence of laws in biology are given by Mayr (1982), pp.
37-43; Mayr (1985), pp. 53-54; Ghiselin (1988), pp. 469-470.
36 Windelband (1894), p. 176.
37 Gould (1989), pp. 48 and 287. See also Gould (1999). For further discussion of
Gould’s historiographical approach, see McRae (1993).
38 Lenoir (1987); Cunningham and Jardine (1990).
39 D. W. Thompson (1942), p. 10.
40 Goodwin (1994); Goodwin and Webster (1996); Kauffman (1995); Kauffman
(2000). See also Ball (1998).
41 Quoted in Lewin (1999), p. 74.
42 An overview of developmental systems theory is provided by Oyama et al. (2001).
43 Elements of this view are to be found in Oppenheim and Putnam (1958).
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The Role of Laws and Contingency
in History 1
Diedel Kornet
It was a great pleasure to study James McAllister’s essay, not in the least
because he discusses the development of the sciences from the perspective
of their internal dynamics. Moreover, as a matter of fact, I found myself
largely in agreement with his conclusions. But it is my task to start a criti-
cal debate, so that is what I will set out now to do by focussing on three
main points.
1 The historical element determines the actual world not
only by contingent events and processes but by
instantiation of laws as well
The conclusion of McAllister is that
“The structural element determines the set of physically possible worlds within which
the actual universe finds itself; the historical element determines which of these
physically possible worlds, and in what order of succession, the universe comes to
instantiate in its development.”
I support the image of the actual universe as one instantiated out of the
many possible universes, but it is not clear how this historical element deter-
mines it. In the introduction, McAllister states that in the historical ap-
proach “the world comes to have the structure that it has as a result of contin-
gent historical events and processes”. But it is not true that all historical events
and processes are contingent. While general laws (McAllister’s structural
element) are not bound to time and space, the events and processes that
they determine (instantiations of laws, as we call them) most certainly are.
Let us take two examples.
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On 1 January 2002 we witnessed the introduction of the euro. This
historical event took place on the organizational level of societies. In their
account of this phenomenon, sociologists, economists and political
scientists can refer only to a limited number of generalized patterns,
because their disciplines have been unable to discover many. Most of their
account will contain descriptions of contingent events and processes.
The generalized patterns that are available are not powerful enough to
predict with any plausibility the date of the next international currency
transition.
Our second example concerns the total solar eclipse of 11 August
|1999. This historical event took place on the organizational level of plane-
tary systems. In their account of this phenomenon, astronomers need
to refer simply to the law of gravitation of which this event is an instantia-
tion. The same law of nature enables them to predict many further
total solar eclipses; the next one will be on 4 December 2002, visible in
Australia.
Structural Approach Historical Approach
I IIA IIB
Generalized pattern; Instantiated Contingent
laws and regularities generalized pattern  events and processes
Examples of historical events
1 Introduction of the euro o ooooo
2 Solar eclipse oooooo
Kant, Comte
3 Physics oooooo
4 Human Sciences oooooo
5 Interpretative persp. o oooo
Future development
6 Physics ooooo ooo o
7 Biology oooo oooo oooo
8 Human Sciences o ooo ooooo
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So, the historical element determines which of the physical possible worlds
instantiates both by contingency and by instantiated laws and regularities. For a
proper further discussion of the position of the different sciences, I denote the
structural approach category I (generalized pattern). I introduce two subcategories
for the historical approach; category IIA (instantiated generalized pattern), which I
have just added to the discussion, and category IIB (contingent events and processes),
which is McAllister’s original historical approach. For an overview of the categories
and the positioning of the two examples of historical events, see the table entries 1
and 2.
2 The Interpretative Perspective of the Human Sciences is
not an example of McAllister’s historical approach (IIB).
It fits categories I (generalized pattern) and IIA
(instantiated generalized pattern) instead
Kant regarded historical knowledge as purely contingent and disqualified
it as scientific for that reason. To the positivist Comte, the maturity of a
discipline hinged on its ability to go beyond the description of mere facts
by the formulation of laws of nature. The ability of formulating laws, that
is using the structural approach in McAllister’s terms (category I), was for
Kant and Comte the criterion to grant scientific status to disciplines. Phys-
ics (positioned in category I) ranked high, and the Human Sciences (posi-
tioned in category IIB; McAllister’s original historical approach) ranked
low (see table entries 3 and 4).
It will now be interesting to look into the defence of the 19th-century
German scholars against the devaluation of the Human Sciences by the
criteria of Kant and Comte, as described by McAllister. How did they de-
fend their disciplines against the charge of lack of natural laws? McAllister
portrays these German scholars as proponents of the historical approach
(IIB). One should therefore expect them to embrace historical contingency
and the inability to go beyond the facts, and to show that descriptions are
respectable scientific outcomes as well.
But that is not at all what happened. They also wanted to go beyond the
mere observed facts, or in other words to escape category IIB in which they
were placed by Kant and Comte (see table entry 5). The scholars invoked an
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Interpretative Perspective in which they proposed structural elements as
alternatives to laws of nature, and thereby positioned the Interpretative
Perspective in the structural approach (I). But they also stressed the impor-
tance of focussing on the particular instantiations of those general pat-
terns, and thereby positioned the Interpretative Perspective in the histori-
cal approach IIA. It is in this sense that some of the proponents classified
this perspective as Historicism. To treat the Interpretative Perspective as
an example of his original historical approach (IIB) as McAllister does is
not justified.
What is the general pattern invoked by the Interpretative Perspective?
As McAllister explains, the Interpretative Perspective puts intentionality at
centre-stage. Cultural phenomena are to be understood above all by refer-
ence to the intentions, beliefs, and meanings. This understanding is possi-
ble by virtue of a presupposed general internal mental pattern (such as
rationality) which enables us by means of our empathic epistemological
capacity to interpret human actions. Ranke recommends cultivation of
empathy; for Dilthey, the human spirit and its acts can be understood only
from the inside; Simmel refers to our ability to identify ourselves with oth-
ers; according to Windelband, we may rely on our informal insight and
intuition; and finally, according to Weber, to achieve an interpretative un-
derstanding of patterns of social action, we may initially ascribe to others a
rationality identical to our own.
It is perhaps debatable whether the internal mental pattern counts as a
valid structural element alongside the laws of nature. But valid or not, the
Interpretative Perspective, in the campaign to stop scientific devaluation,
puts great effort into going beyond the descriptions of mere contingent
facts of which they were accused.
3 The sciences will always differ in their capacity to
formulate laws because they study different levels of
organization
In his conclusion, McAllister recommends that each scientific discipline
integrate the structural approach and the historical approach. Physics
should pay more attention to the historical element and Biology and the
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Human Sciences to the structural element. This suggests the possibility
that all of the various sciences could become similar. Is there indeed hope
to overcome Comte’s hierarchy of the sciences based on their law-formu-
lating capacity for which he, after all, argued on debatable historical, logi-
cal, and perfectionist grounds?
No, there is not. The potential to formulate general laws and mecha-
nisms will always differ among the sciences for ontological reasons. The
objects of study of the different sciences are at different levels of organiza-
tion. During the development of the universe, these levels of organization
emerged in chronological order with increasing complexity. Out of the in-
teraction of elementary particles, stable configurations of such particles
emerged, which we now call atoms. From the interaction of atoms, there
emerged the next organizational level, that of molecules, the autocatalytic
interaction among a number of which in turn gave rise to the level of living
systems. Subsequent levels are those of species and societies.
Each level of organization has a fixed number of possible stable config-
urations (determined by the laws of nature) of which at a particular mo-
ment only a number are actualized. At the atomic level virtually all possible
atomic configurations (described by the atomic theory) have become actu-
alized: almost all elements of the Periodic Table now exist. At the molecu-
lar level, however, far fewer than all possible stable molecular configura-
tions are realized at this moment. The possible stable configurations of
atoms are relatively few because of the limited number of logically possible
combinations of three kinds of elementary particles within an atom, to-
gether with the physical constraint of an upper limit to the proton number.
At the level of molecules, the number of possible stable configurations
increases enormously because of the many logically possible combina-
tions of the more than one hundred different kinds of atoms within a mol-
ecule, many of which are physically stable. If at each subsequent organiza-
tional level the number of stable configurations rises with an accelerating
number of logically possible combinations, of which many are physically
possible, we may expect an ever smaller proportion of actualized entities
compared with the number of possible ones.
A decreasing proportion of filled possible configurations at levels of
organization of increasing complexity has important implications for the
possibility of discovering general patterns. While virtually all possible at-
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oms can be studied and compared in reality, so few of all possible societies
have become instantiated that it is very difficult to formulate general state-
ments about them. When only a small number of the possible entities
have been instantiated, the attention becomes focussed on why the ones
which are there made it, and on the idiosyncrasies of their behavior. It is
contingent on which of the possible stable configurations (determined by
the laws of nature) have made it in history. Researchers in disciplines stud-
ying entities of the higher levels of organization therefore find themselves
heavily occupied with describing the historical path of origin of their spe-
cies or societies and their particular behavior. If only we knew one more
form of biological evolution; what a feast it would then become to general-
ize over living systems.
So the capacity of the different scientific disciplines to formulate laws
depends on the level of organization of the objects of their study. A
rehabilitation of the Human Sciences should therefore not have to wait for
the integrative results of paying more attention to the structural element in
the Human Sciences and to the historical element in the Natural Sciences.
Though undoubtedly there is a lot to be gained here, as I fully agree with
McAllister, the capacity of the Human Sciences to formulate laws is neces-
sarily limited. The simple solution is of course that scientific status should
be related not to the level of organization that is studied but to the methods
that a discipline develops appropriate to that level.
In this light, the recommendations about the way in which the develop-
ment of the monodisciplines should take place can be more realistic and,
by virtue of the three categories that we now have available, also more sub-
tle (see table entries 6, 7, 8). For Physics, it is more relevant to invest in the
historical instantiations of the laws of nature (IIA) than in historical, con-
tingent events and processes (IIB). Biology is a candidate to reach a bal-
anced distribution of attention, for which more investment is needed in
studies of generalized patterns (I) and their instantiation (IIA). Human
Sciences should invest modestly in the structural element, the formula-
tion of generalized patterns (I), and more in the historical element, that is,
in the instantiations of the scarce, available patterns (IIA).
But the real challenge lies in the multidisciplinary integration of the
structural approach and the historical approach. To understand the struc-
ture of our world, we need to understand the transitions from one organi-
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zational level to the other, for which we need general laws as much as their
historical instantiations. But we also need to know how the behavior of an
entity at one level is influenced by its constituent parts at lower levels, as
well as by the entities at higher levels of which it forms a constituent part.
At the level of cells, for instance, to explain programmed cell death (apop-
tosis) we should understand not only how the molecular mechanism of
killing a cell works, but also how the organism of which the cell is a part
acquired, for the benefit of its own interests, the capacity to overrule the
interests of the cell. Similarly, electrons of atoms that are part of a cyclic
molecule or of a biomolecule such as chlorophyll in a living cell behave
differently from electrons in free atoms.
At this moment, the Life Sciences form a center of multidisciplinary
action. Questions about living systems are now tackled not only by biolo-
gists but also by chemists, physicists, mathematicians, computer scien-
tists, and even astrobiologists. In their interaction, levels of organization
are crossed incessantly, and their research programs broadly cover each of
the structural and historical categories. New educational programs such as
Life Science & Technology, born out of the collaboration between the Uni-
versity of Leiden and the Technical University Delft, train students in a
combination of these disciplines from the outset. The new form of science
advocated by James McAllister in which the structural and historical ap-
proaches become integrated may well develop from this new and fast de-
veloping multidisciplinary field.
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3 Science and Society in Flux
Johan van Benthem
Abstract.  Science1  is the search for objective systematic
knowledge about any topic outside of, or inside ourselves. It is a
major cultural component of our modern society – both for its
narrower content and for its general attitudes of free thinking and
the values of elightenment which it embodies.
This essay discusses some current problems that threaten the
functioning of science, in its broad cultural role. These fall under
four heading, two internal, two external.
Architecture: We discuss the need for recalibration of the ancien
regime in academia, which the rise of ‘information and cognition’
as a prime example. We make a case for a new matrix organisation
making sure that talent and money flow where they do most good
for the above functions of science.
Bulk: We discuss the overproduction of scientific information, and
the resulting loss of a unified intellectual perspective. Some new
mechanisms are proposed for countering this.
Isolation: We discuss the potential interfaces of science and
society, making a plea for an activist networking stance, involving
more segments of society in intellectual debate.
Ideologies: We point at threats to science arising from current
political and religious ideologies, and the need for defending the
historical achievements of the Enlightenment.
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1 Introduction
This piece is not quite the same after the events of September 11th, 2001.
How important is the problem as originally set by the Hollandse Maat-
schappij today, worrying about the optimal internal organization of the
sciences – at a time when we are forcibly reminded of the power of obscu-
rantist mentalities opposed to the central things that science has stood for
historically? Some years ago, I met a Kurdish colleague, a Muslim from
northern Iraq, who told me about the profound experience of entering the
world of science. It was as if he described my own personal history. Enter-
ing the world of learning is like a benign religious conversion. It involves
learning to think for yourself, rather than accepting things on faith, being
confronted with universal truths that transcend cherished national or reli-
gious myths, and entering a community not bound in space and time of
people of any race, religion, or national background who think likewise.
Becoming a scientist is truly acquiring a second, non-parochial identity
and joining the world, based on respect for the insights and achievements
of others. This may sound overly dramatic to those no-nonsense politi-
cians who view science as the lubricant of modern industry and universi-
ties as the research and development division of the nation. It may also
seem naive to those who merely want to ‘join the West in order to beat it’,
like contemporary religious fundamentalists using the most sophisticated
technologies to spread ignorance rather than light. But in my view, it is
these deeper values underlying research and scholarship that are most
worth preserving and that ultimately are also most important to the gener-
al well-being of our society. Science is not a one-dimensional threat to, or a
neutral technological engine of, Western civilization. Well-understood, it
is an instrument of liberation – and its values and practices form a crucial
defining element of a truly global human culture.
2 Science as culture
Not all is well with modern science. Indeed, both its internal functioning
and its interactions with general society show many signs of strain. But
before discussing the specific concerns of this essay, let us take a prelimi-
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nary tour of our subject. Modern science is a very complex cultural phe-
nomenon, which admits of no simple definition. Its topics range from dai-
ly phenomena around us to the most abstruse corners of the cosmos – and
its practitioners show an anthropological spread from individual scholars
poring over ancient manuscripts to groups of workers in factory-like labo-
ratories. Merely as a point of departure, let me state the aim of science as
the search for objective, general, and systematic knowledge about any subject
whatsoever, within or outside ourselves.
The adjectives deserve some brief elaboration. “Objective’’: we are after
knowledge that is accessible to and can be verified in principle by anyone
on this planet, transcending personal interests, biological background, or
being among the chosen of some religion. “General”: scientific knowledge
is universal and explains the individual facts of our experience, placing
them in a broader understanding of the world. “Systematic”: science is a
system with constantly emerging internal cross-connections, which forms
a source of intellectual dynamics in itself, in addition to the primary chal-
lenges of understanding the world and ourselves. In principle, no topic is
excluded from this enquiry – though one should agree with our Greek
ancestor Aristotle that
it is the hallmark of the educated mind to give no subject more than that intellectual
precision which it requires…
The result of scientific enquiry are culture products such as certified infor-
mation, theories, methods, algorithms, codified in books, papers, ma-
chines, or software: transferable cultural heritage. But more important
than these is the individual and social process. Science works thanks to a
number of individual attitudes of people participating in it (methodical,
abstract, objective), as well as a largely transnational social organization
which provides guarantees for the right kinds of interaction between its
practitioners: criticism, objectification, cooperation across barriers of
many kinds. It is this process which is ultimately the crucial concern. Cul-
tural treasures mean nothing if they no longer correspond to a vital prac-
tice.
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This description may make science too much of an ideal far removed from
our daily practice. The preceding is not meant to suggest that rationality
does not exist also in our daily practices of information, decision-making,
communication, and acting. Such a separation is totally unfounded and
would lead to a dangerous ‘isolation of rationality’. All the above features
of science are natural extrapolations of general human abilities and natu-
ral features of our best behaviour. Humans deliberate, plan, organize, and
interact in many rational ways, whose borderline with scientific procedure
is often permeable. That is precisely why scientific thinking is a typically
human effort, and one which keeps going without artificial pressures.
Still, it often requires an effort beyond following the cosier grooves of
thought:
think systematically, and even more importantly: think for yourself!
In understanding science, there is also a question of purpose. Why do we
do these things? Again, there is a wide range of motives here. Some people
do research as a vocation in itself, having been ‘touched by the grace’ of
some talent plus deep love of insight. Others may be driven by the inter-
ests of their employers, or of getting rich. This mix of motives is ancient,
and it has varied over time. Rather than emphasizing culture production,
society nowadays seems to expect science to cure cancer, produce an ade-
quate defense system, and keep national economies performing at ever
higher levels in a competitive world. These mixed motives are entirely un-
derstandable where funding is concerned, and moreover, they keep sci-
ence exposed to a wide range of useful external challenges. For instance,
many deep issues have arisen in the confrontation of long-term theory and
shorter-term technological concerns – witness the birth of thermodynam-
ics in the 19th century, stimulated by the rapid rise of machines in the
industrial revolution, and that of ‘informatics’ in the 20th century, spurred
by the stormy development of computers. An active social embedding of
science is essential to its functioning as a major cultural activity, but it also
makes for some of its most interesting topics of study.
But social value may also depend on more ethereal benefits. I would
also like to point to some more esthetic or even emotional aspects of sci-
ence at its best. Many people are led to it (I myself certainly was) by a desire
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to see eternal truths behind the fleeting things around us, to experience
beauty in doing so, and sometimes to have experiences with an intellectual
reality that tastes of infinity. In addition, there is a moral appeal to science,
which seems one more value in itself. Once one sets the standards men-
tioned above, the world changes. It becomes hard to believe the ‘revela-
tions’ handed to us by religions, as the light of reason prevails. Moreover,
there is a strong feeling that this ‘commonsense’ is the same for everyone
on this planet, so that science is by its nature opposed to any national or
racial barrier. The remarkable historical fact is that modern science is a
product of developments in many cultures: Greek, Arabic, Asian, and Eu-
ropean. As such, it shows that its commonsense and rationality are not
lifeless Western idols of the modern age, but vital historical ideals unifying
people across cultures. Moreover, there is no facile multiculturalism here,
undermining real achievement. Real science does not put together incom-
patible ‘cultures’ under one blanket of uncritical respect, but strives for
achievements that shine by a common standard.
Any attempt at reorganizing or steering science in its current social
setting should realize the complexity of scientific activity outlined so far,
and moreover, it should make an effort to preserve the broader cultural
values that it embodies and fosters. These have been created over time,
and they have yielded huge side-benefits in addition to insight and profit,
forming the best known counterweight for modern civilization against re-
ligious bigotry and injustice – and one should never take it for granted that
these virtues will continue without support and defense.
3 Problems, internal and external
The sciences form such a vast field that no simple, more specific character-
ization can cover their content or the dominant habitus of their practition-
ers. In many ways, this complex is a vibrant enterprise, producing one
spectacular result after another: the success story continues. But there are
also a number of observable strains across the width of science, reminding
us that we are dealing with a historical achievement whose automatic suc-
cess cannot be taken for granted. Some of these problems are more inter-
nal, others are more external, but all are eventually best understood in the
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context of interactions between science and society. The following set of
issues will be the major concerns in this essay.
First, there seems to be a law of diminishing returns at work. In some
areas, ever greater amounts of technical sophistication are needed to pro-
duce results whose importance does not have the appeal of the past, de-
spite the still passionate rhetoric of the modern high priests. Any concrete
example is bound to be controversial. But I myself believe this verdict is
true for parts of physics, as one moves down the grain size of the universe,
or history, as one moves from studying nth rate authors to their (n+1)st-
rate commentators – or, for that matter, my own field of logic, as the em-
bers of the great foundational age are dying. On the other hand, so far, new
issues have always come up to fill these voids, and physics, history, and
logic certainly have lots of scope for vigorous new themes. Nevertheless,
this inevitable dynamic of topics and challenges inside science does create
clear tensions. For it challenges the existing intellectual and financial pow-
er structure. Thinking in terms of the future of existing fields may not be
an enlightening way of getting at the most exciting intellectual phenome-
na of today! Indeed, here is my first problem:
a straight-jacket: traditional boundaries badly fit intellectual realities
A second major problem would arise on any principle of organization,
however. Increasingly, science fails to produce any coherent intellectual
picture altogether:
b complexity: loss of perspective by over-production of information
Both these problems threaten the broader intellectual role of science as a
way of giving us an unified perspective on the world which can responsibly
influence general culture. Some of these problems are the price of success,
but this does not make them less urgent. In addition, there are external
problems having to do with the interactions between science and society.
One type of problem is still half-internal, involving the increasing grip of
society on the workings of science. Organizational and financial policies
are not neutral: they influence the intellectual climate in many, sometimes
unintended ways. In particular,
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c current project finance generates harmful competition, and threatens
the classical ideals of coherence and credit to others; while ‘intellectual
property’ endangers the disinterest of science.
Thus, even though science encourages intellectual competition (a non-vio-
lent form of conflict, to the benefit of all), non-intellectual forms of compe-
tition are sneaking in through funding schemes. Governments further
national interests, which can be opposed to the non-national goals of sci-
ence, and ‘entrepreneurial universities’ repeat the same even more paro-
chially. These problems threaten the cosmopolitan role of science, as a
unifying and integrating factor through separate communities.
As a final societal problem, I would mention:
d science is mainly perceived as an instrument, or a superior form of
infotainment, to the detriment of its major formative cultural role.
Of course, our educational system is still fed by the universities. But one
cannot really speak of a vigorous intellectual climate and public opinion
informed by science – and the prestige of creative academic work con-
forming to scientific standards seems on the wane. I have no causal expla-
nation to offer here. But it does seem relevant that many modern tenden-
cies in society are opposed to the basic ideas of science! In modern politics,
emotions of segments of the population rather than well-informed opin-
ions seem to be the basic stuff that one ought to respect and soothe. Feel-
ings of hurt or indignation are treated as irreducible facts. But this form of
‘respect’ means giving up on the basic ideas of the Enlightenment, where
informed and educated opinion counts. An accompanying problem is the
relativism in modern political views. If every religion and culture are cor-
rect in its own way – a presupposition of our state-sponsored ideology of
multiculturalism – we are again giving up a key idea underlying science.
For, in an amazing range of phenomena, one finds the opposite. There is
an objective truth, or at least a well-argued original individual opinion, to
be found provided one makes an effort and becomes informed. This objec-
tive truth can be grasped by all human beings, independent of blind ap-
peals to the authority of political leaders, religious prophets, or holy books.
When I asked the person mentioned in my Introduction how long the
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Kurdish nation had existed historically, he smiled and asked me. “Which
answer do you want to hear? The politically correct one which I am sup-
posed to give as a Kurd, or what I really think?” People who can make that
distinction are enlightened! By contrast, it is our duty to scrutinize every
claim made by an appeal to raw feelings or other forms of non-objectifiable
authority in the harshest possible manner.
Now, this list of problems may seem very pessimistic, rather aptly illus-
trating a common observation about academics. They always complain
about lack of funds, lack of recognition, the general stupidity of others –
but they do not spend anything like the same energy on their core busi-
ness: justifying the major investments that contemporary society is al-
ready making in subsidizing their private hobbies. Perhaps this essay has
the same self-centered plaintive ring. But I do see a difference! I am not
complaining about of lack of funding or recognition – and I do not think
individual scientists deserve better treatment than other citizens. And so-
ciety is completely justified in asking for accounts rendered. But even so, I
do think that attention to the above problems, emphasizing longer-term
general intellectual and moral purposes, will help science perform the
most valuable tasks it can for society.
The following sections address the above problems in more detail. Of
course, these do not all have the same cause – but they do reflect the fast
pace of change in modern society. Therefore, one general issue behind all
of them is that of stability. Which structure and modus operandi will be
most effective for science in a fast-changing social environment? Several
such strategies are already at work around us. One is retreat into subcul-
tures, keeping complexity down by shutting out the larger environment.
This happens both in general society and in science. Another strategy is
raising ‘new people’: windvanes without a core, as advocated recently by a
Dutch politician, who said we needed evolution to a New Man capable of
functioning in an environment offering no stability whatsoever. I myself
find the first strategy disappointing, and the second positively obnoxious.
Even so, I do not have a panacea to cure all – but I do try to point at some
structures and procedures guaranteeing more stability and effectiveness
in the current flux of things.
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4 Recalibration, and optimal organization
For a start, let us consider the structure of science as it faces the modern
world. Received ideas on the architecture of science have fluctuated histor-
ically. In science as in general society, quite recent traditions are some-
times defended with excessive zeal as the eternal natural order of things.
The Middle Ages had their old division into Trivium (grammar, dialectic,
and rhetoric) and Quadrivium (music, arithmetic, geometry and astrono-
my). The 19th and 20th centuries introduced such terms as humanities
(Geisteswissenschaften) versus sciences (Naturwissenschaften). As for today’s
landscape, most contemporary Dutch academics have been raised with the
threefold division into alpha (humanities), beta (mathematics and natural
sciences) and gamma (social sciences) – accepting these as intellectual
natural kinds or even genetic subspecies of humanity (people talk about
being born as a typical beta). Such divisions form the basis of high-school
curricula, and thereby help shape the idea of science and intellectual life,
and provide role models for aspiring intellectuals. But this is not a neutral
decision of intellectual geography! Subgroups inside these boundaries so-
lidify and develop a sense of superiority versus others – the proverbial ar-
rogance of physicists being a prime and live example. Thus, people with
talents that do not fit received boundaries (like this author) become ‘eclec-
ticists’, ‘opportunists’, or at best ‘inter-disciplinary types’.
In reality, the criteria underlying the modern intellectual topography of
the universities are diverse, reflecting many historical accidents. For in-
stance, divisions by topic (nature, economics, history) are run together
with independent criteria of method (mathematical or essayistic), which
may not be easy to compare in their impact with the former. This point is
obvious once you reflect on the current tableau of university disciplines
and faculties – and moreover, it will be amply demonstrated by the con-
crete example of information and cognition in Section 5. Let me just state
two claims which we shall return to in more detail below:
a The intellectual realities of science are multi-dimensional, and hence, as
a matter of principle, there is no natural fixed architecture for it.
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This means that, just as with cartographic maps of the world, any one-
dimensional projection into a flat landscape of disjoint faculties is bound
to distort the total intellectual landscape. We can only aim for optimal pro-
jections, as in cartography, plus additional mechanisms compensating for
the remaining distortions, on which more below. In other words, even
‘helpful’ spatial metaphors of organization should be handled with the
greatest care as their tacit presuppositions may be wrong or at least mis-
leading. Moreover, these dimensions are not fixed once and for all. Histor-
ically, they are in obvious flux, and hence
b One must recalibrate the organization of science with a certain
frequency.
But I advocate this recalibration only for the sake of greater long-term sta-
bility. It is not a sign of progress in itself – consider the current reorganiza-
tional mania.
5 A show-case for reorganization: information and
cognition
Recalibration of basic academic divisions seems appropriate at civilized
intervals to give us time to ponder the more permanent trends of the past
– say, once a century. Indeed, the 20th century has a striking new intellec-
tual trend that runs right across the existing sciences, viz. the emergence
of information and cognition as central themes of enquiry. This trend man-
ifests itself in two ways, internal and external, as so often with important
intellectual changes. Here is its internal prong.
Many sciences are seeing the emergence of fundamental themes hav-
ing to do with how humans, machines, and organizations generate and
transform information. This development is happening simultaneously in
many disciplines, right across alpha–beta–gamma boundaries. Informa-
tion flows thanks to the empirical fact that situations are correlated with
others and hence can carry information about them, given the physical
structure of this world. Cognitive agents take advantage of this, as far as
their perceptors reach, and transform these physical structures upward
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into consciously manipulable symbols, or graphics. At the latter end lies
the goal-directed use of information that is typical for human behaviour.
Thus, information use runs a trajectory from physics to logic. But equally
typically, humans organize and modify logical information in larger social
structures, adding another level of complexity but at the same time also
efficiency. Natural language, the typical human medium for conveying in-
formation which developed in our evolution, is at the same time a physical,
logical and social phenomenon. Thus, it will be clear that the information–
cognition perspective cuts right across established disciplines, drawing
them together in new ways along issues concerning the representation,
modification and communication of information. The result is a steady
growth of insights and techniques, including physical information theory,
logical theories of information content and reasoning, computational ac-
counts of intelligent tasks, and linguistic ones of informational structures
in human communication.
Even the simplest episode of language use, that of one person asking a
question and another person giving an answer, demonstrates all these fea-
tures at the same time. Just think: what happens when people communicate?
Truly understanding even such a simple phenomenon – and we all could
do this without any problems – involves a group of fundamental issues:
– What is meaningful information as used by human agents?
– How is it encoded: in language, context, but also visual cues?
– How is this information transmitted during communication?
– What are the complexities of the various processes involved in produc-
ing a message, analyzing and transforming it?
– How to model the broader purposes of communication, involving
goals, decisions, and longer-term strategies?
Specific disciplines that have something of importance to say about these
particular issues include computer science (models of computation, com-
plexity), linguistics (meaningful information, communication), logic and
artificial intelligence (reasoning systems), mathematics (information the-
ory for signals), psychology (perception, memory, learning), economics
(game theory), sociology (information management in organizations).
This range reflects the fact that communication is partly in the heads of
participants, but partly also an irreducibly social phenomenon.
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And communication is just one example: one can just as well think of
reasoning, learning, or other pervasive topics of this kind. This is no conver-
gence just on paper. Many new conferences and scientific organizations
bring together researchers from all these different disciplines, working on
shared interests. Significantly also, when TIME magazine published its
list of the 20 most prominent intellectuals of the last century, three of
those fit perfectly into this trend:
– the mathematician Kurt Gödel,
– the computer science pioneer Alan Turing,
– the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.
This internal scientific trend has its external counterpart in the rapid rise
of information technology and knowledge-based production processes. I
am not going to elaborate on this aspect, as these phenomena are all
around us, starting with the personal computer on which I am typing this
very sentence. Suffice it to say that every scientific issue mentioned in this
section is made more pregnant and vivid by seeing how it emerges in the
setting of electronic communication in all its varieties.
This double aspect is an important engine of progress today, just as it
has been for the natural sciences in the past. More narrowly technological
and broader scientific issues work together in generating many new fun-
damental issues for a natural conglomerate of sciences of information and
cognition – witness the earlier-mentioned examples of thermodynamics
and computer science. Here is a sample of current challenges that come
about in this way. These demonstrate a variety of concerns, running from
empirical to more mathematical ones. Hopefully, it will be clear that these
questions are not just important qua utility, and hence a duty – they are
also hugely exciting, and hence a pleasure!
1 The enigma which nobody understands. Why is cognition so efficient?
(e.g., what has gone on during your grasping of the previous lines of
text?)
2 What is the right way of combining external observation and internal
reasoning, for instance, when agents engage in planning and acting?
3 What is the comparative content of different information carriers, e.g.
symbolic and graphic, and how can they be integrated?
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4 What is efficient social organization for intelligent persons and ma-
chines?
5 Which conservation laws of complexity govern information process-
ing?
6 How can we integrate existing major information paradigms, from
computational ones (Shannon’s channel theory, Kolmogorov complex-
ity) based on the transmission of coded physical signals, to semantic
notions of information that are the main concern of logic and linguis-
tics?
7 What are the mechanisms driving major cognitive activities like learn-
ing?
8 Emergent phenomena: what new levels of information structure arise
with ‘bulk activities’ like the Internet, comparable to the intrinsic laws
for, say, the statistical behaviour of gases over that of individual mole-
cules?
This list is by no means exhaustive. But it does demonstrate a coherent
agenda of scientific questions, which admit of substantial answers. Exist-
ing fields have already amassed a wealth of relevant notions and tech-
niques. The present period is one of intense intellectual ferment. Last year
alone, some 10 major conferences worldwide brought together computer
scientists, logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, social scientists, and
economists interested in creating fundamental theories of rational behav-
iour, cognitive procedures (plans, games), social choice, or various types of
learning. In addition to purely academic impact, improved understanding
of these phenomena will have clear societal repercussions in education,
arts, and commerce.
My conclusions are simply these:
A new category of Information and Cognition science is in the making, driven by both
internal and external forces and cutting right across the traditional structure of
humanities and sciences.
Moreover, this new intellectual category is of an order of magnitude warranting a
revision of the current Entrenched System of disciplines.
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This example of a new category is not unique. In particular, one can extend
the more computational and linguistic perspective of this section with the
more experimental biological and medical insights of modern neurocogni-
tion, emphasizing the actual workings of the human brain. For instance,
the above example of communication extends naturally into experimental
aspects of brain function. Humans are wonderfully hard-wired for com-
munication, ranging from specialized visual recognition of faces of spe-
cies members to ‘resonance’ of motor neurons with a vocabulary of ges-
tures made by others. This broader connection has been sketched admira-
bly in the recent NWO Report “Fruits of Enlightenment”, which maps out
‘Information and Cognition’ in sufficient depth (http://www.nwo.nl/
cognitie) and hence there is no need to repeat that here. Current develop-
ments in the life sciences (biology, psychology) are of the same order of
magnitude, providing even more support for my second conclusion.
A final comment. The example of Information and Cognition has been
highlighted here mainly because it happens to be my own area of activity
as a logician. However, because of its relative freshness and links with
general developments outside of science, it also naturally ties in with some
other recommendations that I would like to make, concerning interactions
between science, general culture, and society.
6 Optimal organization
What follows from the above considerations? There is little that is original
in my proposal for officially recognizing a new intellectual category. In-
deed, many universities in the United States and Europe have already tak-
en the step of setting up faculties or schools of Informatics, that happy
phrase covering so much more than computer science in the narrower
sense, spanning the intellectual range I have advocated. The Netherlands
has been lagging behind in this organizational drive, even though it is a
recognized centre of innovation in many relevant disciplines. But it is
worthwhile thinking about the more general repercussions of such a
move.
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6.1 Optimizing terminology and removing bias
The general point of the earlier discussion is that intellectual reality is many-
dimensional. The idea that all of science can be put into natural disjoint
zones is untenable, as groupings will depend on one’s criteria. But then,
any bias-free discussion must recognize the relative nature of popular
terms like ‘mono-’, ‘inter-’ or ‘trans-disciplinary’. From the viewpoint of
the traditional categories alpha, beta, and gamma, for instance, informa-
tion and cognition are interdisciplinary. But people can be natural wholes
intellectually and yet not fit into this, having rather a uniform characteris-
tic that we might call iota. From an iota-perspective, the world changes:
marginal groups in the modern university suddenly form a coherent envi-
ronment, departments from different faculties belong together (e.g. lin-
guistics, computer science, psychology), and the same holds for the many
students that come in from high school with just the above combination of
interests. This commonality is often overlooked with the blinkers of the
Ancien Regime in the universities or our national agency NWO – thereby
losing both research opportunities and academic talent. Indeed, having an
iota-perspective leads to suspicion in some quarters. I have had to defend
myself in mathematics circles for also having a degree in philosophy – or
just for being able to write fluent prose. For the record: I like mathemati-
cians! Still, this does show how strong the shibboleths of existing profes-
sional groups can be, fortified by many centuries of developing favourite
idiosyncracies.
Here is a simpler illustration of how historical accidents determine our
language and thinking. There is a little local railroad running from Maas-
tricht to Aachen. It is called an international connection in our train sched-
ule, not for any intrinsic feature but because of some point of history doing
little justice to the geography and culture of that region. I emphasize this
point because existing powers in academia ignore it. It is in their interest
to call all newcomers interdisciplines and then insist on the importance of
things like a ‘thorough monodisciplinary training’, meaning, the unques-
tioned primacy of their position. Constant alertness as regards these insid-
ious manners of speaking, organizing, and fund-allotment is an impera-
tive.
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At this point, I hasten to say that many universities, our national Research
Funding Agency NWO, and even our Academy of Arts and Sciences, the
KNAW, are beginning to open up to such broader viewpoints. But the in-
tellectual battle is by no means won.
Even so, new divisions as advocated here are not directed against other
disciplines, even though shifts in pecking order and funding must occur.
For instance, I myself am convinced that models and methods from phys-
ics will play a hugely beneficial role in the iota-sciences. But it is much
better to have this without importing the current power structure of the
physical sciences, with ‘reformed’ physicists being leaders in informatics.
We do not need academic Perestrojka with the nomenklatoera of the Anc-
ien Regime still in place, but rather a genuine revolution with new faces.
Indeed, it may be useful to analyze why established scientific milieus
have proved so resilient, even as their intellectual impetus is running out.
One reason may be that many students prefer living in groups with fixed
norms, defining achievements by unchanging standards and looking
down on other academic groups by bonding prejudices, repeated ad infini-
tum during coffee breaks. Opening up sometimes leads to uncertainty and
aggression, just as in the world at large. In this sense, there may still be
‘interdisciplinary’ minds in a more absolute sense: people who can func-
tion without agoraphobia in a more open system – though we all need
bounds.
6.2 Matrix organization
A many-dimensional structure is typical for many things in life, and one
has to choose some mode of organization to do justice to it. In particular,
any principle of division generates ‘interdisciplinary themes’, even if one
admits Information and Cognition into the council of the Big Four. The
university should have a permanent way of dealing with this. At least two
dimensions need to be institutionalized:
There must be a matrix-structure, with mechanisms across faculties taking care of the
inevitable boundary phenomena.
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A division into faculties is just one flat projection onto a simplistic one-
dimensional map of zones. We need another axis of variation to see more of
the natural groupings, just as in graphing any complex reality. I do not have
further specific proposals to make here, but the matrix structure in the cur-
rent research and teaching institutes at my own University of Amsterdam
offers a promising format. Departments and faculties provide one, long-term
dimension of organization. Institutes, reviewed in 5-year cycles, form a sec-
ond dimension which may cut right across the first – at least in principle – as
natural thematic clusters emerge. One example is my own habitat of the
‘Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation’, which has united research
groups from philosophy, linguistics, mathematics, and computer science for
a decade now. Of course, one must make sure this two-dimensional freedom
is appreciated and maintained – even when it comes at a cost in terms of
financial complexity and less well-demarcated bureaucratic turf. (As for the
originality of this essay at this point – saying something positive about one’s
own university should count as a revolutionary innovation in The Nether-
lands.) Another model that intrigued me was one from Delft University (A.J.
Berkhout, ‘Universitair Besturingsmodel’, December 2000) which takes an
architectural engineering approach from systems theory. If nothing else,
such approaches are very useful for shaking up entrenched traditions. Final-
ly, the same explicit matrix organization applied to teaching gives us a better
way of searching for available clusters of talent in the student population and
of interfacing with society.
Once the revision based on the experience of the 20th century has been
put in place, however, I have another recommendation to make:
keep whatever system is chosen stable for a long time!
7 Quantity of information +  project finance =  fragmentation
7.1 Information overload and fragmentation
As we are recalibrating universities, we encounter further problems which
affect whatever intellectual geography we choose. A well-known danger is
specialization, breaking the unity of science and threatening its impact on
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general culture. This waste of effort and talent is ever-present. The stand-
ard response that even the most abstruse pieces of science have always
found spectacular applications later in history is a wild generalization
from a very small number of success stories! But today’s new problems
aggravate these long-recognized ones. One insidious new case is a coun-
terpart to the ‘information infarct’ which already afflicts our general socie-
ty. There is so much information around that people often absorb none.
The overproduction of information in science threatens the old ideals.
Nowadays, it is impossible for professors to really have an intellectual grip
on their field of expertise worldwide and to do justice to what others have
achieved. More pregnantly, dissertations used to have the aim of adding
something original to the field while doing full justice to existing relevant
achievements by others. While still paying lip-service to this ideal of broad
scholarship and global fairness, which is slipping between our fingers, the
reality that scientists live in is already completely different. Dissertations
often contain the minimum number of references needed to avoid criti-
cism from competitors in one’s narrower research environment – and re-
searchers often hide in specialized, manageable research communities,
without a view on the whole. Thus, the idea of assigning proper credit on a
worldwide scale and fairness with respect to others’ achievements is under
heavy pressure. Here is a side-effect. Universities still maintain the fiction
of getting balanced international judgments ‘representative of the field’
when making senior appointments of professors as high priests of the pro-
fession. But despite effusive letters of praise piling up in huge files, who
checks that the referees themselves are representative of the field?
I am not claiming any originality for the above observation. A current
strategic report from NWO even listed the overproduction problem as the
key scientific challenge to be met. Perhaps NWO feels this most acutely as
no one in its offices can even try to understand what one year of their
financing has actually produced. But worse, organizations like this may
themselves be part of the problem:
scientific fragmentation is aggravated by current systems of finance.
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Project finance puts a bonus on making oneself different from others,
thereby making research aimed at seeing connections and equivalences
less relevant. Indeed, giving integrative lectures explaining how different
research programs really do very similar things (as I often do) often meets
with a downright hostile reception. Comparability and equivalence threat-
en people’s status and income! Of course, project finance also has some
advantages, like being able to shut down unprofitable research lines before
they become too entrenched. But the drawbacks of the system merit much
more extensive discussion than they normally get.
Thus, we have identified another major problem of current scientific
organization. This time, it is not the straight-jacket of old clothes that no
longer fit, but rather the patchwork: the fragmentation of science. This phe-
nomenon runs parallel to another fragmentation process. Modern socie-
ties are splitting up into minority subcultures of various kinds, and one
finds a lot of similar issues as to what should be the role of the universities
and scientific organizations in maintaining a ‘civil society’.
7.2 Possible remedies
Now it might be thought that my beloved information and cognition sci-
ences have some kind of scientific answer to these problems. Aren’t we
talking about a clear problem of information complexity, solvable by new
sophisticated techniques? ‘Let science cure science’? But in fact, this prob-
lem is a wide open challenge, rather than an area of evident progress. Per-
sonally, I even suspect we will eventually hit mathematical incompleteness
theorems as to what grasp of complex information can be achieved, com-
parable to those of Gödel in the foundations of mathematics.
So, what should we do here? If scientific solutions are not readily available,
all that remains for now is the exercise of some commonsense. There is
obviously some awareness of these matters in the responsible organizations,
both universities and scientific associations. For instance, in my own field,
there has been a flux of Handbooks, revised every decade, which serve as a kind
of longer-term record of what lasting things have been achieved worldwide.
But the selection of Handbook editors and authors is currently still somewhat
haphazard, so the record is not yet as authoritative as it could be. One could
imagine it becoming a prestigious super-star job, regulated by the relevant
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communities through procedures. Likewise, many scientific communities
have initiated integrative conferences, such as the TARK meetings on rational-
ity and knowledge, bringing together people from computer science, eco-
nomics, logic, linguistics, and philosophy. Another example, again in my
world, is the ESSLLI Summer Schools on Logic, Language and Information.
Initiatives like that should be rewarded. But in practice, one sees the opposite:
national and European funding organizations do not fund such integrative
events, because they do not fit into their project categories. Finally, in an
approach to this problem, several universities have started appointing super-
professors for the sake of greater integration, but one can have doubts as to its
efficacy so far, both in the US and in Europe. ‘It is lonely at the top’, and some
super-professors seem to have disappeared with startling suddenness into a
communicative vacuum.
My recommendation would be that universities, funding agencies, and grassroots
scientific organizations set aside special funds and some of their organizational
thinking to integrative initiatives.
Universities should have a core curriculum underlining the unity of science
to students, even if this goes against these adolescents’ baser grab-the-di-
ploma-and-run instincts. They should also find ways of making sure that
professors meet regularly across faculties. One might make it compulsory
for full professors to spend two kinds of sabbatical: one in the warm nest of
specialization, among one’s colleagues abroad, and one in another faculty,
with an obligation to communicate and interact with members of another
discipline. But our national funding agencies and academy of arts and sci-
ences are in a much better position to make integrative efforts an explicit
part of their task, including special calls for integrative projects across
fields – and the rewarding of role models. For instance, they would be
much better-placed for appointing truly integrative chairs. Their national
basis gives them a better platform for seeing and affecting the whole of
science. Likewise, they are better placed to set up meeting places like insti-
tutes for advanced study and the like. This might also be a useful comple-
mentary task for them which is sui generis, as opposed to their more hy-
draulic task of channeling the taxpayers’ money to universities with a min-
imum of fuss.
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These recommendations require both organizational efforts and a change
in habitus among scientists themselves. Looking for larger pictures should
become a recognized achievement of great value to us all, not just a sign of
advancing years.
8 Interfacing science and society
So far, our analysis has been mainly concerned with internal problems of
modern science. But scientific developments do not occur in isolation. As
pointed out for information and cognition, it is of course no coincidence
that scientific flourishing goes hand in hand with technological and social
advances. The same holds for problems. Organizational phenomena in-
side science, such as the above-mentioned fragmentation, are often a re-
flection of more general social problems. (As the ‘Dutch Republic’ disinte-
grates into subcultures, so does what is sometimes called ’the Republic of
Letters’.) But the current situation of academic research in society seems
rather isolated: with complaints from university leaders taking the place of
communication and interaction. The only solution here is a broader vision
of what universities should do and an activist perspective on interfaces.
Instead of painting further problems, let me just briefly look at the
most important interfaces of the universities with society and propose a
forward-looking stance.
Industry Contacts between science and society take many different
forms. Let us look at research first. Obviously, there is a good deal of re-
search going on inside industry, whose borderlines with university re-
search are often fluid. In principle, this is a natural alliance which should
be fostered. Some government-sponsored research belongs to the same
environment. (Incidentally, the emergence of larger businesses and indus-
trial production is itself a very interesting feature of European history, and
one which raises lots of fundamental questions of its own concerning so-
cial engineering and collective rationality.) But this interface could be
much more stimulating and productive, if we see it as an intellectual mat-
ter in addition to profit motives. A huge part of the national talent sits
inside industry. (It must be, as it certainly does not flow overwhelmingly
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into university jobs.) But then, we will all be better off, both in universities
and inside industry, if we create interfaces where these two milieus can
meet without immediate business pressures – the way things have hap-
pened, or still happen, in research labs like those of Philips or in modern
Silicon Valley. Moreover, academic leaders should meet with innovative
business leaders, again without time pressures, to talk about develop-
ments in their respective worlds, in such a way that real developments take
place. These things work better on a personal basis – and indeed, the US,
with its more personal approach to things, sees more of these direct con-
tacts than we do in Europe.
Education The other way in which science impacts on society is
through our system of general education. We take this for granted, but it is
of course a huge cultural achievement that scientific insights make it into
a general curriculum for large parts of the population. But here too, uni-
versities could do much more in interacting with schools, teachers, and
the innovation of curricula. ‘Pre-processing’ high-school kids may be
much more important than teaching students once they have arrived, and
this might mean a major shift in the allocation of funds and uses of avail-
able didactical resources, even inside the university. These ideas are not
new in university circles, but they might be pushed much more effectively,
including public recognition of these achievements. In addition to Nobel
Prizes, we might give ‘Euclid Awards’ for outstanding general didactical
achievements, remembering that famous Alexandrian schoolmaster of el-
ementary geometry called Euclid, whose works have defined history.
The Press It may be an old-fashioned idea that the press has an educa-
tional purpose. It certainly has an undisputed informative purpose, and in
that sense, the press should be a natural ally of the universities in spread-
ing intellectual achievements. It is a common complaint in academic cir-
cles that the results – say in science supplements of our major newspapers
– are haphazard and not a true reflection of what is going on intellectually.
I agree that these show lots of biases and do not convey a true picture of
scientific activity, making it more inaccessible than need be. But, if so,
then meet with journalists, editors, and make sure that the right venues
are created! As a result, the press might start reporting on a more regular
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basis about ongoing discussions within the sciences, rather than the stacca-
to of new discoveries. Even more to the point in the setting of what the
Hollandse Maatschappij is trying to achieve. Should not the present dis-
cussion itself be a typical matter of a debate in which an educated public
might participate just as well?
Politics At least Dutch academia has largely written off politics as a
partner in intellectual endeavours. Here is the prejudice in a nutshell. ‘The
Hague’ consists of quick-scoring politicians concerned only with appeas-
ing the fleeting emotions of the electorate and how they themselves appear
in tomorrow’s press commentaries. The result involves spending huge
amounts on non-productive higher salaries for pre-school teachers or
smothering ‘deprived groups’ in subsidies whose efficiency is hardly
checked – while refusing the most modest sums, by comparison, when it
comes to fundamental research and the production of new knowledge.
And indeed, in my own modest experience, getting on the same wave-
length with politicians is one order of magnitude more difficult than the
average communicative challenge. The other way around, one also does
not get the impression that the average politician has an accurate picture
of science and academics. Nevertheless, this communication gap seems a
matter of time, rather than essence.
In fact, I see all the above interfaces as potentially extremely fruitful, and
well worth an outreach effort on the part of science. But this takes two
major resources:
space, and time!
We need small-scale meeting places, where scientists from universities
can mix with people from industry, education, arts, and politics. Small
networks of this kind exist, but some of them have ossified. A new élan
might come in the form of special centres where people from different
walks of life can spend short sabbaticals, interact in the exchange of infor-
mation, and engage in strategic discussions. Or, we might make it a task of
existing academic institutes, setting aside part of their budget for these
broader functions. Well, this space problem can be solved easily.
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But we also need a different notion of time. At a recent initiative, the
‘Avond van Wetenschap en Maatschappij’ – laudable in itself – the differ-
ence was illustrated in a striking manner. At one evening in the Ridderzaal
of the Dutch parliament, representatives from science, politics, and gener-
al culture were supposed to discuss a huge number of major issues and
vote on them after some half hour of discussion while disturbed by vaguely
irrelevant infotainment from some art academy. No attempt was made to
analyze the purpose of the contact or discuss any single issue in detail.
This Moulin Rouge approach may be good as a first encounter, but in a
sense this is a caricature of what should happen. Serious issues take time,
for taking in information, sustained conversation, and subsequent reflec-
tion. An expert astride both worlds once told me that academic time is just
not available in politics. And the same can often be heard about industry:
the agenda of real business leaders does not allow for extended periods of
discussion, perhaps even retirement. Now this is what should be ques-
tioned. I think it is just a latter-day mistake to think that the best leaders
are those whose agendas are full the longest with the greatest variety of
problems, and who are always there to address current burning issues.
Taking off a day, or a week, or a month to reflect on things may be a much
better long-term investment for one’s firm or the nation. The ideal of a
Dutch minister, for instance, as a quickly burned-up, world-traveling
workaholic is a recent one, and it may be just the wrong response to man-
aging an ever-faster modern society. The Kings of Thailand used to retreat
into a monastery occasionally to meditate. Why shouldn’t our industrial
and political leaders retire occasionally to some intellectual environment
where they can see things in a broader perspective?
In other words, universities and scientific organizations would be well-
advised to devote some of their creative energy to building interfaces with
society along all of the dimensions listed above – and the same is true for
individual scientists. Intellectual culture is one, and we all share the same
interests in maintaining it. In particular, there should be no sharp class
distinction between people fighting their battles on the frontier of research
or among public discussions in newspapers or perhaps the most crucial
cultural battle zone of all: in the classrooms of our schools.
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9 Summary
The recommendations made in this essay amount to the following. Sci-
ence needs to rethink its structure and modus operandi vis–á-vis a fast-
changing technological, cultural and political environment. This calls for
several actions, beginning with the
Internal structure of science, both in universities and national organizations:
a Recalibrate the current division into faculties, making the major emer-
gent development of the 20th century into a new core category: informa-
tion & cognition.
b Create a second dimension of integrating mechanisms across the first
level, addressing specifically the major problems of information over-
load and fragmentation.
Next, equally important are matters of external interfaces of science:
c Create meeting places and times that lead to a lively intellectual interface
between universities, industry and politics, where new scientific ideas
are not just disseminated in one direction, but also stimulated by flows
of informed opinion both ways.
Small networks of people are crucial for these broader purposes, linking
up between Academia and other walks of life. The latter recommendation
also asks for role models. French prime ministers used to write books
while in office, without anyone worrying that this was valuable time taken
away from public affairs. Vice-president Al Gore did the same when in
active politics – and his book actually contains a lot of interesting reflec-
tions on obstacles for interfacing science and politics for those who care
about the environment. The Dutch may be more down-to-earth, but
should we – and are we? Our greatest political leader was no doubt Johan
de Witt, at the helm of the Dutch republic in the mid-17th century. He did
find time to publish innovative scientific works, as well as a wonderful
little book “Waerdije” explaining the basics of finance and risk to the edu-
cated Dutch public. The latter is considered the start of scientific insurance
mathematics: you can see his portrait in academic galleries across Europe.
‘Nederland Kennisland’ (an almost untranslatable political slogan: ‘Neth-
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erlands, knowledge country’) will flourish most if we rethink our received,
but quite recent views of all actors concerned both inside and outside of
Academia.
10   Reviving Enlightenment
My original piece started later and ended here. But at the present time, I
felt the urge to add a preface and a postface. Sections 2 through 9 were
written in optimistic mode – with lots of problems that may be hard but
that do not ‘cut to the bone’. And one can recognize an energetic optimiz-
ing mode to the proposals made in the preceding section. The problems
are interesting, people are basically well-meaning, and if we all spend time
and energy, things will improve.
But September 11th reminds me that it would be naïve to take all this for
granted. This becomes particularly acute with the following consideration,
going back to what was said in the Introduction. I truly feel that there is a
deeper level of importance to science as a defining force in our culture.
The greatest impact of the Scientific Revolution in the 17th century, in my
opinion, is not the intellectual advance of knowledge or the spectacular
breakthroughs in technology. It was rather the subsequent idea of Enlight-
enment, the breaking of the power of vested religion and traditions that
kept people chained to authority and superstition. The most important
advances are those enshrined in the ensuing social life with separation of
church and state, civil liberties, and many other features of modern West-
ern society. These things were fought hard for, but eventually we reached
what Immanuel Kant called:
the liberation of humanity from their self-imposed tutelage
from religious books, political leaders, or whatever other unquestioned
authorities offered themselves up for dominance. We are allowed freedom
of thought, freedom of joining organizations, and freedom of abandoning
those opinions and leaving those organizations safely, without being
branded heretics or apostates… All these freedoms are constitutive of sci-
entific activity. Inside science, we can state dissenting opinions about any-
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thing and against any authority, including the consistency and tenability of
views of authorities or religious dogmas. And these values have spilt over
into general society – of course, in conjunction with other beneficial social
developments pointing in the same direction. In conjunction with general
free-thinking tendencies in Europe, science has made us free! Moreover,
this freedom is not just an extra, detachable side-benefit of the enterprise.
It can be argued that the relative lack of success of innovative science in
parts of the world like the Middle East is precisely because many people try
to adopt the technological advantages without the whole package of men-
tality and history behind it – grafting it onto a political-religious system
that does not incorporate these basic values.
Now, many of these accompanying ideals are under pressure today.
Science is either seen as an evil force enslaving nature and producing mil-
itary abominations, or as a mere gadget producing various technological
conveniences. More problematically, modern science has its enemies – pre-
cisely because of this intellectual liberation. As indicated earlier, I myself
see many current tendencies in our society like, in Kant’s terms, a ‘self-
imposed’ return to prescientific attitudes. Emotions of small groups in the
population are taken as primary realities rather than as issues to be settled
by information about historical facts or even statistical data. Dogmas of
militant religions diametrically opposed to the basic values of Enlighten-
ment are put under a blanket of ‘multicultural happiness’, without careful
scrutiny and debate. Uninformed irrational myths that are emerging all
over the world are not exposed because scientists fear for their travel
funds, the loss of local contacts who want abject ritual apologies from
Westerners rather than critical views – or the emotional reception by the
received opinion in The Netherlands.
All these attitudes undermine our real chances for improving the
world. If they had been prevalent in the 16th and 17th century, we would
have had no revolution toward the modern world. All achievements in our
history that make us civilized in a modern sense were made because there
were people willing to confront religious dogmas and not wrap everything
in vague views of everybody’s being right in one way or another. This courage
seems sadly lacking today, when I look at colleagues exercising all kinds of
self-censorship when their financial status or career options are threat-
ened by speaking up. The rhetoric of intellectual independence at universi-
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ties often hides the most timid behaviour in practice. To me then, there is
also an activist side to thinking about the future of modern science. How
do we highlight the broader values that it brought along, inculcate them in
our students, and militantly uphold them against the enemies of Enlight-
enment?
Note
1 A crucial point of terminology. In the Dutch language, the term ‘wetenschappen’
covers both the sciences and the humanities, and the term ‘science’ is used in this
broad sense in this essay. Do not just think of physicists tending to large
machines, or sociologists waving questionnaires, but also of that philosopher
pondering the notion of rational discourse, or that lonely scholar of early Coptic
manuscripts!
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Does a New Kind of Science Require
a New Kind of Scholar or a New Kind
of University? 1
Keith Devlin
Professor van Benthem suggests that the scientific study of cognition and
information flow lies outside any of the existing sciences, or indeed any of
the generally recognized academic disciplines. This has certainly been my
experience after my own research interests moved into that area (from
mainstream mathematical logic) in the mid-1980s. Since making that
shift, I have not held a regular faculty position at any college or university.
My interests simply did not fully accord with my discipline of training,
namely mathematics.
For the period 1987-89, I had a research appointment at CSLI, the
interdisciplinary research center at Stanford that I now direct. I then took a
position as a mathematics department chair at a leading US liberal arts
college – a wonderful type of interdisciplinary educational institution not
found in Europe. Next, I tried my hand as a dean. And now I find myself
back at CSLI, this time as its Executive Director. Throughout this 14-year
period, I have regularly taught some mathematics courses and written var-
ious books on mathematical topics, but my main scholastic interests have
been elsewhere, occupying a hitherto unnamed and almost unacknowl-
edged nether-region having connections to mathematics, logic, computer
science, linguistics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, communications,
cognitive science, management science, and engineering, and which in
the near future will, I believe, involve biology as well. In other words, I
have been living for some time now in the scientific world Professor van
Benthem describes.
The fact that I have been able to do this for so long indicates that the
existing university framework does at least allow some individuals to pur-
sue the kind of scholastic agenda he outlines – at least, for a limited
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number of such scholars. Of course, the approach I have followed only
works for senior academics, already well established in their original disci-
plines, who can barter experience and administrative skills in exchange for
the freedom to pursue such a risky research agenda. On the other hand,
the area we are focussing on is not sufficiently well developed to offer a
career path for younger scholars; there simply is not yet enough scholarly
depth, nor the scholarly metrics and associated publication outlets, for a
young scientist to establish her- or himself as an “information and cogni-
tion scientist.”
An appropriate academic discipline – a new science – may of course
emerge in the future. But my personal view is that it will not. Rather, I
think the domain we are looking at is more akin to industry or engineering
than science, requiring a combination of different approaches, loosely tied
together by modes of operation and codes of practices, rather than the de-
velopment of a distinctive conceptual framework or a clear research para-
digm that defines a discipline.
The similarity with industry and engineering is also apparent when it
comes to funding. The traditional research funding organizations rarely, if
ever, support the kind of research Professor van Benthem and I are talking
about. For even when they establish “interdisciplinary programs”, re-
search proposals are evaluated by the criteria of the participating disci-
plines, a benchmark which truly barrier-breaking research can never at-
tain.
On the other hand, the kinds of problems that lie at the center of the
current research into cognition and information flow lie at the very heart
of the information and communications technology (ICT) industry. There
the aim is not to develop new scientific understanding, but to design and
build better IC technologies. And that goal provides adequate scope for
funding the kind of research we are talking about.
In this new industrial-academic environment, one obvious measure of
progress or success is meeting the companies’ goals of product innovation
and design. But can this lead to good science? The answer is yes. The na-
ture of the ICT industry is that it requires research that is every bit as chal-
lenging and academically respectable as research in, say, chemistry or
physics or psychology. Work that fully deserves to be called “science” in
the sense outlined by Professor van Benthem.
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Of course, funding is just part of doing science. Scientists also have to
publish their results for others to evaluate and perhaps extend. Hitherto,
most scholars who have ventured into this interdisciplinary brave new
world seem to have taken the route that writer John Brockman has named
The Third Culture.2  In the absence of an existing evaluative structure to
provide certification of merit, Third Culture practitioners step outside the
current academic framework of scholarly books, papers, and peer review-
ing, and use the open marketplace (and its arguably more demanding
metrics) to disseminate their work in the form of academic trade books –
books written for general sale and marketed competitively for profit by
commercial publishers.
Although ostensibly written for a “lay audience” and sometimes re-
ferred to as “popular science”, such books are in fact largely read, and eval-
uated, by other scientists. With authors such as Stephen Hawking, Daniel
Dennett, Richard Dawkings, Paul Davies, Gerald Edelman, Stephen Pink-
er, Stanislas Dehaene, Terence Deacon, Roger Penrose, Francis Crick,
William Calvin, and Joseph LaDoux, the Third Culture is clearly a major
intellectual force. True, most practitioners continue to carry out research
and publish within the disciplines they were trained in, but these days it is
increasingly their more speculative, interdisciplinary, Third Culture writ-
ing that marks the frontiers of scientific knowledge.
In the absence of the standard filter of peer review, Third Culture prac-
titioners use the persuasive techniques of excellent writing to make their
scientific case – not to experts in their own particular branch of science
but to the entire scientific (and related industrial) community. (Hence the
name Third Culture, lying somewhere halfway between the sciences
and the arts of C.P. Snow’s famous Two Cultures divide.) As a result of
the Third Culture, today’s scientific action can often be found not in uni-
versity libraries but on the shelves of Barnes and Noble or online at
Amazon.com.
But what of the future? There are limited opportunities for the kind of
maverick career path I myself have followed during the past 14 years, and
only a handful of practitioners are able to disseminate their work success-
fully through Third Culture publishing. How will advanced societies such
as Europe and the United States ensure the growth and health of future
research in cognition and information flow if, as I have suggested, there is
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no single emergent academic discipline that adequately addresses this do-
main?
At Stanford, we are about to launch a new research initiative, and a
highly novel administrative infrastructure to support it, that we think will
meet this new need. Its name is Media-X. Media-X is not a single disci-
pline. It is not even a cluster of disciplines. It is the study of the design and
use of interactive technologies – interactive media – using whatever meth-
ods and paradigms seem appropriate. (The “X” in the title is meant to be
read as a variable that can refer to any of those conceptual tools.)
Formally, Media-X has the status of an “independent research center”
that reports to the Stanford Dean of Research (and is not, therefore, part of
one of the normal schools such as Humanities and Sciences, Engineering,
etc.). Media-X has no permanent faculty. Any Stanford faculty member or
researcher can be a member of Media-X. Some will be effectively perma-
nent members; others will be involved for the length of a particular
project, or for as long as they desire.
Media-X is not, and is not intended to become, a university depart-
ment. Rather, it is a highly flexible, virtual enterprise, a dynamic network
the stretches across the entire campus. It also provides essential links to
outside ICT industries, which are being invited to partner with us in this
new enterprise, paying an annual membership fee in exchange for faculty
consulting, research collaboration, access to classrooms and students, and
rights to intellectual property developed by the program.
Media-X will receive no funding from the university. Rather, the entire
program will be supported through the industrial membership fees
(which will go to support Media-X research) and one-time endowment
gifts to cover the infrastructure support (which, because of the nature of
Media-X, will be low – less than $0.5m a year).
The Media-X structure cuts orthogonally across the existing university
structure at Stanford – departments, schools, and research centers. As I
have observed, the main link that binds the enterprise together is a collec-
tion of technologies. The Media-X vision brings together central informa-
tion themes – language technologies (e.g. natural language processing,
semantics, dialogue systems), human-computer interaction (e.g. informa-
tion organization, conversational agents, collaborative work environ-
ments), engineering (e.g. product design, information sensing, robotics),
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cognitive science (e.g. artificial intelligence, logic, neuroscience, rationali-
ty and philosophical foundations) – and it adds the artistic execution of
mediated interactions (e.g. computer music, narrative, and the digital art
of lighting, character development, and gestures). A for-profit, in-house
publishing organization will provide a venue for the dissemination of re-
sults that do not fit into existing outlets.
By providing a portal to the Stanford campus, Media-X puts faculty into
contact with companies, research labs, and other groups working on the
development and use of interactive technology, providing research fund-
ing, research projects, and educational projects for use in the classroom.
Of course, the decision of whether to become involved in any particular
project is up to each individual faculty member. Each year, Media-X will
issue a campus-wide request for research proposals in the general area of
Media-X. Different faculty members and researchers are likely to be in-
volved from one year to the next.
In view of Professor van Benthem’s justified concerns that science
should not become the pliant tool of commercial activity, it should be
stressed that Media-X is not a research and development contract agency
for industry. Unlike the (Media-X affiliated) Stanford Research Institute
(SRI)3 , for example, Media-X will not, as a general rule, engage in contract
research. Rather, we will form partnerships with ICT firms, carrying out
university-type research, albeit research that is in large part of relevance to,
and in some cases comes from, those industry partners. Our goal as a uni-
versity enterprise is to carry out research and publish the results openly in
the scientific literature; product development is left to the industry part-
ners themselves. The intention is that Media-X will be sufficiently large
and generate enough funding from industrial member fees that much of
the research carried out is of the traditional “curiosity driven” variety, orig-
inating with the investigators.
The meta-goal in creating Media-X is, then, to find a structure that will
support cross-disciplinary scientific research into cognition and informa-
tion flow – the general area Professor van Benthem has identified in his
essay – using the technological goals of the design, manufacture, and use
of interactive technologies to provide the glue that binds the intellectual
effort together.
In summary, as Professor van Benthem has correctly observed, the
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massively cross-disciplinary nature of cognition and information flow al-
most certainly precludes real progress within the existing university
framework. But that does not mean we need to dismantle that framework
and erect a new one – nor does Professor van Benthem suggest such dras-
tic action. However, both he and I agree that society must find a way to
modify the current framework – essentially the framework of the 19th cen-
tury, although it served us well throughout the 20th – to meet the new
challenges of the 21st century, for which it clearly seems inadequate.
Those of us at Stanford involved in the development and launch of
Media-X believe that such a program (or perhaps a modification thereof)
will provide the appropriate academic structure to fill this need.
For the most part, the intellectual resource for Media-X is supplied by
the existing disciplines, housed in standard university departments. A rel-
atively small number of cross-disciplinarians – “Third Culture” scholars –
will provide the connections that facilitate the various cross-disciplinary
collaborations. Ideally, these individuals would be university faculty, occu-
pying the truly “integrative chairs” Professor van Benthem speaks about in
his essay. In the current Media-X framework, they are a program overhead
and constitute the only significant new cost of Media-X.
If successful, we believe that Media-X will form a model for one aspect
of the university of tomorrow, as we enter an era where the main scientific
and technological problems that society faces will not be met by any single
area of human expertise. With Media-X dependent on industry funding, it
seems unlikely that any one country or major geographic region could
support such programs at more than one or two universities. But this
should be enough to provide an umbrella structure that can legitimize and
support such work on a much wider scale.
Notes
1 Comments on Science in Flux, by Johan van Benthem
2 Brockman, J. The Third Culture : Beyond the Scientific Revolution, Touchstone
Books (1996).
3 SRI is not officially connected to Stanford University.
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Appendix
The Stanford Media-X Initiative
The Media-X Idea
– Media-X is a Stanford University Independent Center that will coordi-
nate the study and design of interactive technology across campus,
bringing together an interdisciplinary group of faculty and students
who will influence the next generation of interactive technology rele-
vant to commerce, learning and entertainment.
– Media-X projects will solve problems related to people and technology,
including ease of use, natural forms of input and output, social and
emotional responses, enhancement of learning, and interaction strate-
gies in business.
– Media-X will organize partnerships with industry, foundations, and
government who will collaborate with faculty and students in class-
rooms and laboratories.
The University Opportunity
– Media-X will offer financial support, research space, and intellectual
forums that support scholarship and teaching related to the design and
study of interactive technology.
– Media-X will support education related to interactive technology
through the B.S. and M.S. in Symbolic Systems, a growing interdepart-
mental major, and through programs related to the core academic de-
partments that participate in the Center.
– Media-X will facilitate relationships between the Stanford research
community and external colleagues who build, market, regulate, and
critique technology.
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The Opportunity for Media-X Partners
– Media-X partners will have facilitated access to new ideas through par-
ticipation in campus classes and labs, placement of researchers on
campus, participation in Center governance, setting of research agen-
das, and sharing of intellectual property.
– Media-X offers professional development opportunities for research-
ers in partner organizations through visits, sabbaticals, project and stu-
dent mentorships, co-teaching, and research collaborations.
– Media-X partners will establish relationships with Stanford students
during degree programs, facilitating student recruiting and knowledge
dissemination.
The Media-X Structure
The launch of Media-X is being coordinated through the Stanford Center
for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI). Governance will be
through the Media-X Executive Council, a body made up of Stanford facul-
ty and researchers and representatives from industrial partners. The Exec-
utive Council will establish program missions, set funding priorities, and
award grants. Industrial members will have access to intellectual property
generated by Media-X projects. All inventions resulting from projects or-
ganized and funded by Media-X will be available to members on a non-
exclusive, royalty-free basis. The Media-X portfolio will continue to grow as
projects are funded and patents are filed. Members will receive regular
notification of filings and will have a fixed period to exercise an option on a
particular invention. The Media-X Option Plan assures that member com-
panies will be informed of all inventions, that they will have access to the
inventions, and that the access to intellectual property can proceed in a
logical and streamlined manner.
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4 Science for the 21st Century
Arie Rip
Abstract.   Science, in its interest in searching for knowledge and
trying to make its products robust, can be contrasted with science
as an authority, which often relies on traditional ways of know-
ledge production and disciplinary controls of quality. If authority
as such, disciplinary or otherwise, rules, science becomes its own
worst enemy. While this is an “essential tension”, it becomes
tractable in practice, and in a variety of ways.
Science as a mosaic of search practices and a range of modes of
knowledge production, embedded in institutions and in society
in general, is evolving. Disciplinary boundaries become less
important in genomics and nanotechnology, but also in earth and
environmental sciences. And the interactions between science and
society are changing: relevance to economic and social issues is
important, expertise is needed but also contested. Science-as-we-
know-it cannot be the final word.
But science-as-we-know-it is itself a product of a long-term socio-
cognitive evolution, in which some attempts to produce robust
knowledge (as in the natural-history mode) were backgrounded
and others (as in the experimental and/or controlled-conditions
mode) were foregrounded. A historical and philosophical detour
allows us to put science-as-we-know-it in perspective.
The important question then is what the further evolution might
be. Gibbons et al. have put up a strong diagnosis, of a disciplinary
and university-based Mode 1 of knowledge production being
overtaken by a transdisciplinary, multi-site and fluid Mode 2 of
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knowledge production. Their diagnosis must be nuanced (Mode 2
search practices were around all the time), but also shifted.
It is not just a matter of discovery in the context of application
(in industry, and with economic goals). The complexities of the
natural world are striking back, and this requires a renewed
natural-history approach.
Already for this reason, indigenous (and local) knowledge has
become important, and creates a challenge to Western-science-as-
we-know-it. Underlying world-views are now being articulated,
and this raises the question about the world view embedded in
Western science. Multi-culturalism is not the answer to this
question, but is definitely the site to explore possible answers.
The African Renaissance movement, and the official recognition,
in New Zealand, of Maori approaches to knowledge production are
two of such sites.
Clearly, science in the 21st century will not be like science-as-we-
know-it.
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1 What is at issue?
Science, in its interest in searching for knowledge and trying to make its
products robust, can be contrasted with science as an authority, which of-
ten relies on traditional ways of knowledge production and disciplinary
controls of quality. If authority as such, disciplinary or otherwise, rules,
science becomes its own worst enemy.
This is a strong statement, and I will modify it somewhat later on. But
what will remain is the recurrent and unavoidable dilemma between – on
the one hand – the need for some order and the reduction of variety that
goes with it to be productive in what one does (here, search for knowledge)
and – on the other hand – the need to go against that same order to inno-
vate or just to respond to changing circumstances. For science and its in-
stitutionalized interest in producing novelties (up to priority races and
conflicts), the dilemma is an essential tension.1
The dilemma will continue. But it is made tractable in practice and in a
variety of ways. Thus, it is important to trace what happens in scientific
practice. History, philosophy and the sociology of science offer important
insights here. But there is more to the dilemma than what happens in
concrete scientific practice. There are modes and methods of ordering the
world and society which have emerged over time, disciplining and ena-
bling at the same time by reducing variety.2  This is linked to large histori-
cal and contemporary issues of modernity, imperialism and globalization
– which will not be discussed as such in this essay but are definitely
present as a backdrop.
I will address the essential tension following two complementary and par-
tially overlapping routes:
– One, by having a closer look at science as a mosaic of search practices
and a range of modes of knowledge production, embedded in institu-
tions and in society in general. This will allow me to create a broader
perspective on science-as-we-know-it: what it is, and what it can be.
Such a broader perspective is necessary, because science and the world
it lives in are changing.3
– Two, and following on from this, by positioning science-as-we-know-it
not as the final word but as a cross-section of ongoing co-evolution of
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science (and knowledge production and authority more generally) and
society. Our practices and institutions are the outcomes of long-term
developments and enable as well as constrain further development.
This is particularly clear for scientific disciplines as cultural categories
and authority structures, but my discussion will be more general.
What are these ongoing changes, and how do they lead to a sense of larger
transformations? I will start by presenting five vignettes which together
indicate the scope of the changes.
First, the shift toward cross-disciplinary and non-disciplinary research:
(From an interview with Donna Dean, senior adviser, USA National Institutes of
Health, The Scientist, Sept. 17, 2001) I think compartmentalization is not as easy to
do now in science as it was 20 years ago. And I don’t think it’s just the fact that I am
older and more experienced. Twenty years ago, it was easier to draw a line between
biochemistry, chemistry, physics, cell biology, endocrinology, physiology. But now,
because of tools and techniques and the genomics revolution, and the skills and
abilities that the researchers have, you can’t draw sharp lines between the fields. What
I see is just a series of overlapping, fuzzy boundaries between and among fields.
Probably the only boundary that is not fuzzy is the fact that the person who is trained
as a PhD cannot go in and do hands-on work with patients.
Second, the shifting away from traditional positions and roles:
Universities now hire stands on trade fairs, which actually have special spaces for
research and technology. The Technical University of Delft, the University of Twente,
and the University of Leiden hired 255 m2 space in the Halle für Forschung und
Technologie of the Hannover Messe in 1993 (UT Nieuws, 25 March 1993).
Scientists, at least biotechnologists, are willing to step out of the traditional system of
science and become part of a research centre supported by a big pharmaceutical
company, and managed in their style. “You have to cope with the problem of having to
justify again and again your research programme. But it’s always better than writing
research grants!” (Webster, 1994: 133) Actors in the world of science do not behave
according to stereotyped views of science. In other words, it is not just a “blizzard of
buzzwords” in science policy and science organisation, disapprovingly identified by
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Ziman (1994: 249), that is coming over us. Scientists and science organisations are
on the move.
Third, the fusion between science, high-tech and innovation competition,
particularly visible in semi-conductors and biotechnology and now also
claimed for the presently fashionable label of nanotechnology:
Researchers in Motorola’s (a major chip-producing company) R&D lab in Tempe,
Arizona, when exploring possibilities for making thin semiconductor layers even
thinner, stumbled on a phenomenon that might be exploited to “glue” gallium
arsenide (in which higher speeds are possible) to silicium, the work-horse of the chips
industry. A hundred or so researchers spent two years developing this lead, and
Motorola took out 270 patents to protect its rights to the new technology. Mobile
phones and optical telecommunication are the primary application domains. At the
same time, this offers a challenge to solid-state science to understand the how and why
of this technical feat. (Based on a news item by Dirk van Delft, NRC Handelsblad 29
September 2001.)
Fourth, the importance of scientific expertise for decision-making under
uncertainty, and the resulting pressures for “sound science” – whatever
that may be:
US Congressman George E. Brown, Jr. analysed three 1995 hearings convened by the
Republican-dominated House Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Environ-
ment, and concluded: “again and again, like a mantra, we heard calls for ‘sound
science’ from Members who had little or no experience of what science does and how it
progresses.” Brown shows that ‘sound science’ turns out to mean ‘empirical science’ in
the sense of direct observation rather than models and statistical analysis. Witnesses
rejected the use of statistical analysis and models in favor of observational data – even
when the use of uncorrected raw data was highly misleading. The epistemic politics
involved become clear when Subcommittee members argue that the government should
intervene on environmental problems only after incontrovertible direct observations
confirm the problem’s existence. Brown warns that such a notion of ‘sound science’
would make it impossible to prepare for environmental harm in advance (Brown
1996). This type of epistemic politics, and the attendant pressures on scientists, returns
again and again, and most emphatically when regulation is at issue.
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Fifth, the social contract between science and society is shifting, with new
stakeholders becoming important and policy-makers willing to create new
spaces.
European Union Commissioner Busquin’s January 2000 proposal for a European
Research Area can be read as primarily an attempt to shift national science policies to
the European level, but also addresses new issues of dialogue with stakeholders and
ethical issues of science and technology. ‘Science and Governance’ is the new concern.
In a major European Union conference on this topic in Brussels in October 2000, a
Greenpeace researcher was invited to sit (and speak) next to the President of the Royal
Society. It is symbolic action, but not without effects. Including effects elsewhere, as
when new science and technology initiatives in Japan like the Research Initiative of
Technology for Society, by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology, refer to the European Union’s approach to support their own venture.
These changes are recognized by the actors as well as analysts. What I
want to do is to create some distance through a philosophical and histori-
cal detour. Rather than addressing the changes as they are being identified
here and now, and thus running the risk of ad-hoc responses, I want to
locate them in longer-term developments. One can still think in terms of
challenges and how to meet them, but we shall then also realize the limits
to action that is trying to make a difference. History teaches modesty.
Analysts have come up with strong claims about changes in the organiza-
tion of science, with university, government and industry overlapping and
co-evolving as in a triple helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) and,
more fundamentally, in modes of knowledge production (Gibbons et al.
1994, Nowotny et al. 2001). While they tend to define changes in terms of
science-as-we know-it, the dynamics they discuss are broader and can help
us to develop a broader perspective.
Gibbons et al. (1994) contrast an earlier Mode 1 (university-based and
disciplinary oriented) with a presently emerging Mode 2, which is
transdisciplinary, fluid, has a variety of sites of knowledge production in-
cluding “discovery in the context of application” (e.g. in industry) and new
forms of quality control. The separate features they describe are clearly
visible, but one might question their overall thesis that these add up to a
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new mode of knowledge production, comparable in its internal and exter-
nal alignments and eventual stabilization to Mode 1 (Rip 2000a).
While their diagnosis of changes is useful as a starting point, one must
realize that their Mode 1 is historically located. It emerged in the course of
the 19th century and became aligned and locked in after 1870. However,
there was interesting science and knowledge production before the 19th
century, and one should inquire into its modes of knowledge production
and how these evolved.
Thus, it is important to understand how a Mode 1 could emerge at all
and get a hold on the variety of knowledge production and institutions. To
put it briefly, it is a lock-in of dynamics at three levels: ongoing search
practices and knowledge production “on location”, cosmopolitan interac-
tions of scientists as in conferences and journals, and interaction and legit-
imation of science in society. The advantage of a lock-in is the creation of a
protected space for doing science – in this case, the combination of relative
autonomy and disciplinary authority – at the price of accepting the con-
straints.
One such constraint is the hold disciplines have obtained on the pro-
duction of scientific knowledge. Another constraint derives from the
norms and values which are part of historically evolved regimes. The re-
gime of science, the endless frontier, prepared already in the late 19th cen-
tury but coming into its own after the Second World War (Bush 1945) is
still visible in attitudes (like an entitlement attitude towards funding for
science) and projections (like the idea of a Golden Age for science in the
1950s and 1960s, after which things would become worse and worse).
These attitudes and projections are of little help in meeting the changes.
Part of the problem (and when recognized as such, part of the solution) are
the projections of what science “is”, that is, what it should be, on the actual
conduct of science. This normative tension will always be present and can
work out positively as when it helps to maintain the integrity of science.
But such projections might be or become irrelevant, as when they refer to
an earlier context, or when the implied view of science is too limited.
The dominance of physics, in particular theoretical physics, and its ideals
of explanation in defining what is good science is an example of a too lim-
106 Arie Rip
ited view of science and in that sense, a limitation. There are hierarchies of
sciences with physics on top, there is the strong claim that physics offers
insight into the building blocks of the universe and so must be able to
explain anything and everything. The scientific picture of the world is then
reduced to the physicist’s picture of the world.4  This elite and thus estab-
lishment position of physics (recently shared with molecular biology),
when generally accepted, reduces the freedom of movement of other sci-
ences. Having grown up professionally as a chemist, and thus located low-
er in the hierarchy, I can speak from experience.
The other projection is that of the unity of science as a cultural phe-
nomenon somewhat independent of actual philosophical work on the uni-
ty of science. In our culture, one can refer to ‘science’, full stop. Such a
reference does away with heterogeneities among the sciences and makes it
easy to attribute authority to ‘science’. Or even agency, as in the phrase
“Science Finds – Industry Applies – Man Conforms” (the theme of the
Chicago World’s Fair in 1933, celebrating “a century of progress”). The
existence of the umbrella term ‘science’ leads to questions about what is
and what is not science (is history included? acupuncture? astrology?) and
creates a pressure towards unification, up to the idea of philosophy of ‘sci-
ence’, full stop.
The term ‘science’ has a respectable history (though not a well-defined
meaning), but its umbrella use is recent and emerges more or less at the
same time as when Whewell felt the need to coin the term ‘scientist’, in the
1830s, a period when scientific research was professionalizing (Ross
1962). Umbrella terms are not innocent. They have effects, as I indicated.
Their force derives from the possibility to project onto them, and the ad-
vantage that can be gained by capturing the term for one’s own endeav-
ours. To be able to say that your work is scientific and that of your oppo-
nent is not puts him in a defensive position.
In this way, ‘science’ functions as an ideograph. The notion of ideo-
graph was introduced by McGee (1980) to capture the force of terms like
‘the people’ or ‘democracy’ which are open (sometimes contested) but
have a positive rhetorical value. Van Lente (1993) has shown in detail how
‘technology’ functions as an ideograph in modern societies. For this essay,
it is sufficient to recognize the rhetorical force and in that sense agency of
ideographs and write a term in capital letters (TECHNOLOGY or SCIENCE) when
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it functions as an ideograph. Once the ideograph SCIENCE is available, its
use cannot be prohibited. In fact, I used the ideograph myself in the open-
ing sentence of this essay – and then compensated by saying I would intro-
duce complexities later on. In particular, there is the contrast between the
external usage of an unifying ideograph and the ongoing heterogeneous
practices in the various sciences. This is a further example of an essential
tension.
The tension is not only between internal practices and external repre-
sentations. Already within science, there is a tension between the search
processes of science-in-the-making, with all their uncertainties, and sci-
ence-ready-made, often showing the authoritative side of its Janus face.5
At this level, one can inquire how the vicissitudes of search processes are
transformed into knowledge claims with some validity. This is a produc-
tive entrance point to discuss the tension and how it is made tractable. In
Section 2, I shall develop an argument about the robustness of knowledge
which can bridge the gap.
Also, to avoid continuing unproductive ways of doing and legitimating
science into the 21st century, one must dig deeper and be prepared to make
historical, sociological and philosophical detours. Section 2 continues by
taking up that challenge. On that basis I can return, in Section 3, to the
possibilities and requirements for science for the 21st century.
This essay is written as a mosaic of observations and examples, comments,
general considerations and arguments, drawing on the literature, and for
the actual text also basing myself on earlier publications of mine. In this
way, I keep the variety of what happens and the heterogeneity of scientific
knowledge production visible, while still being prepared to propose pat-
terns in the co-evolution.
2 A closer look at science and knowledge production
Structural genomics, one of the exciting frontiers of science in the 21st
century (also called proteomics), attempts to produce three-dimensional
structures for all human proteins. The UK Wellcome Foundation, one of
the big sponsors of genomics research, briefly presented structural ge-
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nomics in the first-quarter issue, 2001, of their Wellcome News. One step is
to grow protein crystals to be X-rayed to determine structures. “Salt or sug-
ar crystals are durable and hard, but protein crystals are like fragile cubes
of jelly. Growing crystals is something of a black art. Some scientists are
well known for having ‘green fingers’ at growing crystals while others can
spend years trying to crystallize one protein.”
These ‘black arts’ of the experimenter are well known, and respected,
within science, even if they are not always put up front as in this quote.
Their importance in the actual production of knowledge might undermine
the claim of universal validity and thus detract from the status and public
image of science. And there is often a conviction that one might articulate
and explicate the ‘black art’ so that it becomes transparent and replicable, if
one took the time and effort to do so. This does not occur, though, as long
as the desired effects can be achieved.6
It is not a matter of exorcizing all black art from science, but of under-
standing how science can produce robust results on location. To get nature
to work for us and on our terms, whether in scientific experiments, indus-
trial production, or agricultural and health practices, we have to shape it
and use whatever comes to hand. Local and craft knowledge form an inte-
gral part of scientific knowledge production and can be the key to its suc-
cess.
Genomics (and proteomics, metabolomics, and other “-omics”) shows an-
other interesting feature of scientific knowledge production which is in-
sufficiently taken up in the philosophy of SCIENCE: the recognition of pat-
terns. Genomics is made possible by the marriage of experimental science
and information sciences. But the proliferation of the ‘-omics’ sciences is
an indication of a larger shift. As John Quakenbusch expressed it: “it is a
shift away from biology as a laboratory science, and hypothesis-driven re-
search, to research where (bio)informatics is needed to link data and find
patterns.”7  This is actually a return to research approaches in the field
sciences and thus to the tradition of what I call, with an antiquated term,
‘natural history’. The same John Q. added that genomics, in this way, pro-
vides a new perspective: genes are not monocausal sources of phenotypes
but work in context, in interaction with their environment. This would
then enable holistic approaches to diseases.
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Another interesting aspect of modern science visible in genomics is the
increasing role of simulations and modelling, the three-dimensional fold-
ing of protein molecules, for example, or modelling of metabolic path-
ways. The earlier heavy investment in simulations in wind tunnels and
water flow simulation labs have been overtaken by the advent of powerful
computers and software, but the trend away from the “real” was clear be-
fore. Creating a micro-cosmos which resembles the real world but without
all of its complexities helps us to do research – even if the results apply
only to the micro-cosmos and not to the wider world. Phrased this way, it
would also apply to a laboratory; the additional feature of computer model-
ling is how it introduces dematerialization of science, through rematerial-
ization in computers, software, databases and images.
These developments may revive earlier concerns about the reality of
models in science, from the spatial models of molecules proposed by Van
‘t Hoff in the 1870s to the reluctance of chemists in the 1930s and 1940s to
accept configurational proof of molecules based on physical methods rath-
er than chemical synthesis. With the proliferation of modelling in chemis-
try, some reflection occurs, but very pragmatically:
The final paragraph of a PhD thesis on membranes said: “The performed simulations
have (..) contributed to the fundamental knowledge of membrane dynamics.” And
continued: “As a final remark, one should not forget that all the results that are
presented in this thesis are simulated. They are not ‘real’. One can only hope that they
correspond to reality to such an extent that the conclusions are useful also in the real
world. But what is reality anyway?” (Marrink 1994, p. 145)
Nominalism about unseen components (as with chemists’ ideas of molec-
ular configurations in the 19th century) is relieved when one can manipu-
late materials based on ideas about these unseen components – this might
count as an indirect proof of their existence. The next step, as Wilfred van
Gunsteren, Professor in Informatikgestützte Chemie at the ETH in Zürich
and close collaborator of IBM in its Blue Gene project, phrased it, is the link
with computer-based design: if a simulator can predict the folding and
three-dimensional configuration of a protein on the basis of its amino acid
sequence, a protein engineer can start designing new enzymes on his
computer screen.8
110 Arie Rip
The tension between realism and nominalism returns with climate
change models (and even more so with integrated assessment models),
also because various relationships have to be introduced in such models to
allow the model to “run” and produce outcomes for various scenarios. The
question of the plausibility of such assumptions is backgrounded – until
they are contested. For genomics, similar further debates because of back-
grounded assumptions might also arise. There is reference to them al-
ready within the relevant scientific communities, and with attempts to ac-
tually apply genomics findings and techniques, they might come out into
the open.
Clearly, a lot is happening in scientific knowledge production which does
not agree with a traditional picture of SCIENCE. It is necessary to develop a
“philosophy” of science and knowledge production as a composite picture
which does justice to the achievements of science in knowledge produc-
tion without succumbing to traditional authoritative structures and pres-
sures for legitimation linked to SCIENCE. The first step is to create openings
by showing the cognitive and material underdetermination of knowledge
claims and the importance of processes and trajectories of knowledge de-
velopment. A variety of modalities of production of robust knowledge be-
comes visible this way. The actual production of knowledge is located in
socio-cultural spaces which enable as well as constrain. The overall picture
allows me to consider, in Section 3, what science for the 21st century might
look like.
2.1 A closer look at robustness of knowledge production in science9
Consider the intractable problem of formulating knowledge claims with
universal validity and proving them when one cannot do more than exper-
iments of limited scope, in certain places and at certain times. Still, an
edifice of scientific knowledge has been built on these precarious founda-
tions. Philosophers of science have worried about the strength of the foun-
dations and attempted to specify methodologies for building solid edifices.
Karl Popper’s critical rationalism, with its sociological complement of “or-
ganized scepticism” as a rule in the social system of science, appears to
capture important elements of how the productive practice of building the
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edifice actually proceeds. As Donald Campbell has shown, there is a com-
promise involved, in the sense that scientific communities need what he
calls ‘tribal norms’ to bind them together and make the epistemologically
important norms forceful. Competition for reputation would be one such
tribal norm (Campbell 1979).
The basic point made by philosophers of science and supported
through detailed historical and sociological case studies is that scientific
knowledge is underdetermined. There is no absolute assurance that later
findings and/or new arguments will not undermine present achieve-
ments. There are degrees of solidity, of course. But the nature of scientific
observation and experiment, and the precarious shift from specific find-
ings to more general knowledge claims, always leave openings for doubt
and further checks. Closure of the quest is a practical matter, not a logical
step.
Logically, the ceteris paribus problem undermines any attempt at uni-
versality of knowledge claims. You know what you have observed in this
experiment, here and now. But are the circumstances in another experi-
ment (of your own, of another researcher) exactly the same? You can try to
control the conditions and thus make the ceteris the same – but you cannot
control for what you do not know about. In practice, iterations between
preliminary understanding and first attempts at control often converge to
a stable alignment between working experiments and the scientific under-
standing based upon them (Rip 1982, Collins 1985). Underdetermination
of scientific knowledge claims is not just a philosophical puzzle, there is
an element of successful material control and alignment.
The material aspect of underdetermination returns with a vengeance
in the issue of how experiments that work do so under specific circum-
stances. Experiments on the effects of the release of GMO in the soil using
a so-called microcosm (Cambrosio et al. 1992) tell you a lot about what
happens in the microcosm, but not necessarily about what happens in the
wider world. When society (and the world) is taken as the laboratory
(Krohn and Weyer 1994), it is impossible to do fully controlled experi-
ments. Learning through trial and error occurs but has its risks (when the
trials are dangerous) and are epistemologically limited because they follow
a particular learning trajectory. The example of the introduction of new
medical drugs and the monitoring of effects shows the possibilities as well
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as the limitations (i.e. risks) of the approach.
A further reason for scientific knowledge claims being underdeter-
mined is that to understand what you see, observe, or measure, you need a
“theory” of the situation (of the experiment, of the apparatus), somewhat
separate from the theory of the phenomena. A striking example, studied in
detail by Galison (1987), involves high-energy physics experiments. For
new and/or contested observations which do not fit with the present un-
derstanding, the direction to go cannot be decided unambiguously: it may
be that the theory of the situation is OK, but the theory of the phenomena
to be measured/observed is wrong – or the other way around. In the exper-
iments in CERN and other particle accelerator facilities, the background
phenomena and apparatus are modelled with the help of a theory of the
experiment. The CERN researchers studied by Galison only “found” a new
particle when they changed their theory of the experiment.10
Modelling background phenomena is also important for policy-rele-
vant science, for example, when environmental effects have to be estimat-
ed. If the choices involved remain invisible, the pretenses that have gone
into the final results will remain underexposed. Criticism from scientists
or other involved actors may be necessary. In general, findings should be
presented also in terms of the choices made to obtain them. In quality
control terminology, one could speak of the ‘traceability’ of knowledge
packages. The general philosophical point here is that knowledge claims
are inferences to the best explanation, and the inferential path, with its
checks and further considerations, determines the quality of the outcome
(Lipton 1991).11
From a general and philosophical concern about the underdetermination
of scientific knowledge claims, I have now progressed to consideration of
the actual trajectories followed in the attempts to produce more or less
solid findings. One can then inquire into the nature of such trajectories,
and the de facto requirements made on them, given their history and con-
text.
The first requirement derives from the observation that the definition and
pursuit of specific trajectories are often predicated on a partial closure of a
broader debate. In a sense, one has to put on blinders to make concrete
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progress – hopefully in the right direction! Thomas Kuhn (1970) dis-
cussed so-called scientific revolutions, where epistemic issues are high-
lighted, and emphasized how a new paradigm emerges and becomes dom-
inant. Epistemic debate is then backgrounded, and ‘normal science’, with
its own kind of challenges, ensues and allows progress to be made until
persistent anomalies are thrown up in the course of research within the
paradigm and lead to a renewal of epistemic debate. In other words, the
closure of broader questions can be opened up again through the work
along the trajectory made possible by the closure itself.
The phenomenon of partial closure to make progress is broader than
the Kuhnian examples and does not depend on the emergence of a para-
digm. The study of and debate about the environmental release of geneti-
cally modified organisms (GMOs) provide examples. One issue is that of
possible evolutionary impacts, which could not be settled by regular em-
pirical and logical arguments. The two main contending positions are vis-
ible in these quotes:
“In contrast to conventional breeding, genetic engineering can transfer genes between
species which are widely different in evolutionary terms. However, the greater the
evolutionary distance between the species, the lower the probability that they will
somehow converge. Therefore, the further genetic engineering moves beyond the limits
of traditional breeding, the less reason there is to fear that it could trigger evolutionary
processes which end up in species mixtures and a loss of differentiation in the species
spectrum.” (Van den Daele et al. 1997; 34)
“The fundamental premiss of evolutionary theory is that natural selection (..)
operates on genetic alterations (...) to produce evolutionary change. It follows that at
least some genetic alterations improve the abilities of organisms to survive, to
reproduce, to compete for resources, or to invade new habitats (...). A general assertion
that genetic alterations (...) always lower the fitness of organisms is therefore not
warranted and runs counter to basic evolutionary principles.” (Sharples 1985, quoted
in Von Schomberg 1997; 75).
The debate is further complicated by the question of whether genetic engineering is
‘special’ or just like traditional breeding. The latter suggestion can be used to assuage
fears (nothing unusual is happening) but can also be turned around, because “even
traditional breeding has not been ecologically trouble-free” (Colwell et al. 1985, quoted
in Von Schomberg 1997; 66)
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Partial closure occurred when the regulation of genetic manipulation, and
then also of field tests of GMOs, started to use evolutionary distance as a
criterion of acceptability. Untoward events may break up the closure, but also
societal and cultural considerations – always implicated in epistemic debates.
An example would be the spread of GMOs outside fenced-off fields and the
consequent concern (and liability) of other farmers, as well as consumers
who want GMO-free food. The recognition, by now, that the latter is impossi-
ble (as in the USA legislation about labelling, where GMO-free food may con-
tain up to 1% contamination – an example of material underdetermination)
will lead to a reconsideration of the evolutionary debate.
The second requirement is the recognition of uncertainty as part of the
dynamics of the trajectory. There are varying degrees of tolerance of uncer-
tainty, in general and specifically, in relation to the novelty introduced
through scientific research and related knowledge claims. 12  Uncertainty
can be, and generally is, tolerated within a scientific specialty, especially by
the ‘core set’ working at the research front (Collins 1985). In this sense, a
specialty is enabling, even if there are constraints because of the cognitive,
technical and “tribal” norms. These provide, as it were, a protected space
in which researchers can live with uncertainty.
However, when knowledge is to be used in professional activities
(whether in another scientific specialty, in professional practice, or in prepar-
ing policies and decisions), actors want it to be as solid as possible, except in
situations when there is an interest in finding an opening for alternatives, and
then uncertainties are welcomed. When scientific findings are disseminated
to broader audiences, the link with action is absent, or indirect, and there is
more tolerance of, or perhaps just indifference to, uncertainty.
One immediate implication is that the pressure to reduce uncertainty
and to achieve ‘closure’ is different in the three contexts – the tribal norms
are different for different tribes. One such difference relates to the time
horizon for action. Within a scientific specialty, the quest for “the” truth
has no definite time limit, even if there may be, in competitive areas, a race
to be first. For practical purposes, whether this is getting an instrument to
work in an experiment or expert advice contributing to a decision-making
process, to have ‘solid’ knowledge available has to fit time schedules of
action. In the public sphere, it is important to enable concerted action, cf.
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interest in consensus conferences, and similar attempts to separate the
‘solid’ from the still uncertain. Another indicator is the impatience of deci-
sion-makers and politicians with the conditional statements of scientific
experts and their “on the one hand/on the other hand” vacillations.
To apply the norms of the policy tribe to the work within a scientific
specialty may well be counterproductive. And even counterproductive to
the goals of the policy tribe itself: the pressure for certainty includes a pref-
erence for ‘solid facts’ rather than theories and models. This creates a
problem when anticipatory assessments have to be made for which obser-
vation or measurements are impossible by definition. The fourth vignette
in the Introduction to this essay, about American Congressmen clamour-
ing for sound science, testifies to this.
The third requirement refers to the process of reaching closure, as increas-
ing alignment and acceptance of the alignment achieved as sufficient to
base further work on. The solidity of scientific findings is a matter of align-
ment of controlled observations and theoretical considerations and the
decision that there is enough certainty, for the time being. The process as
well as such explicit or de facto decisions can take place within the protect-
ed space of a specialty or a discipline, but even then cultural and moral
values, interests and circumstances play a role, because these are part of
the construction and maintenance of such protected spaces.13
The ‘state of the art’ in a scientific specialty or domain of research re-
flects the specifics of the earlier sociocognitive processes – a further path-
dependency, now at the level of a domain of research. A good example is
how the state of stratosphere research in the 1960s and early 1970s reflect-
ed efforts to address concerns about effects of supersonic transport air-
craft, which then shaped the possibilities for further research as well as
identification of risks. In particular, Rowland and Molina’s 1974 early
warning about possible damage to the ozone layer from chlorofluorocar-
bons was predicated on data and insights from this trajectory (Callon and
Rip 1992; Rip 1992).
Another intriguing example of how a path was constructed is how the
American Department of Energy became involved with human genomics.
Because of its earlier involvement in the biological effects of low-level radi-
ation, it had built up a tradition of (molecular) biological research and an
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infrastructure including synchotrons. This led to strong participation in
the Human Genome project ten years ago and now to the new and ambi-
tious Program Genomics to Life, focusing on protein complexes that func-
tion as molecular machines, and on microbial consortia. As Program Co-
ordinator David Thomassen said in an interview: “DoE has always had the
flexibility to fund risky research, more than for example the National Insti-
tutes of Health.” 14
There is path-dependent learning involved in and through the alignment
processes. Such learning is open-ended, because nobody knows the ‘right’
answers. It is also collective, rather than individual learning. The notion of
repertoire learning is particularly useful here, and this can be illustrated by
studies of controversies and their outcomes within science as well as sci-
ence-related controversies in society. An eventual alignment creates a rep-
ertoire of considerations which are difficult to go against. In that sense, the
outcome is robust, even if it can be undermined when new arguments,
interests, or values unravel the existing alignment.
Robustness can then be explicated as the combination of consolidation
and well-articulated alignment. The example of the smoking-health link is
instructive to show the importance of the combination of the two. Such a
link was implicated in the prohibition of smoking in some USA states in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, the argument being that smoking is what
morally depraved individuals do (so it must be prohibited) and will lead to
diseases (as punishment for their sins). This not very well articulated align-
ment broke down in and after the First World War, when the cultural aspects
of smoking cigarettes shifted. During the war, citizen groups started to send
cigarettes to soldiers because the cigarette was an “indispensable comfort to
the men”. Moral associations now became positive, the cigarette being iden-
tified with “quiet dignity, courage, and dedication above all” (Troyer and
Markle 1983, p. 40-41). In contrast, by the 1970s, after extended controver-
sies, the smoking-health link had been articulated in great detail, and cultural
shifts (for example, the attempt to link smoking with individual freedom)
could not undermine the “edifice” that had been constructed.
Turning the tables from a retrospective understanding of controversies
and their outcomes, as they occur, to the question of requirements to sup-
port the construction of robust knowledge, it is necessary to identify what
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will work again, at other times and in other places. In these examples,
robustness is an outcome of interactions and struggles, some of them di-
rected towards traditional scientific robustness, others stemming from
values, and again others being part of interest strategies. My claim is that
articulation of the quality of alignments is served by such agonistic (and
sometimes antagonistic) interactions. They force actors to articulate the
merits of their position, to search for arguments and counter-arguments,
and to commission special research. (This is a broadening of the Popperi-
an-Mertonian emphasis on fallibilism and organized scepticism, which
now appears as a special case within the protected space of an academic
scientific community abstracted from many of the vicissitudes of the real
world.) Of course, such agonistic struggles can lead to impasses, when
parties limit themselves to mutual labelling of the other as contemptibly
wrong (as has happened in the debate on nuclear energy and is happening
to some extent in the biotechnology debate, where third parties including
supermarkets now mitigate the impasse). Within academic science, con-
troversies can similarly become unproductive when insider-outsider or
regular-deviant labelling eclipses productive interaction.
Robustness of knowledge is better served by some arrangements than
by others. That was Campbell’s point about tribal norms, as they function
within the academic world. I have broadened his point to include further
interactions and processes. The pursuit of robust knowledge remains, but
the division of labour in its production may change. For example, the
delegation of the production of robust knowledge as well as the assess-
ment of its robustness need not be limited to the relevant scientific and
technological communities.
The examples I discussed were mostly about science-as-we-know-it,
with identifiable sites and practitioners. The kind of robustness we see
then is predicated on these circumstances. The notion of robustness as
alignment is more general and can be used to formulate broader questions
of knowledge production and assurance of its quality.
2.2 The richness of knowledge production, in its various modes
The challenge which has been addressed by modern science is how to
transform local knowledge into knowledge valid at other times and in
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other places. Formulated in this way, the challenge is broad and can be
taken up by other approaches than science-as-we-know-it. It is what drove
Renaissance experimenters; physicists trying to formulate so-called uni-
versal laws; professional consultants advising a variety of clients; and
Mpemba, a Tanzanian boy making ice cream to sell after school and find-
ing out that putting still-hot milk in the fridge froze faster than cold milk
put in the same fridge.
Mpemba’s claim and his story, wonderfully told by David Turnbull
(1998), has predecessors in Aristotle and Francis Bacon. Bacon’s observa-
tion that slightly warm water is more easily frozen than quite cold water is
cited by Thomas Kuhn (1970, p. 16) as the kind of fact gathered by natural
histories prior to the emergence of a first paradigm (which would exclude
them) and which “we are now quite unable to confirm”. A physicist visit-
ing Mpemba’s school, however, conducted a series of experiments con-
firming the phenomenon and published it, together with Mpemba, in a
physics education journal used to publish outcomes from school experi-
ments (Mpemba and Osborne 1969). It was then taken up by the UK mag-
azine New Scientist, which received a plethora of similar observations, and
resurrected again in 1995 when fluid dynamics physicist Auerbach tried to
explain the phenomenon and published on it.
The story of “Mpemba’s physics” as David Turnbull phrases it has a
number of morals. One is about the risks of projecting findings made un-
der controlled circumstances on to what happens out there, without doing
the work of translation. Minnaert’s book, Natuurkunde van het vrije veld,
originally written in the 1930s, is legendary, and rightly so, in having taken
up the challenge.15  The magazine New Scientist has a tradition of being
open to such puzzles. What this shows is the importance of reconsidering
too easy claims of establishment physics when faced with accumulated
knowledge in local practices.
Three modes of robust knowledge production
Robustness of knowledge production has to do with local search practices
becoming linked, their products becoming more or less decontextualized
and able to travel to other locations without losing their validity. From this
perspective, three main modalities of knowledge production can be distin-
guished. The importance of introducing the notion of modalities is to cre-
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ate some independence from traditional disciplinary distinctions, which
are primarily institutional (see 2.3).
The first modality or mode of knowledge production is based on circu-
lation of embodied knowledge and partial articulations and codifications
between local practices. This is the main mode of knowledge production in
traditional knowledge, in the crafts, and in professional communities, also
today, even when there is also strong input from other kinds of knowledge.
The importance of clinical judgement in medical practice would be one
example.
The second modality can be called “natural history”, to honour a vener-
able tradition. Circulation remains important but may be more extended
and consciously sought after, as when Aristotle collected and refined ob-
servations and travelers’ tales, or 17th and 18th century amateurs collected
specimens, museums and gardens were established, and scholars were
hired to study the collections (Westrum 1978; Stemerding 1991). The key
element is the attempt to recognize patterns which extend over time and
place. Since the 19th century, collection, refinement and pattern recogni-
tion have become quite sophisticated; geographical information systems
(GIS) being one example. In fact, there are good reasons to speak of the
rise of a ‘new’ natural history, as I will discuss below.
The third modality is the production of knowledge under controlled
circumstances, in a laboratory and in experimental situations more gener-
ally. This starts out as a local practice, and its reproduction in another local
practice, say, a laboratory attempting to also build a new kind of laser, is
fraught with difficulties which can often only be resolved by visiting the
original location and learning relevant skills (Collins 1974, see also Collins
1985 on replication more generally). The idea is that the phenomena creat-
ed under such restricted circumstances allow access to background regu-
larities which are valid more generally – at the very least as long as one can
recreate the relevant circumstances.16
The power of experiment is clear, but the further claim that it allows
access to background regularities, up to universal laws, and understanding
of the building blocks of the universe (and of society, for that matter) is less
easy to defend. The ideology of the scientific experiment and the attendant
theory building has become so strong, however, that a special effort is nec-
essary to show the limitations. That is why I had to start discussing, in 2.1,
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Figure 1:  Three modes of robust knowledge production
Figure 1 visualizes the three modes of knowledge production and adds the
observation that the distance to “unrestricted” local practices increases
from the first to the third mode of knowledge production. Translations
and transformations between the knowledge claiming to transcend local
practices and subsequent local practices to which these claims are to be
applied are always necessary,17  but they require more effort going from
the first to the second and then the third mode of knowledge production.
On the other hand, if these efforts are successful, they can create impres-
sive effects, as when Pasteur, in the late 19th century, demonstrated the
power of his laboratory-based vaccine to protect sheep from anthrax – after
carefully reconstructing the world outside the laboratory so that it would
allow the emergence of this effect (Latour 1983, Latour 1984). In that
sense, applying knowledge acquired in a laboratory to the wider world is a
form of colonizing the world. Colonialism, in spite of the present and neg-
ative politically correct connotations of the word, has some good things to
it as well.
There is a trade-off between control over circumstances, gradually increas-
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ing from independence derived from moving across different localities
through summation points like musea (Westrum 1978) to laboratories,
and an easy relevance to real-world situations. Some authors have high-
lighted the importance of local knowledge over distanced-experimental
knowledge, as when Brian Wynne showed how Cumbrian shepherds had
more relevant knowledge about after-Chernobyl radiation effects on loca-
tion than the experts advising on regulatory measures (Wynne 1996). On
the other hand, this relevance of local knowledge is predicated on local
circumstances remaining the same or changing only slowly. An adequate
response to rapid and/or larger changes requires an idea of background
dynamics and patterns, enduring processes and underlying mechanisms.
In other words, local knowledge should not be glorified. But it cannot be
automatically assumed that the tradition of Western science-as-we-know-
it, in spite of its achievements until now, has all the answers.
A socio-epistemic history of Western science
Over time, the importance of the controlled-circumstances mode of
knowledge production has grown, and at the expense of relevance to con-
crete and complex situations. Epistemologically, it is a matter of (always
partial) reduction of variability and heterogeneity which is conducive to
knowledge production, but at a cost of distance from “unrestricted” prac-
tices and their complexity. Historically, ‘natural history’ refers to our at-
tempts to map the world and its development. From a major intellectual
thrust (with Aristotle, and the scholars of the 17th and 18th century, and
practitioners all along) it became a backwater, pushed aside by experi-
ment-oriented high science.
Since the 19th century, the disciplinary hierarchy in the sciences is
based on the claim that lab sciences (and work under controlled conditions
more generally) are better in producing valid knowledge than work under
non-controlled conditions.18  Even if, as Ian Hacking (1992) phrased it, lab
science is great, it is about the lab world. This hierarchy is actually a tempo-
rary cross-section of a longer evolution over the centuries and may there-
fore change again. Or perhaps we shall do away with disciplinary hierar-
chies altogether.
The hierarchy has hybrid origins. The epistemic advantage of reduc-
tion of variability was combined with the social and political advantage of
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excluding deviants, that is, actors and approaches not acceptable to estab-
lishments. The second half of the 17th century is a turning point, when the
earlier variety (including reformist and revolutionary approaches) was re-
duced in order to have a Royal Society in the UK and an Académie des
Sciences in France (Van den Daele 1997a, 1997b). Social distancing strat-
egies and exclusion actions created “high” sciences, linked to establish-
ments (royal or otherwise), and availing themselves of what Thomas Kuhn
was to call paradigms, visible in policing actions. “Low” sciences, on the
other hand, were open to whatever appeared to be interesting and useful to
practitioners in relation to a variety of audiences, from the fairs and mar-
kets to the newly emerging industries.
In other words, a socio-epistemic history of science is necessary to show
the historical contingency of the present situation – and in particular what
I see as an unholy alliance between high science and science as an ideo-
graph, and to show the possibility of transcending these limitations. Fig-
ure 2 arranges the variety of approaches and disciplines with the help of
two dimensions: one dimension refers to control over conditions, the oth-
er dimension refers to societal status and the possibility of background
alternative approaches.
Variety of search practices and knowledge production, as defined by knowledge producers
low science high science
natural history Aristotelean “meteorology”, Darwin’s evolutionary theory, geo-
field sciences physical and cosmological theories
restrictedness chemistry, technical sciences From Boyle, Huygens, etc
(controlling materials and engineering (in 17th century) onward.
and circumstances) physics, economics, psychology;
now also molecular biology?
Figure 2
The main diagonal runs from “low” and heterogeneous knowledge pro-
duction of the ‘natural history’ type to high science based on ‘restricted’
circumstances. That is how the history of modern science is often written.
It reflects a purification trend, as Latour (1993) would call it, which has a
material side to it as well, if one considers for example the capacity to pro-
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duce pure chemical compounds (Rip 1982). But it also creates and main-
tains a specific view of the history of science, which reinforces status dif-
ferences. From such a point of view, the achievements of high, restricted
science justify colonization from the lower righthand corner into the
neighbouring boxes, and by now also into the top left corner, for example
in present-day meteorology. The scheme should be read not as an argu-
ment for three centuries of progress in science, but as reflecting the histor-
ical foregrounding of particular modes of knowledge production as (mod-
ern) science. There will be débordements, however, and these become visi-
ble in boundary struggles and in problems of applying scientific insights
in the real, that is, unrestricted world.
The challenge to address the phenomena out there has by now led to
new theoretical approaches, as in Prigogine & Stenger’s analysis of “order
out of chaos”.19  And the tradition of ‘natural history’ has been revitalized
through the increasing importance of the sciences of the environment.
Measuring, mapping and modelling the world become a scientific chal-
lenge in their own right – one might speak of the “3M” sciences – and are
pursued with the help of the new information and communication tech-
nology.20  Thanks partly to the competencies acquired from its coloniza-
tion by high and restricted science, heterogeneous natural history is strik-
ing out in new ways, for example pattern recognition in genomics (cf. in-
troduction to Section 2). The new natural history is here to stay.
To restrict or to un-restrict?
There are definite limitations to the focus on restricted circumstances as
the only basis for the production of robust knowledge. The well-known
physicist (and one-time director of Philips’s central research laboratory)
Casimir observed that in making experimental arrangements for quantita-
tive measurements, we may eliminate the possibility of new phenomena
appearing (Casimir, 1983, p. 161). His example was Lenard’s set-up, which
was better for certain quantitative studies than Röntgen’s, and therefore
Lenard did not discover X-rays (Röntgen rays). The point can be formulat-
ed generally: by restricting and protecting we become productive, but our
backgrounding of the complexities of the material and social world may
also limit our opportunities to discover new and interesting phenomena.
Apart from such self-inflicted limitations on discovery, the quest for
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restrictedness creates further problems when the findings of such lab sci-
ence are expected to apply to the complexities of the real world. The world
has to be domesticated before the findings from the lab are applicable.
And such domestication may create its own problems. The war against
germs, made possible by Pasteur and other’s domestications (see Latour
1983), has its sequel in the acquired resistance of bacteria against antibiot-
ics, which by now has led to the equivalent of the arms race between men
and bacteria.21  Given the complexities and contingencies of the natural
world, well-intentioned actions may backfire when building on findings
from restricted experiments.
One can read my analysis as an argument to unrestrict and perhaps not
restrict at all. Such arguments are in fact being made, for example by envi-
ronmentalists. There is also the interest in the value of local knowledge, as
of Cumbrian shepherds after Chernobyl (Wynne 1991, Wynne 1996), and
in indigenous knowledge even if this interest is often in exploiting it for
other purposes, as indigenous people increasingly realize.
When Brush (1999) interviewed farmers about nomenclature and preferences for the
native potatoes of the Tulumayo Valley in Peru, one response was: “I expect that my
potatoes will make you rich”. Somewhat disingenuously, Brush continues after this
quote in his paper: “The comment was not unanticipated, but it still baffled me.”
There is a fine line to be drawn between the recognition of the value and
potential robustness of local and indigenous knowledge, and embracing
such knowledge as an antidote to the colonialism of Western science. It is
indeed important to be able to relativize one’s reliance on the Western/
modern tradition and appreciate what happens elsewhere, but one should
not go native either. Wynne (1996) as well as Van der Ploeg (1996) wrestle
with this issue.To put it briefly, and in my terms: one must require knowl-
edge claims to have validity elsewhere and at other times, even if only in
the next valley of the Andes.
Some form of theory or at least pattern recognition is necessary to
move findings from one location to another or to apply them to a future
situation. It might well be that this always requires a measure of restricted-
ness. The revenge of natural history cannot then be complete.
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2.3 Protected spaces, and disciplines as partial ordering
Nested protected spaces are the distinguishing characteristic of knowledge
production in science-as-we-know-it. Protected spaces have material, so-
cio-cultural and institutional aspects. This is very clear in the notion of a
laboratory as a place where experiments can be conducted under restricted
conditions; these conditions include the disciplining of its inhabitants and
the exclusion of unwanted visitors. Field sciences have more difficulties in
creating the desired protection, but attempt to create their boundaries as
well. Embracing interference is frowned upon in high science.
The effect of protected spaces is the reduction of interference and of
variety. In other words, productivity is based on exclusion. This holds for
laboratories (and their equivalents) and for disciplinary scientific commu-
nities which guard their status.
Part of the work in research practices is to transform the local produc-
tion of knowledge items into more cosmopolitan knowledge claims – as in
a scientific paper. Such claims are addressed to non-local audiences as
constituted by a research area or problem area.22  These audiences and
areas can be hybrid, as was (and is) the case in many sub-areas of chemis-
try. Research areas, specialties and disciplines offer spaces for cosmopli-
tan scientific work. They enable at the same time as they constrain. Thus,
they offer protected spaces.
Further institutionalization with established journals and, somewhat
later, departments or subdepartments in universities will create a recog-
nized specialty, with its own paradigm, cognitive style, and ideals of expla-
nation. The history of the emergence of disciplines and specialties (within
disciplines or crossing borders as happened for example with physical
chemistry in late 19th century) started in the late 18th century (cf. Hufbauer
1982), but disciplines became serious business with professionalization
and the revitalisation of higher education in the 19th century, also with
respect to research. By the late 19th century, disciplines were dominant
institutional categories, sedimented and codified in university depart-
ments and library categories.
One sees the features of Mode 1 here. To count Mode 1 as a fully
fledged regime of scientific knowledge production, it is also necessary that
the arrangement of laboratory and field research, disciplines, institutions
126 Arie Rip
like universities but also some public research institutes like the Physika-
lische Reichsanstalt in Germany is recognized and accepted by the state and
by civil society as the way to do science. In a sense, this is a social contract
between science and society. It is definitely a protected space, now at the
macro-level, which enables and constrains.
The three types of spaces (micro, meso, and macro) are not independ-
ent. And if they are aligned and become nested spaces, they form a lock-in
which can be hard to change. This is how Mode 1 evolved and was rein-
forced after the Second World War through the advent of new institutions
like science funding agencies. The label “Science, The Endless Frontier”
(after the title of Vannevar Bush’s (1945) Report to the USA President
about the role and organization of science in the USA after the war) can be
used to characterize much of this regime.
Such a characterization and the underlying recognition of the dynam-
ics involved allow further questions to be raised: could this regime evolve
further and eventually transform into a new regime? If Gibbons et al.
(1994) are right, a new regime – their Mode 2 – is upon us. Whether they
are right or not in their specific diagnosis, regimes do evolve. Recent stud-
ies of national research systems have shown general patterns, first in the
emergence of a typically modern research system since 1870 (Rip and Van
der Meulen 1996), then in the way new interactions and institutions have
emerged which addressed evolving interaction between science and socie-
ty (Rip 2002). These studies limit themselves, however, to the organisa-
tion of science and science policy. The complete dynamics must include
modalities of knowledge production as well.
An important entrance point to understand the complete dynamics is
to focus on the link between knowledge production and sponsorship of
knowledge production, in particular in Western science. Sponsorship con-
sists of various forms of patronage over the centuries, up to present sci-
ence policy and university-industry interactions.
To show this, let me go back in time to the European Renaissance. Imme-
diate and bilateral patron-client relationships developed into a triangular
scheme, in which the patron needed advice about his sponsorship, say of a
painting, a sculpture, or an engineering work, from a knowledgeable third
party – in particular, humanist and other Renaissance scholars, who
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might on other occasions profit from patronage themselves.
Galileo at the court of the Medici in Florence was first of all a courtier
who offered his work to his patron. As Biagioli (1993) shows in detail, Gal-
ileo looked carefully after his “local net” but was also active in building a
“cosmopolitan net” with his competing colleagues at other courts – the
competition focused on who could offer the more interesting things to
their respective patrons – and distancing himself from other, low-brow
clients of his patron. Galileo’s case has its specificities, but the pattern that
is visible is more general.
Such cosmopolitan interactions, while deriving from or at least cou-
pled to local contexts and interests, stimulated the emergence of virtual
communities, linked through circulating texts and their contents. The pa-
trons themselves could become invisible when institutions carrying re-
source mobilisation and the subsequent dispensing of resources emerged.
Scientific societies, especially in the eighteenth century, became such a
carrier, and the emergence of scholarly journals in the Republic of Letters
helped to support “cosmopolitan nets”. The influence of patronage games
continued in a more global way, as when institutional etiquette was en-
forced. A striking effect is how the need to appear courteous pushed the
struggles among practitioners below the surface presented to the outside
(cf. Shapin, 1994). Scientists are tradesmen rather than gentlemen but
need to behave and be seen to behave nicely to keep up legitimation.
When the balance shifted to the interactions within emerging and in-
stitutionalizing scholarly/scientific communities, concrete patrons were
increasingly backgrounded even if they remained indispensable. The
professionalization of science in the 19th century foregrounded the role of
communities of (competing) colleagues in judging scientists, their claims
and their promises. This is the birthplace of disciplines-as-we-know-them,
and the struggle about status (including attempts to create a hierarchy
among the disciplines).
Such a system of science created and maintained protected spaces and
enabled further developments. Scientific work became sufficiently inde-
pendent to relate to and profit from distributed sponsorship: from scholar-
ly societies, various patrons, the state (in particular in France and the Ger-
man states) and professional practices (in particular in the UK). The 1870s
mark a further change, with the state coming in as a distant sponsor held
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responsible for the endowment of science; and universities taking up re-
search and scholarship in earnest.
The increased role of the nation-state pushed the idea of a national
community of scientists located primarily at universities. Where there had
been self-styled spokespersons, it was now a scientific establishment with
institutionalized channels for lobbying and advice. This partial lock-in be-
came complete when government funding agencies expanded after the
Second World War – because the agencies were captured by the national
scientific communities, legitimated by the ideology of “Science, The End-
less Frontier”. Government science budgets were constructed, and scien-
tists divided the spoils (while voicing concerns about insufficient fund-
ing). Funding agencies were the bastion of disciplines, with occasional,
and now increasing, guilt feelings about multi- and interdisciplinary work
and attempts to respond to new developments.
Disciplines have other important footholds, like graduate schools in
the USA and the ensuing possibilities for an academic career; in libraries
(in spite of their own good intentions); and in a perverse way in the UK
Research Assessment Exercise of the last decade. Thus, disciplines are a
partial but important ordering of knowledge production, as well as of the
research system and the relationships with sponsors.
This is the history of Mode 1, one could say. But it is also the history of the
relationships with sponsors of science. A closer look at the variety of spon-
sorship relations shows that there was always more to science than the
regime of Mode 1 and allows a better view of the dynamics in the so-called
Mode 2.
Since the late 19th century, local and state governments and industrial
firms have used research and researchers for particular services, as em-
ployees and as contractors. But an element of sponsorship was added be-
cause of the expectation of general value of the findings (so no detailed
specifications) and because the researchers were allowed to further their
own reputation and career. This worked out differently in different scien-
tific fields. In chemistry, a productive practice developed in the late 19th
century of interactions with industry and other sponsors, including a
workable etiquette, which continued into the 20th century. This allowed
chemists to accommodate the new challenge of biotechnology in the
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1980s and 1990s. Biologists, on the other hand, had no such history of
interaction with industry (their practical relations with sponsors were in
medical and agricultural sectors), so the advent of biotechnology created
transitional problems, with conflicting etiquettes and complaints of na-
iveté (Rip and Van Steijn 1985).
The big charitable foundations, the first of which were established in
the early twentieth century, are the nearest equivalent to the earlier pa-
trons of science who could, and would, act according to their own discre-
tion. The Rockefeller Foundation, based in the USA, had a generalized
interest in the natural and social sciences, linked to its concern about the
future of the urban-industrial society. It has stimulated new developments
in biology (including work that paved the way for molecular biology), an-
thropology and social science from the 1930s until at least the 1960s. Be-
ing funded by the Rockefeller Foundation amplified the reputation of the
researcher and the research institution.
In addition to such concrete sponsors, one can see the emergence of
abstract sponsors: an indirect source of resources because reference to
them would support concrete resource mobilisation efforts (especially
with the state and with science funding agencies). In the case of chemistry,
these dynamics are very clear. The wishes of customers and sponsors were
internalized in the field, that is, need not be present as such to have an
influence. The functionalities the sponsors were interested in would be
realized through the heuristics that made up the paradigm or the regime
(Slack 1972; Van den Belt and Rip 1987).23  Instead of Bayer, Hoechst, ICI
or Dupont contracting for specific types of research, it was toward the
chemical industry in general (and also the medical and pharmaceutical
sector) that chemical research and researchers would be oriented, explicit-
ly or implicitly. Since reference to the importance of industry helped to
mobilize resources, industry became an ideograph. And the ideograph IN-
DUSTRY played the role of an abstract sponsor.
The reference to INDUSTRY has become increasingly important for
science in the late 20th century. Spokespersons for industry (that is, indus-
try) are expected to sit on committees, and chairmen of science funding
agencies are often required to have some experience in industry, or at least
in the private sector. By now, users have become important as an ideo-
graphic category as well (Shove and Rip 2001).
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There are other such combinations of concrete and abstract sponsors; the
military being a clear and, in the post World War II situation, very impor-
tant example – even if it cannot anymore be referred to without adding
special defence. The ideograph sustainability has become powerful in
recent years. ngos (non-governmental organisations) ranging from
Greenpeace to the International Council of Scientific Unions present
themselves as spokespersons and are involved in agenda-building for
science. Individual scientists and groups develop new approaches (includ-
ing holistic ones) to link up with sustainability. Being able to invoke
sustainability mobilizes symbolic and financial resources, even if it also
involves one in the debates and controversies about the environment, glo-
bal climate change, and issues of expertise and decision-making generally.
Abstract sponsors create a space, and perhaps a protected space, for scien-
tific research and are thus part of the evolving social contract between sci-
ence and society. They also play havoc with existing disciplinary distinc-
tions. Just as academic disciplines could emerge and stabilize through the
backgrounding of sponsors, the “return” of the sponsors introduces dy-
namics leading to hybrid scientific communities and hybrid forums carry-
ing new or at least modified ways of knowledge production. Patient associ-
ations in medical and health research would be a striking further example
(Callon et al. 2001).
In this way, I broaden the perspective on present changes beyond the
simple diagnosis in terms of a Mode 2 of scientific knowledge production.
And there are other elements to be added, which show how the interface
between science and society is changing and being articulated further and
showing partial institutionalization.24  For example, the role of science and
technology in wealth creation and contributing to the quality of life is gen-
erally accepted (and expected), but there is societal pressure to make the
actual impacts of research visible.
Society is now less fatalistic about the impacts of science and attendant
risks (as with molecular biology and genetic modification) and wants some
technology assessment done (including ethical aspects). And society wants
expertise (up to “sound science”) even in the face of large uncertainties.
Expertise is not limited to what regular science provides.
New stakeholders are becoming important (at all levels of the research
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system). Public scrutiny of science is now a fact of life. It has to do with
public understanding of science but, more importantly, with new interac-
tions in the risk society, including a critical appreciation of experts and
expertise. It also includes continuing trust in science even if specific devel-
opments are being criticized.
The projection of a Mode 2 cannot capture all these changes and
challenges. In fact, it may be too early to think of a new regime. Reduction of
variety can be counterproductive if it reduces the complexity without under-
standing what the complexity is about. For that reason alone, it is prudent to
entertain heterogeneity, cognitively, socio-culturally and institutionally.
3 In praise of heterogeneity: About the further co-evolution
of science and society
Heterogeneity was what we saw when we lifted the homogenising cover
off SCIENCE. This then is an argument for maintaining heterogeneity
and not being concerned overmuch with a loss of autonomy of science-as-
we-knew-it. Pure science, if it ever existed, was a result (and to some ex-
tent, a tactic for legitimacy) of a particular institutional arrangement in the
19th century German universities and in the research universities in the
USA (and elsewehere) which emulated them.
What we also saw was how Western science, that is science-as-we-
know-it as “Westerners”, has co-evolved with society – i.e. Western socie-
ties. In that sense, its shape and to some extent its contents are historically
contingent. The co-evolution continues and with a broader sense of society
than before. Science cannot continue its well-intentioned imperialism
without adapting to the further heterogeneities. Issues of sustainable de-
velopment bring out the possibilities and the tensions. As the UK ESRC
Science in Society Research Programme (2001) notes:
international environmental negotiations often pit Northern scientists, governments,
and NGOs, acting in the name of a global sustainable development agenda that is
heavily informed by the earth sciences, against Southern governments and citizen
organizations, whose concept of sustainable development is focused on more local
needs and local knowledge.
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A tension which has to be made tractable, somehow.
Gibbons et al. (1994) argue that Mode 2 is characterised by an increas-
ing heterogeneity in the cultivation of science. In their more triumphant
moments Mode 2 has the future to itself, especially when more and more
people listen to their diagnosis. My concern is with the basic richness of
knowledge production and the way various “modes” impinge on it. Re-
gimes and institutionalized modes of knowledge production discipline the
richness, unavoidably so, but (hopefully) not so as to completely contain it.
In combination with a particular institutional arrangement and overall so-
cietal legitimation, a lock-in can emerge which limits the co-evolution to
specific paths. The academic-disciplinary Mode 1 of Gibbons et al. (1994)
is an example of such a locked-in socio-epistemic constellation, and their
Mode 2 might become one.
Lock-ins will always occur, but some lock-ins are better than others. My
plea for maintaining heterogeneity, at least for the time being, can then be
positioned as a way to escape too rapid lock-ins. Under conditions of un-
certainty, it is only prudent to maintain variety. But heterogeneity is valua-
ble in its own right. This is why I highlighted natural history as a way to
embrace variety and recognize patterns rather than go all out in control-
ling the world.
The heterogeneity that is encountered at the moment can be deplored as
threatening science-as-we-know-it. But it can also be seen as a kind of
melting pot, and one similar in terms of openness and variety to the melt-
ing pot of the European Renaissance. If the 17th century represented an
unprecedented shift in the socio-cognitive history of science, it is impor-
tant to look more closely into the nature of knowledge production before
that time, in the 14th to 16th century European Renaissance.
For a birthplace of Western science as-we-know-it, it looked messy,
unruly, and without clear boundaries between various knowledges. There
were the (medieval) universities and travelling humanists, artists and en-
gineers. There were also almanac makers, astrologers, mountebanks and
ciarlatani performing tricks at the fairs. Princes and wealthy persons were
sought as sponsors, the scholarly work and craftwork to be done were de-
fined in terms of their wishes and aspirations, as well as those of the mar-
ketplace.
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One intriguing variety of knowledge production was through so-called ‘professors of
secrets’. They collected recipes from different crafts and some of their own experience,
and sold them at the fairs or to sponsors. The ambivalence in their position is curiously
similar to that of biotechnologists and other scientists in commercially important
areas. They had to advertise themselves and their knowledge in order to create some
visibility. However, at the same time they had to keep their secrets in order to
maintain a competitive advantage over other such ‘professors’ operating at the same
market or for the same sponsors (Eamon 1985).
The so-called scientific revolution of the 17th century replaced unruliness
with proper procedure (in scientific academies) and started to create
boundaries between mechanical philosophy and the crafts (Van den Daele
1977a, b). Whether one sees this as an achievement or as de-humanisation
(Toulmin 1990), the rationalistic mode of knowledge production which
eventually emerged has grown out of the fertile soil of the Renaissance.
The richness, variety and openness of knowledge production at the time
were important for the scientific revolution. And it remained, and re-
mains, important as a backdrop to high science and as a source of renewal.
The recognition of the role of heterogeneity is particularly important to
appreciate different cultures: within science, and in the various “trading
zones”, but also in society in general, at a time when multiculturalism is
increasing, and attempts are being made to define an African Renaissance
with its own kind of knowledge production, or to have Islamic science dif-
fer from Western science. Worldwide, there is an “indigenous Renais-
sance” (Battiste 2000), and to support indigenous knowledge efforts has
become politically correct. While my emphasis on the importance of heter-
ogeneity can be read as an argument for a multicultural scenario, and I
would be willing to make such an argument, there is also the idea of a
“melting pot” and thus the need to avoid high fences between the cultures.
Productive knowledge production requires some further specification,
however, and some closure of epistemic debate. One such provisional clo-
sure refers to the status and productive use of expertise, in regulatory sci-
ence and in attempts to create (precariously) new and authoritative fo-
rums. Another provisional closure is the allowance of different cosmovi-
sions referring to different cultural backgrounds: indigenous knowledge
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versus Western science, but also Muslim, Chinese or Japanese approaches
to knowledge production. To accept the knowledge claims from the differ-
ent cultural backgrounds as rightful is politically correct. But such a multi-
cultural scenario has to be checked for how productive its alignments are,
that is, how essential tensions can be made tractable.
There are risks when cultural communities take over the quality con-
trol that used to be effected by disciplinary communities. The same exclu-
sionary tactics will be involved (“we are the only ones who can judge”), but
these tactics will foreground cultural heritage rather than new knowledge
production. The multicultural scenario can be traced and evaluated be-
cause funding programs and national science policy in a number of
countries have special support and funding for indigenous knowledge.
Pressures to do so are bottom-up, with the advent of an “indigenous Ren-
aissance” worldwide (Battiste 2000), and top-down, with the political cor-
rectness of supporting indigenous knowledge efforts in countries like
South Africa and New Zealand.
I shall take New Zealand’s funding of Maori Knowledge and Develop-
ment research as a test case for the multicultural scenario. I shall refer
back to some disciplinary tribes within Western science, to relativize the
contrast between indigenous knowledge and high science.
High fences might well be raised, and the protected space may become a
strong shelter from outside influences. By way of example, I shall present
a mini-scenario (with an added twist). There is a special budget in New
Zealand’s Science Vote for Maori Knowledge and Development, which is
translated into dedicated portfolios of the science funding agencies. Maori
Development research must be by the Maori, for the Maori, and work from
a Maori world view and approach to knowledge (kaupapa Maori). In addi-
tion, the conduct of research must adhere to tikanga Maori, customary
practices and principles, including the judgment of what looks right.25
High-level (non-Maori) science policy officials insist that “Maori world-
views have equal status alongside Western science.” In the funding agen-
cies and the research-performing institutions, there is a tendency to go for
projects where Maori knowledge of a natural history kind is input for a
Western-style research project. From the side of the Maori, there is insist-
ence on a layered view of knowledge with differential access. This justifies
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the limitation of participation to researchers who identify and belong, and
general restrictions of access to community and personal knowledge (and
the additional issue of communal intellectual property rights).
Does this imply that assessment of research proposals and research
results must be done by Maori, and that quality will be defined as follow-
ing a Maori approach? This will be politically correct, but there will be a
danger of a closed-shop. Therefore, “trading zones” are important between
indigenous knowledge and Western science, but also between quality-con-
trol communities and the wider world. The necessary translations and
transformations need not be in place yet, but the challenge to create them
is important.
The added twist is the comparison with old-boys’ networks in Western
science. And relatedly, of “pockets” of research continuing more or less on
their own terms, like high-energy physics. John Ziman (1981) once por-
tayed them as the HEP tribe (joined precariously with the HET tribes). Their
kaupapa is more esoteric than that of the Maori, and they have their tribal
norms, and tikanga more generally (Traweek 1988). In other words, if one
condemns Maori-development research, one might also have to condemn
high-energy physics.
Closed-shops are protected spaces at the meso-level, which can be main-
tained as long as the circumstances are right: financial and professional
resources for ever more ambitious particle accelerators in high-energy
physics, political and cultural resources (and over time, human resources)
for Maori Knowledge and Development research.
In both cases, I would want the protection to be partial only and have
outsiders, sympathetic or otherwise, involved in assessing the robustness
of the knowledge being produced. Support for indigenous knowledge is
often argued in terms of overcoming colonialism, while support for high-
energy physics is claimed because it extends the frontiers of knowledge
(with the implicit imperialism that such extensions are the right of high-
energy physics). In both cases, one must have a closer, no-nonsense look
at the knowledge production, using the ideas of robustness and variety of
modes of knowledge production set out in Section 2 of this essay.
There are other scenarios for science and knowledge production in the 21st
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century. There is the brave new world of biotech, genomics, and nanotech-
nology. These developments are undoubtedly important. But the promises
will be fulfilled (if at all) in a process of co-evolution between science and
society – where versions of multiculturalism will be important, as for ex-
ample currently in the differences in appreciation of genetic modification
of plants, animals, and perhaps humans.
There is also the pervasive role of information and communication
technologies. In my diagnosis of the situation of knowledge production,
the new natural history approaches are the key development for science in
the 21st century. Information and communication technologies are not
just an important support to the new natural history, but also help shape
its contents. One striking phenomenon is how information and commu-
nication technologies can address issues of indigenous knowledge, for ex-
ample in making layered access to knowledge possible.
In all scenarios, a recurrent issue is the quality of the knowledge which
is produced and taken up. My analysis in terms of robustness, protected
spaces and agonistic interactions allows me to specify, in conclusion, a
number of requirements for the processes and arrangements for robust
knowledge production. Such requirements could be used to evaluate pos-
sible scenarios, but also for real-life developments that invite reflection
and action.
Briefly, almost aphoristically:
– Profit from lab science, that is, insights and effects derived under con-
trolled conditions, but without being overwhelmed by its promising
possibilities. There is more complexity in the world than can be
shoveled away by pushing for controlled conditions.
– Give old and new ‘natural history’ modes of knowledge a central place
in their own right, and to address major issues of environment and
sustainability.
– Forget about disciplines as traditionally defined and kept apart and de-
velop a patchwork of partially overlapping domains of knowledge pro-
duction (which are present anyhow). Include the social sciences and
humanities in the spectrum (Rip 1995). Domains of knowledge pro-
duction might be defined in terms of specific approaches and world
views, but only when openings for agonistic interaction remain.
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– Instead of going for interdisciplinarity as a goal, develop heterogene-
ous knowledge management. The present interest in interdisciplinary
research is an effect of the hold disciplines have on doing science, and
the wish to overcome the hold, rather than there being value in inter-
disciplinary research as such. A lateral approach would be to start from
the possibility to “manage” knowledge and its arrangements and con-
stellations, and develop ways to manage heterogeneous knowledge
production. There are intriguing examples, as when indigenous knowl-
edge (of Zulu farming women, of medicine men and women), ngos,
agricultural extension services and research stations, and worldwide
agricultural and rural development insights and findings form a patch-
work quilt in ongoing attempts to improve subsistence agriculture in a
valley in Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa.26
– The input from new stakeholders gets regularized, starting with their
role as spokespersons for abstract sponsors, say Greenpeace for sus-
tainability, patient associations for health (cf. Callon et al. 2001),
etc. This is actually a further differentiation and institutionalization of
what counts as the interface between science and society. As a meso-
and macro-protected space, it can (and should) be evaluated in terms of
its potential for robust knowledge production.
– Public involvement more generally based not on so-called public un-
derstanding of science, but on public appreciation which includes
skills like ‘science savvy’ and ‘scientific connoisseurship.27
– There will be links between the levels of the systems of knowledge pro-
duction, up to partial lock-ins in the form of nested spaces. This can be
productive, but openings and interstices must remain.
There is no guarantee that such requirements will overcome the essential
tension between search and authority (including the implied authority of
existing institution and the social order). But it can make it tractable: pro-
ductive work is possible, and change is not prohibited.
My storyline has emphasised a three-level dynamic: (i) varying, hetero-
geneous practices of knowledge production, (ii) meso-level organisations,
institutions with their inertia and openings for change, and (iii) possible
lock-ins when interactions with environments are (re)structured as a pro-
tected space. I then argued for opening up such protected spaces, or at
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least be reflexive about them and keep their boundaries permeable.
This perspective and the suggestions for action are not in the modern-
ist vein, where challenges are identified and actors rise to meet them. It is
a reflective approach: looking back, identifying paths taken and their alter-
natives, trying to see how these may shape the present and the future. And
then trying to modulate the dynamics, based on this understanding and on
further reflection on their value.
Notes
1 As Kuhn (1977) phrased it and Polanyi (1963) experienced it.
2 See Law (1994) about the search for “root order” as the basic project of modernity
itself, and its link with two more ancient traditions: “a monotheistic commitment
to a single source of knowledge, and the hegemonic commitment to spread the
good news” (quotes from p. 7), and Latour (1991) about “purification” as the
thrust of modernity, while its practices continue to be replete with “hybrid
monsters”.
3 In this essay, I use ‘science’ in the Anglo-Saxon sense, where it can be contrasted
with the humanities (and with the hybrid category of ‘social sciences’).
Continental European countries have a tradition of Wissenschaft which
encompasses the whole range. When the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences
(KNAW) wants to indicate the range of scholarly work it covers, it has to use
convoluted phrases like RNA of Sciences and Letters, or Sciences and Arts, or
Sciences and Humanities. These reflect historical and institutional distinctions.
Epistemologically, one can envision new arrangements (Rip 1995).
4 In an official study of the US National Academy of Sciences on the future of
physics, one finds these claims about physics: “Physics is in many ways the parent
of the other physical sciences (..) Well under way (..) is nothing less than the
unification of the physical sciences. (..) the basic contribution of physics is the
secure foundation on which all this knowledge is built – on understanding,
confirmed by the most stringent experimental tests, of the interactions between
elementary particles and the ways in which they determine the structure of atoms
and molecules. (..) Biology obviously derives part of its nourishment from physics
by way of chemistry.” (Bromley 1972, p. 67 and 69-70). See Rip (1979) for further
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analysis of such reports as one site where the scientific picture of the world
becomes visible.
5 The terminology here derives from Latour (1987) and has been taken up widely
(also by Nowotny et al. 2001), but the point does not depend on the particular
terminology. It has has been discussed under other headings, for example
‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification’, and their linkages (Böhme, Van
den Daele and Krohn 1972, Schaeffer 1983).
6 Think also of the ‘black arts’ of adding compounds and materials to a product
formulation to make it actually work, whether with vaccines or herbicides or the
composition of the bath in electroplating – these are not mentioned when
scientific knowledge is celebrated for its practical powers. For vaccines and the
adjuvants necessary to make them work, see for example Turnbull (2000), on the
malaria vaccine. For herbicides, see how in an interview with a spokesperson
from Monsanto, questions about such additives led to breaking off of the
interview (F. Valkema, Chemisch Weekblad, 25 August 2001, p. 3). Electroplating,
to be effective, requires the addition of some organic chemicals. But nobody
knows why exactly. And firms tend to be protective about their preferred mixes.
7 Quakenbusch, one of the directors of TIGR, The Institute for Genomic Research,
in the USA, spoke at the Genomics Conference in The Hague, 6 November 2001,
at which the major research funding efforts in this field in the Netherlands were
presented. It is more than a data management issue: “Swimming in a rapidly
rising sea of data – how to keep from drowning?”, as another speaker at the
Conference put it.
8 From an interview in NRC Handelsblad, 17 November 2001, at the occasion of
Van Gunsteren’s NWO-Huygens lecture in The Hague. Van Gunsteren also
noted the first simulation of the formation of a membrane from an arbitrary
collection of fatty acids in water, this year in Groningen, by Siewert-Jan Marrink
and Alan Mark.
9 This section draws heavily on my scoping paper for the ESTO project on
Technological Risk and the Management of Uncertainty, commissioned by the
Forward Studies Unit of the European Union. A synthesis of the four scoping
papers written for this project has been published (Stirling 1999), but does not
emphasize the points I am using in this essay.
10 Ziman (1978) similarly emphasizes how attempts to exclude disturbing factors
still leave the ambiguity of whether the observed effect is real or a result of a “dirty
system” (p. 59). Thus, “Physics is the harvest of this Kantian fisherman, whose
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net only catches fish larger than the size of its mesh, and who proudly proclaims
as a ‘law of nature’ that all fish are larger than that size.” (p. 30) The additional
point is that there are many tribes of fishermen. In another study, Galison
analysed the interaction between the experimental physicists, the engineers and
the theoretical physicists in high-energy particle accelerator experiments and
noted how this resembled a “trading zone” – as between USA soldiers and
American Indians in the 19th century (Galison 1997).
11 The inferential route towards an interpretation or explanation resembles design:
there is first an idea, a sketch, related to a notion of why the envisaged artefact
would work. Then it must be made to come true, including tests of a prototype. In
both cases, something new is created which has to “work”. In both cases, also, a
path is followed, starting with the original idea, further shaped by initial attempts
to elaborate it and by the tests that are done. The original idea might well be
modified in the light of such experiences. The eventual, more or less robust
knowledge claim or design derives its robustness from the quality of the path that
has been followed, as well as from its properties here and now. If the result is still
unsatisfactory, one may have to start again, redefine the path as it were. This is a
well-known challenge in design. For knowledge claims, the researcher tends to
identify with the path s/he has followed, and it is other researchers (especially
when they contest the knowledge claim) who go for a different path. The further
implication, highlighted in recent sociology of knowledge, is that contesting
knowledge claims often cannot be assessed definitively because they are part of
different paths, for example, based on different experimental set-ups,
assumptions about parameters, etc.
12 In his study of missile guidance technology, Donald MacKenzie addressed the
issue of uncertainties, for example in the guidance system and in the assurance of
the missile reaching its target, and showed that tolerance for uncertainty differs
across various relevant groups (MacKenzie 1990; 370-372).
13 Some scholars in the sociology of knowledge have emphasized a methodologically
relativist approach to truth, but that is not my intention. It would get me
entangled, unnecessarily, in what has been called the Science Wars (see Hacking
(1999) for an analysis). My aim is to understand better what it is that makes
findings and knowledge claims robust.
14 NRC Handelsblad, 25 August 2001. Information about the Program can be found
at http://doegenomicstolife.org/
15 The book has been translated into English and continues to be reprinted. Of the
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1948, still available edition by Dover Publications (New York), M.G.J. Minnaert,
The Nature of Light and Colour in the Open Air, a reader commented on the
Amazon website: “still up to date”. A new translation with additional photographs
appeared in 1993 (M.G.J. Minnaert and Len Seymour, Light and Colour in the
Outdoors, New York etc.: Springer Verlag).
16 Philosophically, this is a constructive realist position: regularities are real, but
constructed (cf. Bhaskar 1975). The construction has cognitive and material
aspects, as brought out nicely in J.D. Bernal’s aphorism: “Science, in one aspect,
is ordered technique; in another, it is rationalized mythology.” (Quoted from his
Science in History by Rip (1982), on p. 219.) The further point, recurrent in this
essay, is that such construction involves a hopefully productive reduction of
complexity.
17 The phrase ‘translations and transformations’ is an attempt to capture the
meaning of the French term “translation” as used in actor-network theory (Callon
et al. 1986): shifting others (and oneself) in order to transform a situation, with
attendant translations (“traduction” in French).
18 Field sciences cannot give up on local idiosyncracies: “unlike laboratories, natural
sites can never be exclusively scientific domains” (Rees (2001), at p. 507, quoting
Kucklick and Kohler). And should not give up: “The study of the natural world
actually remains highly site-dependent and regional in character.” (Williams
2000, at p. 503)
19 See for example the re-issue of their book, Prigogine and Stengers (1989).
20 Interestingly, as I intimated already, models are a micro-cosmos, in which
fragments of high science findings are applied together with ad-hoc, intuitive or
experience-based structuring.
21 In 1987, Beecham (and other pharmaceutical companies) introduced a product
that was expected to reduce the resistance of bacteria against penicillin (Chemisch
Weekblad, 2 July 1987, p. 272). Come 1997, molecular biologists, in their labs,
found ways to disarm bacterial resistance genetically – but the problem is whether
this will help in the real world, with organisms that multiply very, very fast (New
Scientist, 9 August 1997, p. 4). For new pesticides, some regulatory agencies now
require an assessment of resistance which might be built up after applying such a
pesticide on a larger scale.
22 See Whitley (1984) on the smallest units of scientific organization and Rip (1985)
on the transformation of local, non-disciplinary knowledge production into
scientific papers.
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23 This way of formulating the point resembles the finalisation and functionalization
thesis of the Starnberg group (Schäfer 1983) but does not depend on their overall
(and physicalist) diagnosis of the development of Western science.
24 In Nowotny et al. (2001), the sequel to the Gibbons et al. (1994) thesis on Mode 1
and Mode 2, some of these elements are discussed.
25 For in-depth discussion, see Smith (2000). Details of the science funding set-up
can be found at the Ministry’s website, including a report on a workshop from
which I drew my quotes (http://www.morst.govt.nz/creating/maori).
26 This claim is based on ongoing work in a comparative project led by Jan-Douwe
van der Ploeg of Wageningen Agricultural University, in which local approaches
in agriculture in the Netherlands, Italy and Kwazulu-Natal are studied.
27 ‘Scientific connoisseurship’ is “the capacity to make informed judgements about
scientific claims and to judge the competence and credibility of individuals and
institutions who are presented as scientific experts or arbiters of scientific
expertise” (Economic and Social Research Council 2001).
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Redrawing Disciplinary Boundaries –
but to What Degree? 1
Aant Elzinga
First of all, let me say that I agree with the main point of Prof. Rip’s contri-
bution, viz., the need to keep an open mind and affirm the plurality of
forms of production of knowledge. Science as socially contingent but pro-
tected institutional space generates both awe and envy. Indeed, in the bal-
ance between search and authority, primacy to the serendipitous nature of
the former has to be upheld in the sometimes stifling face of the latter. His
demonstration of the historically situated and contingent character of the
traditionally dominant image of science, the one that has tended to extrap-
olate and totalize a small physics-oriented segment in existing knowledge
landscapes, is both perceptive and appreciated.
The dominant academic image, as he points out, was largely a projec-
tion of a very specific set of conditions and features in particular historical
circumstances, reinforced in the 20th century by the advent of logical em-
piricist philosophers. Later it was found that not even physics lived up to
its ideals (cf. N.R. Hanson, P. Feyerabend, S. Toulmin, T. Kuhn). With the
emergence of a new (cognitive) sociology of science, combined with inter-
est in policy, attention has been drawn to many other modes of science,
among them medical and agricultural, engineering and not least chemical
research, where trajectories have involved constant interfoliation with
practical pursuits, in so-called contexts of application.
As a counterpoint today to the mainstream image of autonomous aca-
demic science traditionally celebrated in the epistemological lens of the
analytic philosophy of science, sociologists and policy analysts have come
up with the notion of Mode 2 and university-industry-governmental triple-
helix complexes. Likewise, interdisciplinarity is played up in retrospective
contrast to so-called Mode 1 monodisciplinary academic science, which in
the polemics of the situation is highly schematized, thus paradoxically
lending force to the earlier particularism that is to be rejected.
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Arie Rip argues that also these new images of scientific knowledge produc-
tion have a social epistemology that is rather limited in scope. They are
ideologically coloured totalizations of another segment of the knowledge
production landscape. In the new metaphors, contexts of application tend
to converge with domains of privatization and commodification, even if in
the face of criticism some latter-day advocates of the newer images have
retreated to a position of wanting to give recognition to non-commercial
users, NGOs and representatives of civil society. Still, if one looks more
closely, the projection of these new models largely takes events in areas
like biotechnology and microelectronics and now increasingly also re-
search into advanced industrial materials as their main reference. Thus,
they are caught up in propagating a new particularism while claiming gen-
erality. In my estimation they conflate technical characteristics of semi-
automation in knowledge production with specific modes of intellectual
property and the science-society interface. Arie Rip’s words of caution are
timely, but they could have been formulated more sharply.
The points that I wish to raise for discussion, and where we perhaps
diverge to some extent, are the following:
a What will happen to disciplines in the 21st century?
b Is what we are witnessing today in the advances of computational
methods and semi-automated techniques for data processing, pattern
recognition and the like really a return to natural history?
With regard to the first question, certainly something has happened in the
scientific disciplines. There has been a proliferation of subspecialities, and
greater permeability between knowledge domains. In my own university
30 years ago, the physics department had one seminar, whereas today
there are 20 parallel seminars in the same but much expanded and differ-
entiated department. Still physics, chemistry, geology, biology, pathology,
glaciology, genetics, etc., remain the primary areas in which one is certi-
fied as an undergraduate major. The same cores are also relevant in desig-
nating PhDs. The major learned societies joined by ICSU, “classes” in
academies of sciences and arts, and the workings of the Nobel prize insti-
tution continue to do their share in undergirding disciplinary divisions
and identities. Job announcements in the journal Science, even when re-
cruiting for positions in bioinformatics and proteonics, most often call for
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a strong core foundation in classical genetics, pharmacology, biology,
computer science or applied mathematics. Solid expertise in a primary
core discipline also remains in other fields like radio astronomy, geomor-
phology, oceanography, etc. Here, too, computational methods and vizual-
ization technologies have a strong impact, but without the lucrative mone-
tary profits and hence without the mega-amounts of private funding to
speed things up and render them equally visible and talked about as the
hybrid domains of biomedicine or nanotechnology.
Arie Rip himself refers to his own background in chemistry in a way that
indicates the resilience of residual primary certification and associated
professional identities.
Apart from the inertia of institutional arrangements of primary certifica-
tion, there is a second aspect, one largely missing in Prof. Rip’s account. I have
in mind the way the world is; he mentions it in his abstract when he says “the
complexities of the natural world are striking back, and this requires a re-
newed natural history approach”. However, in the bulk of his essay there is
very little to suggest that the irreductive specificity of systemic (emergent)
properties central to different dimensions of the natural world, by virtue of
their agency, share in the guilt of reproducing cognitive-social orders in terms
of core disciplines. In the 19th century scientists and philosophers spent quite
a bit of time trying to classify knowledge on the basis of ontological distinc-
tions. Later, methodological differences were invoked, and in our time func-
tional ties to areas of utilisation of knowledge.
In the 21st century institutional orders of certification and systemic spe-
cificities in the ways of the natural world, in the laboratory and outside in
the field, will probably continue to influence the recognition of certain
broad areas as disciplinary cores.
I see the emergence and development of hybrid fields like bioinformat-
ics, proteonics and nanotechnology as mainly applied and representing
technical advances in methods of computation, data processing, analysis.
It is a question of semi-automation with human interaction, where pattern
recognition is speeded up and done on a scale undreamed of before. This
occurs at a conjuncture when we have had over a century of research since
the polemics that revolved around natural history fixed on classification
and taxonomic work on the one hand and the artificially constraining rep-
ertoires of laboratories on the other. But even in the 19th century it was not
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merely a question of either/or. There were at least three lines of thinking:
(i) pushing Nature into the laboratory, (ii) moving laboratory experimenta-
tion into the field (field stations), and (iii) regarding Nature as such as a
grand laboratory. In the second case variables were also restricted and con-
trolled, in association with the work of classification and taxonomy.
Whereas natural history might align with inductivist methodologies, labo-
ratory experimentation tended to go in hand with hypothetico-deductive
and predictive ideals. Even in the field numeric grids might be placed over
natural plots to translate local properties into more general ones.
The classificatory work being done today is more often linked to attempts
to extend further analysis of systems at scales from organs, tissues, cells, to
the molecular, or in materials science to the atomic levels (nanotubes), and in
geology magnetospheric, atmospheric, oceanic, mantel, to fluid-to-solid core
systems of the Earth. This represents a further step. The focus on the systemic
in this sense appears in systems biology, earth systems science, general circu-
lation models and subsystems in climatology. This is something new. Prof.
Rip distinguishes between three historical stages in the development of sci-
ence, from a crafts mode, to natural history, to concentration on the laborato-
ry. In my historical scheme I would instead present an account in terms of the
movement from a crafts mode knowledge production, to taxonomy and natu-
ral history, to a focus on processes, and then focus on the systemic, where the
latter overlies and frames the earlier heuristic approaches. In analogy with the
discussion of the 19th century, there are three parallel thoughts: (i) putting
Nature in the computer (simulation, virtual reality), (ii) deploying the compu-
ter in the field (automated data collection and assembly, computer-aided
observation), and (iii) taking Nature as a computer (both in terms of models
informed by communications theories and semiotics, and in terms of con-
structing bio-computers).
Finally, the problem appears of the essential tension between search
and authority when the walls of academic ivory towers are dismantled to
let in local practitioners and knowledge practices regarding delicate mat-
ters of quality control. The problem is certainly pinpointed in the essay. As
an issue it deserves further discussion.
Note
1 Comments on Science for the 21st Century, by Arie Rip.
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5 Science and Democracy
Herman Philipse
Abstract.    From the seventeenth century onwards, there has
been a spectacular growth of scientific knowledge. Should we
expect this growth to continue at the same pace? Would that be
possible without an equally spectacular increase in expenditure?
How should politicians in a democratic state rationally determine
the appropriate level of public investment in scientific research?
This prize essay provides tentative answers to these burning
issues.
In Section One, an attempt is made to characterise at a meta-level
all branches of science and scholarship, not individually, but
collectively. Epistemic growth turns out to be an essential
characteristic of science. In Section Two, the growth of science
is analysed from a historical perspective. What are the prospects
of scientific growth in a saturation economy of science? Possible
opportunities for, and obstacles to, the future growth of science
are explored. The third section is concerned with the rationality
of investments in science. Pertinent issues are discussed within
the conceptual framework of rational decision theory. What kinds
of benefits from science should we distinguish, and how should
we value them? Is it possible to predict specific outcomes of
investments in research? If this is not feasible, how can it be
rational to invest in scientific research at all? The traditional
“public good” justification for state investments in basic research
turns out to be defective. Are we able to give a better justification?
And if so, with which model of rationality can we determine the
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right level of investments in a specific country? By way of an
example, the Dutch policy with regard to publicly funded research
is analysed. Finally, it is argued that there is an intrinsic relation
between democracy and the scientific attitude. Democracies
function better to the extent that voters and politicians make up




The oldest learned society in The Netherlands, the Hollandsche Maatschap-
pij der Wetenschappen, was founded on 21 May 1752 in the city of Haarlem.
According to the preamble to its first proceedings, it came into existence
because some citizens sought entertainment in performing, imitating,
and discussing scientific experiments. Headed by the Lutheran minister
Van der Aa, they had formed a small scientific collegium, which now ob-
tained official status, consciously imitating “in the Netherlands the admi-
rable diligence of other Kingdoms and Republics in their support and en-
couragement of the Sciences and Arts”.1
On the occasion of its 250th anniversary, the governing body of the
Maatschappij has organised a prize contest, whose contestants have been
given a pensum that is neither light nor simple. They are asked to provide:
“A universal characterisation of all branches of science and scholarship
(‘wetenschap’), such that it may serve as a basis for valuing current scientific
activity, and also enables us to formulate new problems and approaches, particularly
if these do not fit in with the present-day classification of disciplines. This
characterisation – having the nature of a description at a meta-level – will not only
contain an enumeration of the elements of science (‘wetenschapselementen’),
but also indicate the interest groups and professional circles these elements link up
with, in order to provide an explanation of the achievements of the past and to explore
the opportunities for, and obstacles to, future developments.”2
I do not dare to propose a scholarly interpretation of this text. Rather, I
shall briefly reflect on the year 1752, focussing on the two “professional
circles” united in the setup of the Hollandsche Maatschappij der Weten-
schappen: those of science and economics. Two observations on Dutch sci-
ence and economics in 1752 will give rise to the questions I attempt to
answer in this prize essay, questions that, I hold, are elements of the set of
possible interpretations one might legitimately assign to the query quoted
above.
Learned societies were born late in the Dutch Republic. Indeed, these
societies, typical products of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlighten-
ment, had been founded much earlier elsewhere in Europe. The first of
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them was the Accademia dei Lincei, erected in 1603 by the Roman Prince
Frederico Gesi.3  In 1611, Galileo Galilei enlisted as a member, and the
participants in the Accademia achieved important epistemological objec-
tives of precision by their use of scientific instruments such as the micro-
scope. However, after the condemnation of Galileo by the Roman Church
in 1633, the Accademia declined.4  In general, scientific progress in south-
ern countries such as Italy and Spain was thwarted by Catholic conserva-
tism, and learned societies in Northern Europe turned out to be much
more effective, particularly the Royal Society in London (1660).5
Why was the first Dutch learned society founded only in 1752, ev-
enthough the Dutch Republic was one of the early and major players in the
scientific revolution? Historians point to a number of factors that explain
this backwardness, such as the lack of a strong central government in The
Netherlands and the local influence of conservative Calvinist ministers.
The religious resistance melted away in the eighteenth century when the
doctrine of physico-theology enabled believers to reconcile science with
faith.6  But whatever its causes, the late institutionalisation of science in
The Netherlands may have had pernicious effects. In order to discern such
possible effects, we have to look at the economic situation of the time.
In the year 1752 the Dutch Republic, though still very rich, had already
gone into a slow but steady recession. Its economic growth stagnated, and
the Dutch were investing large sums in British and French funds instead
of at home. Signs of the downturn were ominous. For example, the output
of Leiden fine cloth had fallen from 25,000 rolls a year in 1700 to 8,000 by
the late 1730s, the output of Leiden camlets fell from 37,000 pieces in
1700 to 3,600 pieces by 1770, and the Haarlem industry of linen bleaching
shriveled in the 1730s and ’40s. The celebrated windmill-driven industrial
complex on the Zaan, which produced timber, sail-canvas, ropes and
ships, went into a freefall by the 1750s, and many of the mills fell still and
silent. An index of industrial production in Holland, setting 1584 at 100,
shows a peak of 545 in 1664, dropping to 108 in 1795. Whereas England
was heading towards the Industrial Revolution, around the 1750s the Unit-
ed Provinces “abdicated as world leader in trade and manufacture and
went into a postindustrial mode”.7
Is there some causal connection, one might wonder, between the eco-
nomic decline of the United Provinces in the eighteenth century and the
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tardy foundation of its first learned society? To put it in more modern and
anachronistic terms, could the Dutch Republic have avoided economic
decline, at least partially, by investing more, and more timely, in research
and development, and by building adequate institutions of research much
earlier? Admittedly, the changes in the means of production during the
initial phases of the industrial revolution in England were not due to the
impact of theoretical science. For example, the impressive improvements
in the efficiency and fuel consumption of steam engines between 1698
(Savery) and 1770 (Watt) were achieved by trial and error; theoretical un-
derstanding came only in the 1820s with the work of Sadi Carnot. Yet it
has been argued that without the empirical and experimental attitude ad-
vocated by Francis Bacon and practised by the members of learned socie-
ties such as the Lunar Society in Birmingham, these improvements could
not have been realised.8
Economic historians are somewhat puzzled by the Dutch degeneration
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But several authors point to a
lack of intellectual eagerness in the Dutch. One of them writes, for in-
stance:
The Dutch merchant seemed to be dozing off on the soft cushions of formerly gathered
riches and the leaders of industrial business from this period strike us as belonging to
the respectable class of slow fat-bellied trade bosses whose brains, suffering from
spiritual flabbiness, prevented them from hazarding the leap from the traditional way
of doing business.9
Is it far-fetched to suppose, then, that if in the seventeenth century the
Dutch Republic would have founded a scientific institution similar to the
Royal Society in London, the official aim of which was “to improve the
knowledge of natural things, and all useful Arts, Manufactures, Mechan-
ick practices, Engynes and Inventions by Experiments (not meddling with
Divinity, etc.)”, its economical fate in the eighteenth century might have
been considerably better?10
This historical issue raises a set of political and philosophical ques-
tions of a more general import, on which I focus in the present essay.
Scientific research is a costly affair, and especially in the domain of pure
theoretical science, its results are uncertain. By what types of arguments
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might justify investments in fundamental research and theoretical sci-
ence? If results of theoretical science and scholarship are considered as
collective goods, how can one legitimise the budgets for producing these
goods in a democratic society? What, in general, is the relation between
science and democracy? These are timely questions, because govern-
ments are faced with many competing demands for public funding. To
most politicians and voters, the benefits associated with public spending
on health or education are more obvious than those stemming from in-
vestment in basic research.
I tackle these issues at an abstract and philosophical level. In Section
One, I review three different kinds of meta-descriptions of science, that is,
I attempt to provide “a universal characterisation of all branches of science
and scholarship”, taken collectively. Epistemic growth turns out to be a
cardinal characteristic of science. The second section is concerned with
scientific growth. It is argued that the exponential growth of science dur-
ing the three last centuries cannot continue. This raises the issue of wheth-
er and how we can optimise scientific growth under the regime of a satura-
tion economy of science. In Section Three, I come to the core issue of the
justification of (public) investments in basic or pure research. In order to
discuss this issue properly, I introduce the conceptual framework of ra-
tional decision theory. Do politicians satisfy the requirements of rational
decision theory when they decide on public investments in basic research?
One requirement for deciding rationally on this issue is that we adequately
establish the value of scientific research by exploring its possible benefits.
Such a proper valuation of scientific research is an urgent task, to which
this essay is meant to contribute.
1 What is Science?
The question “What is science?” is not itself a scientific question; it be-
longs to the meta-level of the philosophy of science. Of course, scientists
can be, and sometimes have been, philosophers of science as well. But one
may be an excellent scientist and a poor philosopher of science, as is
shown by the example of Isaac Newton.11  The philosophy of science is at
least as old as Aristotle, and the issues it deals with arise from reflecting on
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science: general questions such as “What is a law of nature?”, “What types
of theoretical unification may we distinguish and what do they accom-
plish?”, or “When is a theory confirmed by its predictions?”, and questions
concerning particular sciences, such as “Is there an interesting sense in
which Newton’s Law of Inertia can be considered as a convention?”, or “Is
it possible to explain the direction of time in terms of entropy?”12
Both in Aristotle’s epoch and today, the question “What is science?” is
important because we want to distinguish between reliable or “scientific”
knowledge on the one hand and mere opinions or pseudoscientific views
on the other. Its actuality is shown by many facts, such as the popularity of
so-called “alternative” medicine, the fact that scientific research is some-
times perverted under the influence of powerful patrons such as pharma-
ceutical firms, or the attempt by Christian fundamentalists in the United
States to dress up the creation myth as a science in order to get it accepted
as a legitimate subject in the syllabus of state schools. When the State of
Arkansas passed a law that required equal treatment of the theory of evolu-
tion and creationism, scientists challenged the constitutionality of the new
law in court, and the judges had to ask: What is science?13
To this question three types of answers have been given (a) in terms of
statements or beliefs, or (b) in terms of method, or, finally, (c) in terms of
cultural processes, research traditions, institutions, and attitudes. Each of
these types of answers opens up a field of research of its own, but in order
to obtain an adequate conception of what science is, we should combine
answers of each of these types. Let me discuss briefly the three types of
answers in order to prepare the grounds for the topic of section 2, how we
might optimize the growth of scientific knowledge.
a From Foundationalism to a Competitive Model of Justification
According to the Aristotelian tradition in epistemology, (scientific) knowl-
edge is justified true belief. In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle (384-322 BC)
required the strongest form of justification, proof by logical deduction
from true premises, and in order to avoid an infinite regress in the chain of
deductions, he stipulated that there be fundamental beliefs which do not
stand in need of a justification by deduction because they are self-evidently
true. In other words, Aristotle invented the ideal of an axiomatic-deductive
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system, in which the truth of the theorems is guaranteed by the self-evi-
dence of the axioms and the validity of the deductions. Euclid’s works on
geometry and optics are early attempts to put this foundationalist ideal of
knowledge into practice, and the notion of an axiomatic-deductive system
exercised a deep influence in European cultural history. During the scien-
tific revolution, Galileo axiomatised his theory of local motions in The Two
New Sciences, Newton formulated classical mechanics as an axiomatic-de-
ductive system in his Principles, and Spinoza shaped his philosophy as an
axiomatic system in his Ethics. Furthermore, the ideal inspired substantial
developments in deductive logic from the 1850s onwards.
The definition of scientific knowledge as an axiomatic-deductive sys-
tem of true propositions remained popular until around 1900 – even
though it was admitted that many disciplines, such as history, geology, or
botany, cannot even aspire to it – but it raised a perplexing epistemological
issue, which may be called “the problem of the first principles”.14  How are
we supposed to guarantee the truth of the axioms of a scientific system, if
these axioms cannot be justified by deduction from other truths? From the
scientific revolution onwards, philosophers such as Descartes, Hume,
Kant, and Husserl proposed different solutions to this problem, both with
regard to mathematics and concerning the empirical sciences. But these
solutions are only of interest to the historian of philosophy. The classical
foundationalist ideal of science as an axiomatic-deductive system of true
propositions has been superseded by developments in mathematics and in
the sciences.
In geometry, the Euclidian axiom of parallels had been questioned by
mathematicians already in Antiquity. Since the axiom involves the notion
of infinity, it was not considered as self-evident, and attempts were made
to prove it as a theorem or to get rid of it altogether. Both attempts failed
during more than two thousand years of research, and eventually the strat-
egy of proving the axiom by a reductio ad absurdum of its negation led to the
conclusion that alternative consistent systems of geometry are possible, in
which the axiom of parallels is replaced by one of its negations. This dis-
covery of non-Euclidean geometries by Bolyai, Lobachevski, Gauss, and
Riemann in the nineteenth century eventually led to a drastic revision of
the notion of an axiomatic-deductive system in the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. The foundationalist requirement that the axioms be self-evi-
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dently true was dropped, and (pure) mathematics was re-interpreted as a
discipline concerned with conceptual (or merely syntactical) deductive sys-
tems only, and not with substantial truth in the sense of correspondence
with some kind of reality. Instead of wondering how one might account
for the allegedly self-evident truth of axioms (if they are not purely concep-
tual), philosophers of mathematics now focussed on the question of how
one is to demonstrate properties of deductive systems such as complete-
ness and consistency, and this issue was solved by (meta)mathematical
means. From the first quarter of the twentieth century onwards, the pure
mathematician is interested not so much in the substantial truth of the
axioms, but primarily in the logical relations between axioms and theo-
rems.15
The demise of the foundationalist ideal of knowledge with regard to the
empirical sciences occurred at about the same time, but for different rea-
sons. Here, the problem of the first principles had been intractable from
the very start, for a simple reason of logic. It seems that the first principles
or axioms of the empirical sciences must be empirical judgements of ob-
servation, which are, logically speaking, singular or particular propositions
(about one item or some items). But from such propositions, one cannot
deduce the laws and theories of empirical science, which are, logically
speaking, universal (about all items of an open class). Philosophers have
proposed three different strategies for solving this problem, all of which
have failed. They have argued that perceptual judgements can be univer-
sal, because they may be concerned with universal “essences” of classes of
entities (Aristotle, revived by Husserl and the phenomenologists), a view
which was rejected during the scientific revolution and which was criti-
cised effectively in the twentieth century by philosophers such as Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. Or they argued that the empirical sciences
are not only based upon statements of observation but also on substantial
axioms which are universal a priori, that is, independent of experience, and
necessarily true (Descartes, Kant, Eddington). This view has been refuted
by scientific revolutions, both in the second half of the seventeenth centu-
ry and in the first half of the twentieth century, during which axioms that
were regarded as necessarily true by Descartes (no vacuum) or Kant (deter-
minism, actual space is Euclidean) were rejected by scientists (Pascal,
Bohr, Einstein).
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Finally, a third attempt has been made to save the foundationalist model of
(theoretical) scientific knowledge as an axiomatic system of truths, this
time by weakening its requirements. If it is logically impossible to deduce
scientific theories and laws from singular judgements of observation, they
might nevertheless be made probable by inductive support of such judge-
ments. However, specifying the relevant notion of the probability of theo-
ries has turned out to be very difficult. Neither the frequency interpreta-
tion of probability nor the interpretation of probability as proportion or as
a propensity helps us here. We seem to be dealing with mere ‘subjective’
probabilities, which are degrees of personal conviction, and it is tempting
to apply Bayes’s theorem to the probability that scientific theories and law-
like statements are true. We would have to assign a prior probability to
these theories, which is then modified by experiments and observations in
accordance with Bayes’ theorem.16
However, Bayes’ theorem is too simplistic a model of the justification
of theoretical scientific knowledge. It does not tell us how scientists are
supposed to assign prior probabilities to theories, and it neglects the fact
that in evaluating theories, scientists attach great importance to specific
epistemic virtues of these theories, such as explanatory power, simplicity,
coherence with established theories, novel predictions, and unification. In
order to develop a model of justification that is more adequate to the actual
practice of justifying theories in science, we have to depart more radically
from the traditional foundationalist models and to acknowledge that, typi-
cally, the justification of theories is based upon a comparative assessment
of competing hypotheses.
According to such a non-foundationalist and “competitive” model, the
justification of theories is relative not only to the data-set available at a
given point in history, but also to the rival theories available at that time
and to the accepted background knowledge.17  We may say that a specific
theory T is justified at time t if and only if it performs better than its rivals
in terms of an accepted set of criteria for theory choice, such as predictive
accuracy, internal coherence, external consistency with established theo-
ries and with background knowledge, unifying power, explanatory depth,
and fertility for future research.18  As there will be a trade-off between
these criteria, the evaluation of theories cannot proceed on the basis of an
algorithm such as Bayes’s theorem. It is typically a complex value judge-
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ment about which experts may disagree in many cases and over consider-
able periods of time. Let us call this the model of competitive justification.
If the model of competitive justification is correct, it can never be
shown once and for all that specific scientific theories and law statements
are justified. In principle, it is always possible that a theory T justified at tn
becomes unjustified at tn+1, either because the data-set has been expanded
with new findings that were not predicted by T, or because a better rival
has been invented in the meantime. This idea is called ‘fallibilism’ by phi-
losophers of science, and it follows from the demise of foundationalism.
The demarcation between scientific and pseudo-scientific ideas now be-
comes a function of time.19
These insights have important implications for our idea of scientific
knowledge. Whereas the foundationalist view of scientific knowledge is
static in that, once the axioms have been discovered, scientific growth is
merely cumulative, the model of competitive justification stresses a more
radical kind of epistemic progress as a defining characteristic of science.
Progress not only occurs at the level of the data-sets of scientific disci-
plines, but also at the level of theories, that may be eliminated in favour of
superior rivals. Cases of theory-substitution at a fundamental level are of-
ten called “scientific revolutions”. In principle, there is no limit to theoret-
ical growth in the sciences, and the idea of the ‘end of science’ is incoher-
ent.20  If this is the case, one might conclude that a definition of science in
general should not focus primarily on particular beliefs and systems of
statements, but rather on the method by which these beliefs are acquired
and justified. Is there something called “the scientific method” that can be
used to define the scientific enterprise?
b Does “The Scientific Method” Exist?
The notion of a scientific method may be used at different levels of gener-
ality.21  At the lowest level, methods are particular devices for obtaining
specific kinds of information, and there are indefinitely many scientific
methods, such as the litmus test, X-ray crystallography, or carbon dating.
Typically, the reliability of these methods can be investigated and ex-
plained by science itself, and in the course of scientific progress, ever new
methods are developed, such as nuclear magnetic resonance, which was
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pioneered by physicists at Harvard and Stanford Universities who were
trying to measure the magnetic moments of atomic nuclei.
At this lowest level of generality, there is a co-evolution of science and
methodology, and we may imagine that science has evolved gradually
from older practices of acquiring knowledge, such as magic and interpret-
ing omens. To the question of how methods at this level can be justified,
we may answer by applying, mutatis mutandis, the model of justification
by competition sketched above. Methods, like theories, are justified by
competition with rivals, though in the case of methods, the criteria for
selection will be different from the criteria used in theory choice. In justi-
fying and choosing methods, we use criteria such as the degree of reliabil-
ity, precision, technological simplicity, theoretical soundness, and cost.
Methodological progress at this lowest level is breathtaking. But none of
these methods can be used in a definition of the scientific enterprise as
such, for their application is typically limited to one or more specific sub-
disciplines.
At the medium level of generality are situated methods, the validity of
which is not explained by particular scientific theories, even though they
cannot be practised in all areas of research. Examples are Mill’s methods
of experimental inquiry, randomized controlled trials in medical research,
or the stylometric method of dating manuscripts and attributing writings
to authors. At this level, there is methodological progress as well, but it is
slower than at the lowest level, because it depends mainly on logical or
mathematical considerations and is not propelled by scientific discoveries.
Since these methods cannot be practised in all areas of research and schol-
arship, they cannot be used to define the scientific enterprise either. Is
there a top level of generality at which we might characterise science as
such, including the social sciences and the humanities, by means of a
methodological canon? May we demarcate once and for all the scientific
from the non- or pseudo-scientific by something called “the scientific
method”? This is what some philosophers of science have tried to do, such
as, notoriously, Sir Karl Popper, but they have not been very successful.22
In order to see why this is the case, it is helpful to spell out the criteria
of success for such an attempt. In order to qualify as “the scientific meth-
od”, the proposed method should (1) be distinctive of science and common
to all areas of research, including the social sciences and, perhaps, the hu-
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manities; (2) explain the progress and success of science; (3) be a true
“method”, that is, be applicable in a methodical fashion and not depend
mainly upon imagination, intuition, etc.; (4) not depend for its validity on
specific scientific theories that might be false, for in that case it would not
demarcate science once and for all from other human activities. In other
words, the validity of the method should be a priori.23
That it is difficult to succeed in terms of these criteria may be shown by
the example of Karl Popper. Strict falsificationism, Popper’s initial propos-
al, fails on criteria (1), (2) and (3). Popper’s basic idea was that inductive
inference can never be justified. He argued that the truth of inductive gen-
eralisations and general theories cannot even be made probable on the
basis of particular evidence. Logically speaking, however, a general state-
ment can be falsified by a counter-instance, and such a falsification is
purely deductive, by modus tollendo tollens. This is why Popper proposed
falsificationism as a general methodology of science. According to falsifi-
cationism, scientific laws and theories are creative guesses or hazardous
hypotheses, which we have to put to the severest possible tests. If they are
falsified by these tests, we reject them; if not, they are “corroborated”, and
we accept them provisionally. A hypothesis which, in principle, cannot be
falsified deductively, is “unfalsifiable”, and Popper regarded unfalsifiable
statements as unscientific.
Falsificationalism clearly fails to meet criterion (1) for, strictly speak-
ing, all statistical hypotheses are deductively unfalsifiable. If a statistical
hypothesis says that two-thirds of a population have characteristic C, and if
we find that in the investigated sample 85% of the items possess that char-
acteristic, this is not logically incompatible with the hypothesis, unless we
inductively generalise this latter proportion to the entire population. How-
ever, according to falsificationism, inductions are not allowed. Falsifica-
tionism also fails to meet criterion (2). According to Popper, we should
prefer corroborated theories to falsified theories because the former are
nearer to the truth than the latter. Hence, falsificationism would explain
the progress of science as an increase in “verisimilitude”. But if no induc-
tions are allowed, and corroboration is purely a report of our past efforts to
falsify a theory, there is no good reason to prefer corroborated theories to
falsified theories. For in that case, the fact that a theory has been falsified
in the past is no good reason for thinking that it will ever be falsified again
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in the future, and the fact that a theory could not be falsified by experiment
E in the past is no good reason for thinking that a repetition of E will not
falsify the theory on the next occasion. Hence, falsificationism cannot ex-
plain the success of science.
Finally, falsificationism fails as a definition of the scientific methods
on account of criterion (3) as well. Popper never thought that there was a
method for inventing hypotheses, for invention depends on creativity.
Methodology would not play a role in the “context of discovery”, but only in
the “context of justification”. In this latter context, the method of falsifica-
tionism would be simple: it prescribes that we look for severe tests and
abandon a hypothesis if it has been falsified by a counter-instance. In fact,
however, things are not that simple. A testable prediction never follows
from a hypothesis on its own; many other premises are needed for deriv-
ing it. Consequently, a refutation of a prediction does not deductively falsi-
fy the hypothesis. It is a matter of decision which premise is held responsi-
ble for the refutation, and there is no clear method for making this deci-
sion. Furthermore, in order to establish that a prediction is refuted, we
typically need many universal premises. If these cannot be established by
induction, as Popper claims, they must be hypotheses. Again, it follows
that the hypothesis under testing cannot be falsified by a simple deductive
method, for we must decide to accept these other hypotheses in order to
conclude that the hypothesis under testing has been falsified.24
Later philosophers of science, such as Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan,
have attempted to improve on Popper’s falsificationism in the light of these
standard criticisms. Reviewing their proposals, however, one will reach the
verdict that nobody has succeeded in developing a substantial methodology of
science that meets the four criteria formulated above. As one author con-
cludes from a similar line of argument, “there is nothing that can usefully be
called the scientific method”, although, of course, there is a large spectrum of
methods used in scientific research and scholarship.25
c The Scientific Forum
For this reason, some philosophers of science, such as the Dutch psychol-
ogist A.D. de Groot, have concluded that we should attempt to characterise
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science primarily in terms of institutions, cultural or social processes, and
attitudes, rather than in terms of statements or of method. The basic
premises of De Groot’s views are the following. First, there is not one sub-
stantial methodology for making decisions in all areas of scientific re-
search (including the social sciences and the humanities). But, second,
this does not imply that “anything goes”, as has been argued, notoriously,
by the provocative philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. The reason is
that researchers will reach agreement on decisions by reasonable discus-
sion over shorter or longer periods of time. De Groot introduced the label
“the scientific Forum” for all those social processes and institutions in
which scientists examine and discuss each others’ views, such as learned
societies, scientific journals, conferences, public debates, doctorate exami-
nations, and, ultimately, the history of science itself. He claimed that if one
catalogues the basic rules and values which the members of scientific fora
use in their discussions and evaluations, one gets a “normative minimal
methodology” of science, which would be unique in the sense that there is
no alternative to this methodology, and which would also describe the core
of what we call “the scientific attitude”.26
As I shall argue in the next section, this institutional point of view on
science is fruitful indeed. Yet one may be somewhat disappointed by the
“normative minimal methodology” of the ten institutional rules De Groot
proposed. Let me mention the most salient rules and values only. A scien-
tific forum is in principle “open” in the sense that anyone who has the
relevant expertise can join in. For a forum, only arguments count, and
power is irrelevant. Since a scientific forum acquires authority – not power
– to the extent that the members agree, its discussions aim at agreement.
Unanimity reached by arguments is not only its aim. It is also a criterion
for the general public that what the forum agrees upon is justified by sci-
ence at that moment of time. Finally, unanimity functions as a rule of
procedure. If one expert disagrees, the discussion is re-opened. According
to De Groot, scientific values such as intellectual honesty, clarity, and ob-
jectivity can be derived from the desideratum that the Forum functions
adequately. Since in fact it dysfunctions quite often, the minimal method-
ology of the Forum is not only partially descriptive of actual science, but
also normative.27
The model of the forum is “democratic” in that arguments count irre-
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spective of the person who advances them. However, it should be sharply
distinguished from a very different model of democratic decision-making,
which De Groot calls the model of the gremium. Whereas gremia decide by
majority vote, fora decide by unanimity based upon arguments. De Groot
warns against a “politisation” of science that might result from confusing
these two models.28  But it cannot be avoided that decisions by scientific
fora are sometimes taken by majority vote, whereas the quality of decisions
taken by gremia will be optimised if gremia apply De Groot’s minimal
methodology of science as far as possible. In other words, a democratic
state will function better to the extent that decision-makers adopt the sci-
entific attitude as specified by the rules for the scientific Forum, as I argue
in subsection 3e.29
The minimal methodology of the Forum has the advantage that be-
cause of the very fact that it is minimal, it may be applied to all areas of
science and scholarship. Yet it is doubtful whether it can be used as a def-
inition of the scientific enterprise. The reason is that the methodology may
and should be applied also outside of the domain of scientific research. We
come to the skeptical conclusion that there is not one simple answer to the
question of “what is science?” In other words, it is impossible to provide a
succinct “universal characterisation of all branches of science and scholar-
ship”, which this contest requires. Perhaps this should have been expected
from the very start, in view of the great diversity of the different areas of
science and scholarship. Yet we have encountered some useful ideas, such
as the one that science is characterised by epistemic growth, and the no-
tion of justification by competition. This latter notion has been developed
by philosophers of science, but it may be applied, mutatis mutandis, in oth-
er domains (§ 3d).
2 Maximising the Growth of Science
Science is often conceived of as a body of knowledge, a structured system
of statements and theories. But we have seen in subsection 1a that this
conception leaves out an important dimension of science. What is justified
scientific knowledge at one stage of history may be pseudo-science at a
later stage, as the example of astrology shows. It follows that growth or
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progress is a cardinal characteristic of science and that growth often occurs
by discarding theories.
Historians of science have investigated scientific growth in all its as-
pects, tracing the succession of theories and ideas, studying the develop-
ment of methods and practices of research and, finally, charting the histo-
ry of institutions and expenditure. The spectacular growth of science since
the 17th century is best illustrated by this latter aspect, because it is open to
measurement. A quantitative history of science was pioneered by Derek de
Solla Price in 1963, and he proposed, as a first “law of growth for science”,
that science grows exponentially or, at least, that it has grown exponential-
ly from the scientific revolution onwards. Depending on the parameters
one chooses, such as the growth of manpower, of journals, of published
articles, or of money invested, the crude size of science has doubled in
every period of 10 to 20 years over the last three and a half centuries.
This “law” of growth for science has interesting corollaries. First, a 15-
year doubling time extended over three centuries of growth corresponds to
an increase of 20 powers of two, that is, a factor of about one million.
Thus, in the interval from 1650 to 1950, indicators of the size of science
have increased by the order of a million. Second, the law accounts for a
phenomenon which De Solla Price calls “the coefficient of immediacy” of
science. During the last three and a half centuries, scientists of each gener-
ation have had the impression that most scientific developments occurred
during their life time and that they lived in the age in which big science
really got started. This effect of immediacy can be explained on the basis of
De Solla Price’s first law. Assuming that the number of scientists doubles
every 15 years, then in any interval of 15 years there will come into being as
many scientists as in the entire preceding time. However, at any particular
time, the set of co-existing scientists will have as members all scientists
produced during, say, an average career period of 45 years. Assuming,
then, that for every scientist born before such a period of 45 years, there is
one scientist living who was born in the first doubling period, two in the
second, and four in the third, we must conclude that about 871/2 percent of
all scientists who have ever existed is alive now. This has been true for
nearly all periods during the last three and a half centuries.30
Such a growth rate cannot go on forever, because it dwarfs other growth
rates. During the last three hundred years, for instance, every doubling of
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the population has produced about three doublings of the number of sci-
entists, but we cannot imagine a human society in which all adults are
professionally engaged in scientific research. Given the level of intelli-
gence needed for being a minimal scientist (defined as one who produces
only one paper in a lifetime), one might calculate that the number of scien-
tists in the population cannot exceed 8%.31  De Solla Price predicted in
1963 that the exponential growth of science would reach its saturation lim-
it within the next human generation. This seems to have happened during
the last decades. The investment in scientific research expressed as a per-
centage of the GDP has been steadily diminishing in many countries. In
The Netherlands, for instance, the total investment in Research and Devel-
opment diminished from 2.2% of GDP in 1987 to 1.77% of GDP in 1996.32
In 1998, Europe as a whole spent on average 1.8% of GDP on research.
Incidentally, this percentage is low in comparison with Japan (2.9% in
1998) and the United States (2.8%), and the gap is growing. In 1992, the
difference between Europe and the United States in the total expenditure
for research was about 12 billion euro; in 1998 the gulf had widened to
about 60 billion euro. Given the fact that research and development ac-
count for 25% to 50% of economic growth, the European backlog is a cause
for concern in the European Commission. In a recent document, the com-
mission urged the member states to invest more in scientific research and
to create a “European Research Space”.33  As De Solla Price wrote in 1963,
“when a country decides that it can afford to let science grow only at the
rate of the national economic expansion, and that the supply and demand
of scientific manpower be allowed to tend to equality, this is tantamount to
a suicidal withdrawal from the scientific race”.34
Leaving aside for the moment these differences between national lev-
els of investment (see subsection 3d), we may conclude that the spectacu-
lar exponential growth of science in terms of money and manpower is
coming to an end. We enter the phase of a saturation economy of science,
in which an optimally efficient deployment of resources becomes crucial,
because attempts to increase them exponentially will mostly turn out to be
futile. The question is, then, whether and how we can maximise scientific
growth in terms of results if growth in terms of money and manpower is
slowing down or even negative. In this section, I briefly discuss this issue,
focussing on methodology (a, b) and the design of institutions (c).
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a The Technology of Research
Is it possible to speed up or at least maintain the growth of scientific
knowledge by improving on methods, in spite of a constant or even lower-
ing level of expenditure? I shall argue that there are good reasons for being
skeptical at this point.
As we have seen in subsection 1b, one might study scientific methodol-
ogy at three levels of abstraction: a lowest level of theory-laden technical
inventions; a medium level, and the upper level of a methodology that is
valid for all areas of research and scholarship. I shall examine the problem
of optimising the growth of science by methodological improvements for
two levels only, the lowest level of research technology (§ 2a), and the up-
per level of general methodology (§ 2b).
At the lowest level, methodological improvements for obtaining knowl-
edge may not only save money, they also cost money. The reason is that
methodological advances at this level consist in new technical devices for
obtaining information, that is, for expanding our data-set. These devices
have to be developed and produced, and the processes of development and
production require investments in money and personnel. So our question
at this level is a specific one: is it likely that we may maintain or even speed
up the growth of scientific knowledge by improving on particular methods
for obtaining data, while we are diminishing the level of expenditure or at
best keeping it constant?
Answers to this question will have to be formulated in terms of proba-
bilities, and they should be justified by empirical research on the invest-
ments in scientific technology over, say, the last three centuries. Instead of
doing this type of research, however, I shall discuss an a priori argument
for skepticism, which I shall then qualify by reviewing one example of a
fairly recent methodological improvement. The argument has been devel-
oped by a distinguished philosopher of science from Pittsburgh, Nicholas
Rescher, in a little book of 1996, called Priceless Knowledge? Natural Science
in Economic Perspective.35
Rescher argues that although there cannot be a theoretical limit to scien-
tific growth, it is inevitable that empirical science will progress ever more
slowly for strictly practical and ultimately economic reasons. His argu-
ment is as follows. We may characterise the growth of scientific knowledge
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in empirical science in terms of dynamic cycles of equilibrium and dise-
quilibrium between the theory and the data-set. Theorists attempt to cap-
ture the regularities they discern in a given data-set by inventing the sim-
plest theoretical structure that accommodates them, which they then
project inductively “across the board”. However, the regulative idea that
theories are universally valid implies an imperative to broaden the range of
our experience, to extend the database as far as we can. As the history of
science shows, the expansion of the database eventually causes a disequi-
librium between the old theory and new data, and this disequilibrium cre-
ates the need for new theoretical structures. There is no good reason for
supposing that any given theory will be the final one, so that, in principle,
the cycle can be repeated indefinitely.
If we define the growth of science primarily in terms of ever better
theories, our global question as to the possibilities of speeding up the
growth of science in spite of a constant level of expenditure may be an-
swered by settling two separate issues: (1) Can we accelerate the expansion
of the data-set while expenditure is constant? (2) Can we speed up the in-
tellectual processes by which theories, in the broad sense of organised
epistemic structures, are generated on the basis of a data-set, without in-
creasing costs? Rescher answers both questions negatively. Both the ex-
pansion of the data-set and the generation of theories will slow down un-
less expenditure increases drastically. Let me go briefly into these two is-
sues.
(1) If we interpret science within the framework of the theory of evolu-
tion, we may say that initially, the potential data-set of science consisted of
the information humans could obtain by using their unaided sense organs
in their ecological niche. In other words, humans could explore only their
parametric neighbourhood in the parametric space of physical variables
such as temperature, speed, pressure, and electric charge. At this “home
base” in the accustomed natural environment, humanity could collect data
at relatively low costs, thanks to the evolutionary attunement of its sensory
and cognitive apparatus. From the 17th century onwards, however, further
progress was possible only by artificially extending the data-set by means
of technical devices that enabled humans to transcend the limitations due
to their evolutionary heritage. Henceforth, at each stage of scientific ad-
vance, humanity can progress only if it moves even farther away from its
173Science and Democracy
evolutionary home base in nature. “After the major findings accessible via
the data of a given level of technological sophistication have been achieved,
further major findings become realizable only when one ascends to the
next level of sophistication in data-relevant technology.”36  It is plausible to
assume that this “technological escalation” implies an ongoing escalation
in the resource costs of significant scientific discovery, because technology
will become ever more expensive as we move further away from our natu-
ral parametric neighbourhood.
Two further points are relevant here. First, the law of diminishing re-
turns generally applies if we try to approach specific limits in the parame-
ter space of nature. Whenever we attempt to push a technology to the lim-
its of its capacity, aiming at greater vacua, lower temperatures, higher field
strengths, or speeds approaching that of light, costs increase exponential-
ly, and less progress is bought for higher costs. Rescher speaks here of a
“technology-intensive arms race against nature” and compares the eco-
nomics of scientific progress with the prices of the series of B bombers,
from the old B-17 of World War II to the supersonic B-1 of the 1990 era.37
Second, the economics of science differs from that of productive enter-
prises in business. Whereas business enterprises aim at mass production,
and, over time, the ratio of investment cost per produced unit declines
exponentially due to economies of scale, the production of new technolog-
ical devices by the science industry typically aims at novelty all the time, for
there is no point in doing a particular experiment over and over again. The
science industry usually does not focus on mass production of technologi-
cal devices, but at pioneering production. As a consequence, the ratio of
investment per produced unit has increased exponentially. From these
considerations we may conclude that further progress in data technology
will be ever more expensive. As a result, scientific progress at the level of
expanding the data-set will slow down and, eventually, come to a halt
altogether if expenditure remains constant or increases less than exponen-
tially.
(2) What about scientific progress at the level of theory? Here, too, we may
assume that growth will slow down, even if the data-set is quickly expanding.
It is intuitively plausible that the greater the body of mere information provid-
ed by the database, the more difficult it will be to invent patterns of order that
obtain in the data-set. Theoretical inventions abound in the earlier phases of
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a new discipline and become ever scarcer in the course of progress. Rescher
argues for a law of logarithmic returns that allegedly obtains for the relation
between the increase in mere information and the increase in theoretical or
significant knowledge. The law implies that an exponential growth of mere
information is coordinated with linear growth of significant knowledge. Leav-
ing such pseudo-precision aside and taking the invention of ever new gener-
ations of computers into account, we may nevertheless conclude with Re-
scher that “the more knowledge we already have in hand, the slower... will be
the rate at which knowledge grows with newly acquired information”.38  This
implies that the objective of increasing theoretical knowledge involves ever-
escalating demands on the growth of the database and on investments in
theoretical work.
From the considerations under (1) and (2) it follows that it is impossible
even to maintain a linear growth of theoretical scientific knowledge while the
level of expenditure in technology and manpower remains constant. One
might think, however, that this skeptical conclusion is refuted by examples of
drastically decreasing costs in research technology. The PCR method in DNA
research may be mentioned as an instance of this phenomenon.
The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method was invented by Dr Kary
B. Mullis (La Jolla) and first presented in 1985, for which Mullis received
the 1993 Nobel Prize in Chemistry (shared with Michael Smith). By this
simple and cheap procedure, for which one only needs a test tube, a spe-
cialised polymerase enzyme, the four nucleotide bases, a primer, and a
source of heat, it is possible to replicate an individual DNA segment of a
complicated genetic material several million times within a few hours.
With recombinant technology, this task would have required several days.
The PCR method can be applied automatically and with great precision by
commercially produced PCR apparatuses. It is a revolutionary new instru-
ment for basic research, such as determining genetic and evolutionary
connections between different species, or the human genome project, and
for applied biomedical research: diagnosing viral and bacterial infections
(HIV, for example), localising the genetic alterations underlying hereditary
diseases, and forensic research.39
Yet my feeling is that such counter-examples do not refute Rescher’s
skeptical argument. Research costs may decrease locally because of tech-
nological inventions while, globally speaking, Rescher’s conclusion re-
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mains true. Indeed, it is plausible to assume that this is the case, although
the skeptical argument must be tested by empirical research.40  Let us ac-
cept for the sake of discussion that, other factors remaining equal, it will be
impossible even to maintain the present rate of scientific growth without
substantially increasing investments in research technology. Let us fur-
ther assume that, globally speaking, a substantial increase in expenditure
for basic research is unlikely. Are there any other factors the manipulation
of which might speed up scientific growth under these conditions?
b The Principle of Proliferation
If such factors exist at all in the domain of scientific method, and if Re-
scher’s skeptical argument is valid, we have to look for them at the higher
levels of methodology. At these levels, methodology is not theory-laden
and does not consist of technologies. In principle, one might imagine that
here improvements of method might yield accelerated scientific growth
without substantial increases in expenditure. Are there any proposals for
methodological improvement at these levels that will accomplish this feat?
I shall discuss one example of such a proposal only, the “Principle of
Proliferation” (PoP). My reasons for discussing the PoP are twofold. First,
this principle supposedly belongs to the general methodology of science
and scholarship. Hence, if introducing it accelerates epistemic growth, it
will do so globally, perhaps in all disciplines. Second, the principle has
been proposed by a member of Popper’s school in the philosophy of sci-
ence, Paul Feyerabend. According to Popper and his pupils, the aim of
normative methodology is to optimise the growth of science. As Popper
said, “the central problem of epistemology has always been and still is the
problem of the growth of knowledge”.41  Feyerabend explicitly introduced
the PoP as a methological rule that promotes epistemic growth, and as far
as I know, no other independent rules have been proposed with this objec-
tive in general methodology during the last decades. For this reason, we
may safely assume that his proposal is representative for the entire do-
main of general scientific methodology in the sense that if the PoP turns
out not to be a reliable rule for accelerating scientific growth, as I shall
argue, probably no other new methodological rule will be found that satis-
fies this requirement.
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Feyerabend first presented his argument for the PoP in 1963 as an attempt
to improve on the methodology of logical positivism.42  He reproached log-
ical positivism for stimulating a dogmatic attitude in the sciences because
of the methodology of inductive confirmation it advocated. Feyerabend ar-
gued that in order to be a good empiricist, we should not attempt to con-
firm a specific theory as well as possible by empirical tests, but rather de-
velop alternative theories and test the rival theories against each other, giv-
en the data-set. This methodological rule is called the PoP. Since it takes
time and investment to develop alternative theories up to the point that
they yield solutions to actual scientific problems, Feyerabend also advocat-
ed a second methodological rule that is a corollary of the PoP: the Principle
of Tenacity (PoT). This principle prescribes that we stick to alternative the-
ories under development in the face of considerable difficulties.
One might say that Feyerabend endorsed the competitive model of jus-
tification which I sketched in subsection 1a and added PoP and PoT as
methodological rules to this model. His argument for these embellish-
ments was derived from one particular example, Brownian motion. Ac-
cording to Feyerabend, the Brownian particle is what Wilhelm Ostwald
had called a perpetual motion machine of the second kind, so that its exist-
ence would refute the phenomenological second law of thermodynamics.
Feyerabend argued, firstly, that the relevance of Brownian motion to the
second law would never have been grasped if scientists had merely at-
tempted to “confront thermodynamics with the facts”, as the logical posi-
tivist methodology prescribes. Rather, it was because scientists considered
an alternative view, the kinetic theory, which explains Brownian motion,
that they saw its relevance to the second law of thermodynamics. He
claimed, secondly, that without the kinetic theory, it would have been im-
possible to see that Brownian motion refutes the second law. Feyerabend
concluded that proliferation of theories is indispensable for the progress of
science, because, in general, empirical difficulties for one theory are only
discovered in the light of an alternative theory.
Are PoP and PoT sound methodological rules that will speed up the
growth of theoretical science in spite of stagnating investments, if applied
consistently? There are four reasons for being skeptical at this point.
First, one may doubt the physics of Feyerabend’s argument. For in-
stance, it is dubious whether Brownian motion could be considered as a
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perpetuum mobile of the second kind, which refutes the second law of
thermodynamics. Second, Feyerabend’s argument contains the fallacy of
hasty generalisation. It may be true that sometimes an empirical anomaly
for a theory can be discerned only in the light of an alternative theory, but
this is not generally true. For instance, the phenomenon of black body
radiation was known long before Planck derived his formula for black-
body curves in 1900, and it was seen to be incompatible with traditional
physical theories such as classical thermodynamics and electromagnetic
theory. What typically happens in the history of science is that scientists
only start to develop an alternative to the existing theoretical paradigm af-
ter anomalies have been piling up for some time, as Kuhn has argued in
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.43
This common practice is more rational than Feyerabend’s PoP, which
prescribes that alternative theories must be developed in all disciplines at
all stages of scientific progress since, allegedly, anomalies cannot be dis-
covered without an alternative theory. It is more rational – and this is my
third reason – because the costs of developing alternative theories are
huge, at least in those disciplines in which theories are complicated struc-
tures that embody mathematically formulated laws and in which reliable
measurement is possible. Applying Feyerabend’s PoP and PoT will not
speed up scientific growth in spite of stagnating investments; rather it will
slow down growth because large sums are wasted on irrelevant theoretical
work. Even worse, universal application of PoP and PoT may create intel-
lectual chaos, as is shown both by the later development of Feyerabend’s
philosophy and by disciplines in which theoretical proliferation abounds,
such as clinical psychology.
In 1961, Feyerabend had argued that there is no logical or epistemolog-
ical difference between scientific theories and so-called myths, such as the
doctrine of witchcraft. These myths have had observational success, like
scientific theories, because they created their own interpretation of experi-
ence. Yet there is an important difference between believers in myths and
scientists, Feyerabend held at that time. The former adopt an attitude of
complete and dogmatic acceptance, whereas good scientists have an atti-
tude of criticism concerning their theories.44  By introducing PoP and PoT
into scientific methodology, however, Feyerabend undermined his earlier
distinction between science and myth in terms of attitudes. This under-
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mining mechanism explains the extremist multicultural and post-mod-
ernist ideology of his later years. If tenacity is a legitimate attitude for de-
veloping alternatives to accepted scientific views, which is prescribed by
PoP, we should mitigate our critical attitude with regard to attempts at
constructing alternative theories. Hence it may seem that “anything goes”
in intellectual matters. In a paper called “How to Defend Society Against
Science” (1975), Feyerabend concluded that accepted “science is just one
of the many ideologies that propel society”. Accordingly, he advocated “a
formal separation between state and science” and argued that in a future
society, scientists should be “more than balanced by magicians, or priests,
or astrologers”.45
What is wrong with PoP and PoT is that they are not methodological
rules at all, and this is my fourth argument. Methodological rules proper
should be applicable in all circumstances, or at least in a set of situations
that may be specified in advance. This is not possible with regard to theo-
retical proliferation and tenacity. Sometimes it is advisable to develop an
alternative to existing theories, and sometimes it may be worthwhile to
display tenacity, but quite often, it can only be assessed by hindsight
whether specific instances of proliferation or tenacity have been good or
bad for the growth of science. As PoP and PoT are the only proposals for
new methodological rules that have been put forward in general methodol-
ogy during the last few decades, the prospects for speeding up scientific
growth by introducing a superior general methodology are grim indeed.
That PoP is not a sound methodological rule may also be shown by
academic disciplines in which abundant proliferation of “theories” causes
stagnation rather than growth. The Dutch psychologist and philosopher of
science A.D. de Groot, to whom I referred earlier, has argued that in psy-
chology theoretical proliferation is a symptom of a dysfunctioning scientif-
ic forum. Because developing a new “theory” or starting a new therapeutic
school yields more status than patiently testing the existing views or ex-
panding the data-set, the number of theories has become too large. Seri-
ous researchers are unable to make a rational choice between all the
schools and sects. As a consequence, the average quality of the field sinks:
bad ideas survive for too long, and good ideas go unnoticed. In such a
situation, critical examination of existing ideas is a more important task
than developing new ones, and further proliferation is counterproductive.
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A similar situation obtains in philosophy, but fora that are appointed to
review the quality of research, such as the VSNU committees in The Nether-
lands, often prefer theoretical proliferation to critical evaluations of exist-
ing theories.46
It is improbable, then, that we will be able to speed up or even maintain
the global growth of science in a period of stagnating investments either by
improving on research technology or by introducing new rules of method.
If methodology does not help us here, are there other means? Could we
promote scientific growth by re-designing our research institutions and
universities, for example?
c Institutional Design
There is no doubt that the foundation of new institutions, or re-designing
existing institutions, may speed up local scientific growth considerably. In
his lectures on the development of mathematics, Felix Klein devoted a sec-
tion to the foundation of the École Polytechnique in Paris (1794) because,
due to the stringent admission policies and the exceptionally high de-
mands put on the pupils, this school brought France to the forefront of
mathematics in the first half of the 19th century.47
The importance of institutional design is also stressed by De Groot,
who argues that institutional improvements such as quality assessments
of research may strengthen the proper functioning of the scientific forum.
De Groot lists seven conditions for a sound scientific development, most
of which have to be met by institutional design and funding: (1) scientific
institutions must offer an attractive career to talented and ambitious stu-
dents (2) who have to be trained properly. Furthermore, scientific research
(3) must produce a percentage of useful results (4) that have a reasonable
life-span, such that (5) the best results are preserved whereas inferior and
insignificant products of research are eliminated (6) by means of a valid
procedure of evaluation and selection. A proper functioning of all these
sub-processes yields (7) the social prestige of scientific research, that is
essential for its public and private funding.48
It is not always easy to decide whether specific new institutions create
opportunities for, or rather obstacles to, the growth of science. Let me dis-
cuss briefly the Dutch example of so-called research-schools, introduced in
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The Netherlands during the last decade of the 20th century. These schools
are meant to be both graduate schools and centres for excellent research,
with an independent budget responsibility and with links to universities.
According to the committee that advised the Dutch government on these
schools in 1990, presided over by Dr. A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan, the objectives
of founding the schools were, inter alia, to promote cooperation between
universities, to strengthen research management, and to raise the external
visibility of research in order to attract more external funding.49  Some 115
schools have been formally approved of by 2001.50
In order to meet the first of these objectives, to promote cooperation
between universities, research schools should have a “federal” organisa-
tion, assembling excellent researchers working in several universities. As
the universities were supposed to provide nearly the entire budget of the
schools, each federal school would have to drain the budgets of the partic-
ipating universities. Furthermore, it should have a strong management
(second objective) and a high external visibility (third objective). But these
requirements do not fit in with another aim of the Dutch government.
Impressed by the market ideology, the Ministry of Education wants to
stimulate competition between universities, and a competitive mecha-
nism has been installed in the model for funding these institutions. Obvi-
ously, the objective of inter-university cooperation and that of inter-univer-
sity competition contradict each other, because they imply antagonistic
strategies for budget management. In order to compete, universities have
to protect their individual budget responsibilities, whereas inter-university
cooperation in federal research schools requires that research budgets be
transferred to these schools.
As a consequence, organisers of research schools are facing the follow-
ing dilemma.51  If they prefer a federal school, they discover that its auton-
omy and budget will be undermined by competition between the partici-
pating universities. If, however, they prefer a local school within one uni-
versity only, they will wonder what its surplus value is compared to a local
research institute with a graduate programme. It seems, then, that found-
ing research schools in The Netherlands runs the risk of causing a waste of
time and money, and this is due to conflicting government objectives. An
exception is formed by those few schools that have been able to obtain
considerable external funding, either within the framework of the so-
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called “In-depth Strategy” or from non-governmental organisations.52  Ac-
cording to a recent evaluation, most research schools have had some posi-
tive effect on the quality of graduate programmes, but it is debatable
whether they have contributed positively to the quality and output of re-
search.53  The considerable cost of overhead in terms of time and money
must be subtracted from the investments in research proper.
The greatest institutional challenges are faced by the European Union
as a whole. While the university systems in the United States and Japan
have the shape of a quality pyramid, with a few outstanding institutions at
the top, most European countries have egalitarian and state-dominated
systems that all differ from each other. If Europe really wants to compete
with the best American universities, it will have to create a European uni-
versity and research space. The European Committee is not blind to this
necessity, but the measures it proposes, such as creating networks of exist-
ing national research institutes, are modest in relation to its objectives. 54
What is needed to favour the creation of top universities and research in-
stitutions comparable to Harvard, Princeton, MIT, or Caltec is to privatise at
least half of the European universities and give the best of them the free-
dom from national restrictions and the generous funding needed for pur-
suing the road to the top. If this is not feasible, one might perhaps create
international top universities in Europe by building a number of new and
highly selective European institutions situated “above” the existing univer-
sities. However, neither of these strategies will succeed without huge in-
vestments.
The gist of my arguments in section 2 is that in order to maintain the
growth of science, ever greater investments in money and personnel are
needed. What justifies such investments? Which types of arguments and
models of justification are appropriate if we want to legitimise a specific
level of expenditure? What level of public expenditure should a democratic
state such as The Netherlands aspire to? These questions are the topics of
Section 3, in which I focus on the justification of basic research within the
political framework of a democratic state. In order to discuss these issues
properly, I shall first introduce the conceptual framework of rational deci-
sion theory.
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3 Democratic Justification of Investments in Basic Research
A decision to invest a determinate sum in scientific research is justified for
an actor, be it a democratic government or the board of a company, if this
decision is a rational one in the context in which it is made. But what is
rationality? When is a decision rational? These questions are the topic of
rational decision theory, as pioneered by John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern in their classic study Theory of Games and Economic Behav-
iour.55  I shall briefly introduce the conceptual structure of this theory in
order to define a framework for the discussion on investment in basic re-
search in this section.
Rational decision theory is a normative and mathematically formulated
theory. It would be a mistake to suppose that actual human beings deliber-
ate rationally in conformity with the theory. On the contrary, psychological
research has revealed that human thinking and decision-making are fun-
damentally flawed and limited processes.56  This discrepancy between ac-
tual decision-making and the ideal of rationality specified by rational deci-
sion theory raises some interesting problems. How should one character-
ise the shortcomings of actual decision-making in the light of the ideal of
rationality specified by decision theory? Which of these shortcomings are
avoidable in a determinate situation? And which limitations of rationality
are intrinsic to specific kinds of decisions? By answering these questions,
we might attempt to spell out a model of optimal rationality for a specific
type of decision, such as the decision by democratic states to invest in fun-
damental scientific research.
In subsection (a), I introduce the basic terminology of rational decision
theory, as it was re-formulated in terms of subjective expective utility by
Leonard Savage in 1954, and in (b) I specify the kinds of benefits that may
result from investing in basic scientific research.57  Under (c) I discuss an
essential limit of rationality with regard to investments in basic theoretical
science: the paradoxical fact that natural science, being our most powerful
predictive tool, is itself unpredictable as far as its content is concerned.
Apart from this essential limitation, there are also accidental and avoidable
limitations of rationality, and politicians display such avoidable irrational-
ities. This is the reason that in subsection (d) I discuss into some detail the
cost-benefit rationality of government investments in basic research,
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drawing on the recent SPRU review of the literature on The Relationship Be-
tween Publicly Funded Basic Research and Economic Performance of 1996.58
I sketch the outlines for a new justification of public investments in re-
search. Since the actual rationality of the Dutch governmental decisions is
low in this domain, I also propose a model of justification for improving it.
Finally, I argue (e) that the scientific attitude is intrinsically related to a
properly functioning democracy, so that a major objective of education in a
democracy should be to promote the scientific attitude in all citizens.
a Decisions and Mistakes
A decision may be defined as a choice of conduct in a complex situation in
which there is more than one possible course of action under considera-
tion. Rational decision theory assumes that the decision-maker can form
expectations, formulated in terms of probabilities, concerning the future
outcomes of each course of action, and that he is able to assess these out-
comes on an evaluative continuum reflecting personal values and current
goals.
The empirical implementation of decision theory presupposes that
both probabilities and the subjective valuation of outcomes can be ex-
pressed in numbers. Probabilities are quantified on a scale between zero
(impossible) and one (certain), and subjective values of each possible out-
come are expressed in another conventional scale, assigning, say, -100 to
the worst possible outcome and +100 to the best possible outcome. Psy-
chologists and economists have developed a great number of scaling
methods to solve the measurement problems of how these numbers
might be extracted from people’s thoughts about decision situations.
The best decision for a subject in a given situation may now be calculat-
ed in three steps. First, the situation must be modeled as a decision tree, in
which for each possible option in that situation all possible outcomes are
mapped. Second, numbers are assigned to the probabilities and the sub-
jective values of these outcomes. Finally, the best decision, defined as the
decision that leads to the highest expected utility, is calculated by summa-
rising the utilities of each option, where the utility of an outcome is de-
fined as its probability multiplied by its value.. In other words, a decision is
184 Herman Philipse
rational if the expected utility of the option chosen from the option set in a
situation is greater than that of all other options. Rational decision theory
has the form of an axiomatic deductive system. What Von Neumann and
Morgenstern proved is that whenever the axioms of their system are satis-
fied, a numerical measure can be assigned to each possible outcome, and
the options can be ordered in terms of their expected utilities. As a conse-
quence, it can be calculated what the most rational decision is in each situ-
ation.
In principle, decision theory may be applied in two fundamentally dif-
ferent ways, the behaviourist and the mentalist manner. It is applied be-
haviouristically if the actual choices people make are interpreted as reveal-
ing their values or preferences, and these revealed preferences are inter-
preted as implying utilities. This application is favoured by economists,
but it is inadequate if we want to use decision theory in order to make up
our minds about which option we should prefer in a given situation. For
such a use, decision theory should be applied mentalistically: we must ask
ourselves how we value outcomes and how to estimate the probabilities of
these outcomes. We may also use the theory mentalistically in predicting
the decisions of other people. We ask them to make judgments about their
values and subjective probabilities, and we combine these judgments in
accordance with the axioms of decision theory. We then derive predictions
concerning the decisions these people will make.
I am not introducing the conceptual framework of decision theory in
order to assign determinate numbers to the expected utilities of specific
options for investing in scientific research to calculate the most rational
decision. Even if this could be done in principle, the outcomes of the rele-
vant measurements would depend on the details of individual situations.
My objectives are more abstract and philosophical. The framework of deci-
sion theory is helpful in specifying the kinds of mistakes one might make
in actual situations that ask for a decision and in attempting to prevent
such mistakes. In general, five types of mistakes may be distinguished: (1)
an inadequate analysis of the relevant situation resulting, for instance, in
the omission of relevant options, (2) mistakes in the assessment of proba-
bilities of outcomes, (3) overlooking possible outcomes of options, (4) in-
sufficient reflection on one’s own valuation of outcomes, and (5) making
contradictory choices. I briefly illustrate (1), (2), (4) and (5). In the next
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subsection, I shall focus on (3) as applied to the problem of investing in
basic research.59
1. Few people possess to a high degree what Robert Musil once called “a
sense of possibility” (Möglichkeitssinn). Indeed, the protagonist of his main
novel, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, was an exception in that he had an
acute sense of possibilities, whereas most people are dominated by a sense
of “reality”, that is, by habit. As a consequence, we often neglect possible
courses of action in a given situation. Empirical decision theorists discov-
ered that in everyday situations, people have a general tendency to focus on
a few salient possibilities to which they are accustomed, ignoring all the
others.60  Another example of mistake (1) would be to overlook the fact that
decisions are only concerned with future courses of action that have future
effects (costs and benefits). Often one commits the fallacy of “sunk costs”,
that is, one enters surreptitiously costs made in the past into the analysis of
the decision situation. This happens, for instance, if one refuses to sell
shares on which one has made a great loss in the past, even though the
probability of future gains is lower than on other shares one might buy. It
is a fundamental rule of rationality that decisions should be based upon
future consequences only.
2. The most important examples of (2), mistaken estimations of proba-
bilities, are due to biased sampling or to neglecting base rates. Biased sam-
pling may occur in many ways. Since we remember our successes better
than our failures, we will overestimate the success rate of our behavioural
routines. Examiners in entrance examinations may think that they are do-
ing a good job if the students they selected succeed, but they forget that
data about the rejected applicants are not available. A state may pride itself
on the high productivity of its publicly funded research and conclude that
more investments are not needed, but overlook the fact that this productiv-
ity is due to accidental circumstances that will disappear soon.61  Further-
more, we systematically overestimate the frequency of salient events and
morally negative occurrences. For instance, numerous people cancelled
their air travel arrangements after the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001 and decided to go on holiday by car. They forgot that the probability
of a traffic accident remains much higher than that of a plane crash staged
by terrorists. Similarly, a cost-benefit analysis of scientific research is often
biased negatively by too much attention paid to spectacular risks of scien-
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tific developmens, in genetic engineering, for example.
Neglecting base rates also has many manifestations. One is the effect
of what is called “anchoring”. Because of our limited attention channels,
we often focus on one item of evidence that “anchors” our estimate of
probabilities or averages, and such information considered early in the
judgement process tends to be overweighted in the final judgement. If
asked what is the average price of a textbook, students presented with an
expensive sample will come up with a higher estimate than students pre-
sented with a cheap item. Another way to neglect base rates is overlooking
the regression effect. Regression toward the mean is inevitable for scaled
variables that are not perfectly correlated. If someone performs exception-
ally well on one occasion, it is probable that he will perform less well on the
next occasion, that is, his performance will regress toward the mean of his
or her performances. By making a non-regressive prediction of the next
performance, one commits the fallacy of overlooking the regression effect.
Teachers commit this fallacy if they argue that praise of pupils for an unu-
sually excellent performance is counterproductive, because pupils will per-
form less well next time.
3. Mistakes of type (3), overlooking possible outcomes of choices, are
particularly relevant to the issue of investments in basic research. In my
view, politicians tend to underestimate the benefits of scientific research
in two ways: they focus exclusively on the economic benefits, and they fail
to appreciate the diversity of economic benefits of publicly funded re-
search. For this reason, I shall discuss these issues more amply in subsec-
tions 3b and 3d. Let me briefly illustrate mistakes of types (4) and (5) before
coming to them.
4. Nothing is more difficult than to determine what we really value in
life, and mistaken decisions are often due to insufficient reflection on our
valuations. An example of such a mistake (4) would be the decision by a
factory owner in a small town to introduce automation in his factory. Al-
though automation increased his profits because many workers were
made redundant, in fact it turned out that the owner’s real utilities in run-
ning the business had little to do with the profit he made. His greatest
satisfaction was derived from providing employment to many people in
his community. Applied decision theorists question decision-makers at
length about their values and about their estimates of probabilities. I hold
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that Dutch politics stands in need of such applied decision-theoretical ad-
vice with regard to its valuation of scientific research in relation to other
public goods, in particular social security.
When the Dutch laws of social security were introduced, such as the
law on unfitness for labour (WAO), it was never anticipated that huge
numbers of people would profit from them. Nor could politicians antici-
pate that the generous social security system of The Netherlands would
make it into one of the most attractive countries in the world for “refu-
gees”. Politicians should not be blamed for this lack of foresight (although,
if they had possessed it, they would have voted against the proposed laws),
because all human actions have unintended effects. They must be blamed,
however, for not systematically searching for unintended effects and for
not sufficiently reconsidering the laws in the light of these unintended
consequences.
If the Netherlands spends too much on social security, it under-invests
in scientific research, as I shall argue in subsection 3d-4. Hence, I plead for
a re-evaluation of these domains of public spending. There are many caus-
es for the present distortion of political valuations. First, whereas social
security spending has a short-term objective, aiming at alleviating the
present material needs of citizens, investing in basic research has long-
term positive effects: it is crucial for an economy that remains competitive
in the long run. But democratic politicians usually focus on the short term
and do not anticipate the future beyond the next elections. Second, politi-
cians commit the fallacy of focussing on salient negative examples, ne-
glecting base rates and overall effects. One well documented case of per-
sonal misery has more influence on the decisions of politicians than statis-
tics and long-term economic predictions. Furthermore, it is often
overlooked that the positive performance of the Dutch economy during
the last decade of the twentieth century has been caused by non-sustaina-
ble policies, such as low salaries and consensus between social partners
(“poldermodel”). In the long run, such a positive performance must be
based upon an increase of productivity caused by investments in research
and technology. Finally, if large numbers of people profit from social secu-
rity, politicians who propose to curb the system risk losing votes, whereas
no votes are lost by economising on fundamental research.62
5. The fifth type of mistake consists in making contradictory decisions.
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In the literature on decision theory, such mistakes are illustrated by inco-
herent betting behaviour that might turn a subject into a “money pump”.
With regard to government policies, however, it is more typical that deci-
sions are contradictory in relation to each other because of incompatible
objectives. The example of Dutch research schools showed that these insti-
tutions often cannot meet the requirement of a substantial independent
budget responsibility because the objective of inter-university cooperation
is in conflict with the objective of competition between universities. An-
other and more damaging contradiction exists between the official ambi-
tion of the Dutch government to turn the Dutch economy into a knowl-
edge-based economy (“kenniseconomie”) and its attitude with regard to
investing in research.
Dutch policy-makers seem to think that a substantial increase in gov-
ernment spending on research is not necessary. In the relevant docu-
ments, one may discern two arguments to this effect. According to the
first, the relatively low level of investment in research and development in
The Netherlands is not due to the level of public spending but to the low
level of investments by the private sector, because Dutch public spending
is at the average level of the OECD countries. The second argument says
that The Netherlands might shift its attention from home production of
scientific knowledge to using knowledge produced elsewhere in the world,
that is, it might focus more on “diffusion” of knowledge than on re-
search.63  I shall argue in subsection 3d that these arguments are mistak-
en. They show that Dutch policy-makers have alarmingly little insight into
the real economic benefits of research and the mechanisms of knowledge
diffusion. Let me first say a few words on the benefits of scientific research
in general.
b Benefits of Scientific Research
To the extent that governments attempt to justify public spending on sci-
entific research, they do so mostly on the basis of economic arguments:
investing in research pays off in economic terms. But this point of view is
too narrow. By overlooking non-economic benefits of research in science
and the humanities, governments commit the mistake of neglecting possi-
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ble utilities of choices (see subsection 3a-3).
Scientific research in the broad sense of the term yields at least four
different types of benefits: (1) economic, (2) knowledge needed for non-
economic action, (3) purely cognitive and cultural benefits, and finally (4)
attitudinal benefits. The first sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics reads: “All
men naturally desire knowledge”. Humans do so for two reasons: knowl-
edge is needed for successful action or production, and acquiring knowl-
edge is a joy in itself. Broadly speaking, benefits of types (1) and (2) are
means to successful action or production, and benefits of types (3) and (4)
are ends in themselves. Let me briefly discuss these four types.
1. According to a document published in the year 2000 by the Europe-
an Commission, “25 to 50 percent of economic growth is due to scientific
research and technology”.64  In view of this information, which I shall
qualify and discuss in subsection 3d, the Commission is raising the alarm
concerning the research conditions in Europe. As I mentioned in section
2, the average investments in research and development within the Euro-
pean Union amount to about 1.8% of the GDP, versus 2.8% in the United
States and 2.9% in Japan, and the gulf is widening quickly. Many other
indicators are equally alarming. The percentage of scientific researchers
working in industry in terms of the workforce as a whole is much less in
the European Union (2.5%) than in Japan (6%) or the United States
(6.7%). The European trade balance for technological products has shown
a deficit of about 20 billion euro a year over the last ten years. The number
of European post-doctorate students in the United States is about twice as
high as the number of American post-doctorate students of a similar level
in Europe. Finally, the attitude with regard to science among the American
public is more positive that that of Europeans. With the entrance of East-
ern European states in the Union, the balance between Europe and the
United States will deteriorate further, for the average level of investment in
research in the candidate countries is even lower than it is in the European
Union. For these reasons, the European commission pleads for a funda-
mental discussion on the necessity of investing in scientific research.
The Dutch state spends more on scientific research (in terms of per-
centage of the GDP) than most small countries in the European Union,
such as Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. But it invests considerably less than
France, Germany, Finland, and Sweden. There is no reason for compla-
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cency at this point for a country that aims at developing a knowledge-based
economy, as I argue under (d).
2. Scientific research is also needed to inform action and production
outside the economic sphere, both public and private. Fundamental re-
search with military objectives comes to mind as a prime example, but a
great many other examples are available. Medical research may have eco-
nomic benefits, but its primary aim is to enhance human health. Scholar-
ship in the humanities, such as history and cultural studies, may be essen-
tial to the success of foreign politics. Research on religions such as Islam is
indispensable in order to stimulate multicultural discussions in Western
countries, that are needed for the social integration of minorities. Re-
search on the ecosystem Earth, in which many different disciplines play a
role, is necessary in order to prevent environmental disaster. If one adds
up these and many other non-economic benefits of research, one may con-
clude that, taken together, they are more important than the purely eco-
nomic benefits. For this reason it is surprising that both the European
Union and individual countries focus primarily on economic benefits
whenever they want to justify public investments in research.
3. Apart from being a means to other ends, scientific research is also an
end in itself, both for the individual and for humanity as a whole. Aristotle
argued in book X of his Nicomachean Ethics that the highest form of hu-
man happiness consists in the activity of Theoria, the disinterested con-
templation of truth. Indeed, according to Aristotle, speculative and disin-
terested scientific activity is the highest of the Virtues and the ultimate aim
of human life. Aristotle defended this noble ideal of humanity against
competing conceptions with trenchant arguments and scorn. With regard
to those who hold that pleasure and amusement are the ultimate aims of
life, he wrote that “to make amusement the object of our serious pursuits
and our work seems foolish and childish to excess: Anacharsis’ motto, Play
in order that you may work, is felt to be the right rule”.65
Aristotle’s noble ideal has been obscured by Christianity, a religion
whose plebeian origins have been obvious to acute observers such as Frie-
drich Nietzsche, but it was rediscovered during the European Enlighten-
ment. Today, the ideal is in danger of being lost again, because of the vul-
gar materialism of modern culture. On the one hand, it would be com-
pletely justified for modern states to enable as many people to lead the life
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of scholarship and scientific research as they can afford.66  On the other
hand, it is unlikely that politicians will ever feel the force of this argument
for investing in research. The reason is that the intellectual pleasures of
research and their superiority to most other pleasures are obvious only to
those who have devoted their life to the search for truth, and politicians are
mostly not among them.
As far as humanity as a whole is concerned, the advancement of sci-
ence has freed the thinking part of mankind from the fetters of religious
superstition and wishful thought, and it has deeply changed man’s view of
the world and of his own place in the universe. The intellectual superiority
of Western culture in relation to cultures that have not produced the self-
correcting tradition of scholarship and scientific research is obvious to
each serious student of comparative cultural history. From the point of
view of intellectual and spiritual life, science in the broad sense of Wissen-
schaft is the greatest adventure mankind has ever undertaken. It is an aim
in itself of humanity, and to consider science as a mere means to economic
life is as degrading to science as to the human being who considers it thus.
4. Finally, scientific research has important attitudinal benefits. Taking
part in the activity of scientific research and scholarship teaches us that all
our convictions are fallible and that it is a pleasure to be corrected by oth-
ers. Researchers learn to practise the virtues of objectivity, criticism, im-
partiality, and intellectual creativity. In subsection 3e, I shall argue that
these virtues are not only essential to science but also beneficial to demo-
cratic society at large.
In this subsection I have argued that the greatest benefits of science and
scholarship, that is, those benefits that are not subservient to economic
aims, are usually overlooked in discussions on the justification of invest-
ments in science. Many of the purely economic benefits are neglected as
well in such discussions, as I shall argue in subsection 3d. Before coming
to this issue, let us review a serious problem for those who want to invest
in scientific research, the problem of unpredictability.
c The Problem of Unpredictability
A decision cannot be rational unless the subject has listed all the relevant
outcomes of choices and has reflected carefully on the valuation of these
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outcomes. We have seen that with regard to public investments in scientif-
ic research, both of these necessary conditions for rationality are rarely
satisfied. Politicians tend to overlook the utilities of research and underval-
ue scientific research in relation to other public goods, such as social secu-
rity. What should we think about a third important necessary condition for
rationality, the proper assessment of probabilities of outcomes?
Investors in scientific research are sometimes discouraged because the
outcomes of research cannot be predicted, with any probability whatsoev-
er, as far as their content is concerned. This problem of unpredictability
has been aptly characterised by Henri Poincaré, when he wrote: “Do not,
therefore, expect any prophesy from me: had I known what one will dis-
cover tomorrow, I would have published it long ago, to secure priority”.67
Although the problem of unpredictability is trivial and its solution quite
obvious, it is useful to spell it out, because an insufficient appreciation of
the problem may lead to unrealistic expectations and demands of investors
in scientific research.
Science is our most powerful predictive tool, and in Western culture it
has replaced older methods of foreseeing the future, such as astrology,
reading omens, or religious prophesy (even though these outdated meth-
ods survive as folklore in popular culture). It may, therefore, come as a
surprise that science cannot predict itself with regard to its future content.
In general, there is no reason why one would not be able to predict the
knowledge which someone else will possess at a later date. I can predict,
for instance, that students of physics at the University of Leiden who pass
their propedeutic exams will have mastered classical mechanics and the
calculus at a specific level. But is it possible for a person to predict the
knowledge he will possess at a later date if he does not possess that knowl-
edge now? Similarly, will the scientific community be able to predict the
content of new theories or experimental discoveries which it has not yet
invented or made? The supposition that it can leads to a contradiction. In
order to predict at time tn that the scientific community will invent a spe-
cific new theory T at time tn+1, we would have to have that new theory T at
our disposal at time tn, so that it cannot be a new theory: it must be known
already at tn. Hence, prediction of the content of new knowledge is logical-
ly impossible.
A similar but slightly more complicated argument shows that it is log-
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ically impossible to predict the future acceptance of an empirical theory
that we now do not yet accept even though it has already been invented. In
order to do this, it would be necessary to predict events, on the basis of our
presently accepted theories, that are not yet observed but which, when ob-
served, would provide sufficient evidence for the as yet unaccepted theory
and would motivate its acceptance for that reason. But the supposition that
this is possible also leads to a contradiction. The reason is that events pre-
dictable on the basis of theories we now accept will count, if observed, as
evidence for these theories and not as good reasons for accepting a new
theory which we do not now accept. Of course we may simply calculate the
observable consequences of a new theory and accept it if these conse-
quences materialise. But in that case, we are not predicting that they will
indeed materialise.68
One may object that these arguments are irrelevant to the demands of
investors in scientific research. What these investors want to predict, the
objection says, is not the content of new theories of discoveries but the
likelihood that there will be results, irrespective of the content of these
results. It is doubtful, however, whether investors would be satisfied by
such empty predictions. If they invest in research because they expect a
technological spin-off, for example, they will want to assess the probability
of results of a certain kind. And in order to predict results of a certain kind,
one has to predict at least the global content of new discoveries.
It would be interesting to investigate empirically how able scientists are
in predicting the global content of new discoveries. The anecdotal evidence
we have is not very promising, however, for as far as we know, the record
in science forecasting of even the most qualified experts is poor. For in-
stance, shortly after the publication of Frederick Soddy’s 1930 book Science
and Life, in which the author speculated about the possibility of atomic
bombs, the Nobel laureate in physics Robert A. Millikan wrote that “the
new evidence born of further scientific study is to the effect that it is highly
improbable that there is any appreciable amount of available subatomic
energy to tap”.69  Fifteen years later, on 6 August 1945, Hiroshima was
destroyed by an atomic bomb, that killed 70,000 people.70  By way of a
conclusion, I quote Nicholas Rescher as he writes: “Since we cannot pre-
dict the answers to the presently open questions of natural science, we also
cannot predict its future questions, for these questions will hinge upon
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those as yet unrealizable answers...”.71  And if we cannot predict the future
questions of science, we are unable to predict even the kind of answers, if
any, that scientists will provide to these future questions.
The problem of unpredictability may seem to preclude any rationality
of decisions to invest in scientific research, but this is an illusion. Al-
though we cannot predict the outcome of particular research activities and,
indeed, cannot predict that there will be an outcome at all at a given time in
the future, statistics over large aggregates of research activities show that,
globally speaking, scientific research pays off, even in purely economic
terms (see under d). If one calculates, for example, the total amount of
capital generated by the invention of the transistor, one will probably find
that this single invention paid for all research in the world for many
years.72  Yet it remains true that the problem of unpredictability has seri-
ous implications for the rationality of local investments in scientific re-
search.
One implication is that investments should not be over-specific. If we
assume that the problem of unpredictability is more serious with regard to
fundamental investigations than in applied research, we must conclude
that in fundamental research larger aggregates must be funded and that
the decision of which research proposals receive funding must be left to
the scientists working in the field. A second implication is that we cannot
leave the funding of basic research to private players in the market. Since
the aggregates to be funded must be large, they will not be sufficiently
specific for receiving funding by private companies. This implication
brings us to an issue to be discussed in the next subsection: why should
there be public funding of scientific research?
Another implication is that it is not easy to foresee which specific type
of research institution will be most profitable in the future. In the explan-
atory memorandum of the present prize contest, the governing body of the
Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen raises questions such as:
Will a different taxonomy of scientific disciplines favour the growth of
knowledge? Should we invest in deepening disciplinary research or rather
in broadening research in the sense of making it interdisciplinary? Could
it be that the traditional classification of disciplines in natural sciences,
social sciences, and humanities is an obstacle to further growth of knowl-
edge?
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The answer to all these questions is the same, to wit, no answer. Because
we cannot predict future knowledge, we simply cannot know in advance
what kind of research institution is most profitable in the long run. The
wisest course is to build different types of institutions in the Western
world and just see what happens. Here, as elsewhere, the model of justifi-
cation by competition is the best one we have. A comparative evaluation of
research institutions has already yielded some interesting conclusions,
one of which I shall mention in subsection 3d.
I stress the importance of the problem of unpredictability here because
in Western societies the attitude with regard to public funding of research
has changed in the last quarter of the twentieth century. After the Second
World War until well in the 1980s, most governments in industrialised
countries endorsed the model for basic research advocated in 1945 by Van-
nevar Bush, the US presidential science adviser. According to this model,
governments fund basic research, and this will yield, at some time or oth-
er, contributions to national wealth, health, and security. The attitude to-
wards expected benefits from science was relaxed, as should be the case if
one takes the problem of unpredictability seriously.
But after the 1970s, public expenditure came under strain, and the fur-
ther “democratisation” of Western societies led to demands for greater
public accountability. In The Netherlands, for instance, it was argued that
scientific research should produce more social benefits (“maatschappeli-
jke relevantie”). It seems that in most OECD countries, a new political
consensus for science is emerging according to which governments will
invest in basic research only if it generates more direct and specific bene-
fits.73  This new political mentality will be harmful to the long-term cultur-
al and economic interests of these countries, because it endangers invest-
ments in fundamental research the results of which cannot be predicted.
d Public funding of basic research: the economic argument
As we saw in subsection 3b, scientific research has at least four different
types of benefits, and the economic benefit is only one of them. One might
argue with reference to each of these benefits that scientific research
should be publicly funded, but in this section I focus only on the economic
argument for public investment in fundamental or basic research. My pri-
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mary question is, then, (1) why exactly should basic research be publicly
funded, if one focuses on its economic benefits?74  Using, among other
documents, the 1996 review by the Science Policy Research Unit of the
University of Sussex (SPRU) of the existing literature on The Relationship
Between Publicly Funded Basic Research and Economic Performance, I shall
also answer three other questions: (2) What types of economic benefit of
fundamental research can be distinguished? (3) Can we measure the eco-
nomic benefits of basic research? (4): How are we to determine the proper
level of public investment in basic research?75
1 The mechanism of the market can function efficiently only if the con-
sumption of an item of the relevant category by one consumer rivals the
consumption of that same item by another consumer and if consumers
can be excluded from consumption of the relevant goods. If the conditions
of rivalry and excludability are satisfied, we speak of purely individual
goods. However, if one or both of these conditions are not satisfied, alloca-
tion of the relevant goods will be inefficient. If there is no rivalry, the mar-
ginal costs per extra consumer are zero, whereas consumers will not be
prepared to pay a price that is substantially higher than the marginal costs
per consumer. And if there is no excludability, consumers will not want to
pay a price at all, that is, they will want to be free riders, and no producer
for the good will be found. Economists distinguish various kinds of collec-
tive goods depending on which conditions are violated and to what extent,
and in principle it may be rational for national states to produce collective
or public goods.
According to the traditional argument for state funding, basic research
should be considered as a public good. This is because the main product of
research allegedly consists in codified information that is costly to produce
but virtually costless to transfer, to use, and to re-use. In other words, with
regard to the products of scientific research, there would be no rivalry. In
that case it is economically efficient to make the results of basic research
freely available to all potential users by publishing them in a publicly ac-
cessible form. As a consequence, there will be no incentive for private pro-
ducers to fund basic research, because they cannot appropriate the eco-
nomic benefits of its products. It follows that basic research must be pub-
licly funded.76
197Science and Democracy
This “public good” argument presupposes that the only, or the main, util-
ity of basic research consists in publicly accessible publications of results,
and that no cost is attached to the use of these results: one could just read
the publications. If this is so, there is neither rivalry nor excludability. Be-
cause there is no excludability, consumers will want to be free riders, and
in the private sphere no producer of basic scientific knowledge will be
found. It does not follow, however, that it is rational for a particular state,
such as The Netherlands, to fund basic research. If the argument is cor-
rect, states can be free riders as well, using the information produced by
research funded by other states, without seriously investing in research
themselves.
This seems to be the point of the observation made by the Dutch Cen-
tral Planning Office (Centraal Planbureau) quoted in subsection 3a, ac-
cording to which The Netherlands should shift its focus from producing
scientific research to “diffusion” of research. In this context, “diffusion” is
simply a euphemism for using knowledge which others have produced
without paying for it. In the same manner as a small country such as The
Netherlands underinvests in its military protection because it profits from
the military of large allies, it might underinvest in scientific research and
profit from the investments made by other countries.
There are, however, two problems with this Dutch use of the traditional
argument for public investment in basic research: the use is not quite de-
cent, and the argument is invalid. Let me focus on the problem of invalid-
ity. It is neither the case that the products of scientific research can be used
and re-used without costs, nor that the main utility of basic research con-
sists in publicly available publications.
Many authors stress that it requires a substantial research capacity to
understand and use scientific knowledge, both by individuals and organi-
sations. Hence using this knowledge is not at all without cost; it is impos-
sible without an expensive research capacity of the user. At the personal
level, the reason is that many epistemic capacities are tacit and can only be
acquired by extensive training. Personal interaction is often necessary for
transferring knowledge, and in many cases, the best method for transfer-
ring knowledge from one organisation to another is the physical transfer
of the skilled individuals who possess this knowledge. At the level of re-
search organisations, information is exchanged mostly between laborato-
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ries that have something to offer to each other. It follows that if a country
does not have a substantial research capacity, it will be excluded from this
type of scientific communication.
Furthermore, scientific research typically has a great many benefits
that are available only to the countries that fund it, as we shall see under
(2). It has been suggested that published information is not even the most
important product of scientific research. Although publications are an im-
portant source for learning about research, one of their functions is to sig-
nal the presence of tacit and technical knowledge in specific research
groups, which may be exploited through personal contacts. It follows that
economists who adhere to the traditional argument for public funding of
research, including the economists of the Dutch Central Planning Office,
are mistaking a pars pro toto, since they assume that the publicly accessible
publications are the main products of research.77
If the traditional “public good” argument for state funding of basic re-
search is partly based on mistaken assumptions, this does not imply that
no public funding of fundamental research is needed. On the contrary, as
the SPRU review says, “numerous studies over the last 25 years have indi-
cated that market forces lead to sub-optimal investments in basic re-
search”.78  A better rationale for public funding of basic research may be
given by adding two lines of argument to the traditional case for consider-
ing research as a “public good”. One line is based upon the problem of
unpredictability. Since the lack of predictability is a serious problem for
investors in basic research that can be solved only by investing in large
aggregates of research over long periods of time, states will have to contrib-
ute substantially to the funding of basic research. The second line of argu-
ment consists in drawing attention to the great number of local economic
benefits of investing in basic research. Scientific knowledge is embodied
in individuals and organisations, and the main benefits of research flow
through training and networks. Public funding is indispensable to provide
training and to sustain a nation’s access to international networks.79
2 If publicly accessible publications are not the only and not even the
main economically relevant benefits of basic research, what other econom-
ic benefits can be distinguished? On the basis of an extensive study of the
literature, the SPRU review lists five other economic benefits:
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– In the process of basic research, new instruments and methodologies
are invented. Transfer of these new technological methodologies to in-
dustry often opens up new industrial possibilities and dramatically
changes the pace of technological advance. Good examples are comput-
ers, the Internet, and gen-technologies such as the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) method discussed in subsection 2a.
– Skills acquired by people involved in basic research, particularly gradu-
ate students, yield great economic benefits as individuals are trans-
ferred from basic research into industry. They carry with them sub-
stantial tacit knowledge and master the codified knowledge of their
field.
– By participating in fundamental research, individuals also acquire the
general capacity to analyse and solve complex problems outside of their
specialty. This capacity is essential for management and often proves
of great benefit to firms and other organisations confronted by com-
plex problems.
– Without a substantial home capacity for scientific research, a country
cannot access international networks of experts and information. This
observation holds for all domains of basic research separately, and it
raises painful issues for small countries. If a country such as The Neth-
erlands decides to focus on some domains only, neglecting others, it
will lose access to top networks in these other domains.
– In some cases, basic research leads to the creation of “spin-off” compa-
nies that profit from the epistemic capacities of academics.80
The relative weight of these different benefits turns out to vary with the
scientific field, technology, and industrial sector. As a consequence, no
simple model can capture the relation between basic research and its eco-
nomic benefits. It is clear, however, that the traditional argument for pub-
lic funding of research needs to be corrected and supplemented. There are
many more benefits than the traditional argument assumes, and these
benefits are often “local” in the sense that they come only to the countries
that invest in basic research.
It has been argued by a number of authors, for instance, that epistemic
spillovers from geographical proximity are much more important than the
traditional argument for public funding allows for. The local technological
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infrastructure turns out to determine the capacity for industrial innova-
tion, especially if university research and development is closely associated
with industrial research and development. In other words, geography is an
important influence on the process of innovation, because investments in
human and technological capacities at specific places create “locational
advantages”.
These local spillover effects also show up in co-author and citation be-
haviour. Hicks et al. (1996) have shown that even though the Japanese
share of the world total of scientific publications is between 8% and 13%,
88% of the joint papers by a Japanese author involve a Japanese collabora-
tor and only 18% a foreign partner. This proves that not all partners in the
world are equally attractive, for in that case there would be only between
8% and 13% joint papers with a Japanese partner. Similarly, Narin and
Olivastro (1994) found that across all major countries there is a systematic
bias favouring one’s own country in the degree to which companies cite
scientific papers in their patents. People prefer partners who are spatially
closer and more similar in language, culture, and history.81
From these considerations, we may draw two conclusions. If the Dutch
government wants to be a free rider in research, focussing more on the
diffusion of knowledge than on its production, it will discover that by econ-
omising on production, the Dutch will lose the capacity to profit from the
diffusion of knowledge produced elsewhere.82  A recent OECD study from
June 2001 on the relation between research and productivity concludes
that since “countries which spend more on R&D take more advantage of
foreign technology, free riding (waiting for other countries to develop the
new technology and just trying to imitate when it is ready) would be inef-
fective”.83  The second conclusion is concerned with institutional design.
If a substantial benefit of fundamental research consists in skills acquired
by graduate students, universities should have a major share of fundamen-
tal research, and posts for graduate students should be made attractive.84
Furthermore, because of local spill-over effects, research laboratories of
industries should be situated in the vicinity of university research centres.
3 Can we measure the economic benefits of fundamental research? In
principle, there are three methods for doing so that complement each oth-
er: econometric studies, surveys, and case studies. Econometric studies
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typically rely on large databases and use statistical techniques in order to
assess the economic rates of return (annual profit rates) to research on a
macro level. Surveys have been used to estimate how much basic research
contributes to specific products and processes, whereas case studies focus
on particular sectors of technologies. Each of these methods has advantag-
es and specific problems. For example, case studies provide detailed in-
sight into mechanisms of knowledge diffusion, but their results cannot be
generalised.
There are many difficulties in measuring fundamental research and its
contribution to economic welfare. First, there is the problem of tracing the
transfer of information from basic research to particular technical innova-
tions. Such transfers are not priced or sold, and thus they are not account-
ed for in any bookkeeping, and they are neither excludable nor rival. Sec-
ond, it is misleading to estimate to what proportion basic research contrib-
utes to technological developments merely by computing the sums
invested in it, which are very small in relation to the investments in appli-
cations and commercialisation. The development of classical mechanics
by Newton did not require much investment, but its long-term contribu-
tions to economic welfare are astronomical. Yet no other reliable methods
of measurement exist for estimating the economic benefits of publicly
funded research. The example of classical mechanics brings us to a third
difficulty: most estimates of the economic benefits of fundamental re-
search take only short terms (up to fifteen years) into account, whereas the
influence of deep theoretical discoveries is often great in the long run and
unpredictable.
Two other factors contribute to the likelihood that the economic bene-
fits of publicly funded basic research are generally underestimated. The
data on research and development used in American studies include a
large component of military research, in which the economic return is
low.85  And much econometric research depends on data provided by the
staff of industrial research organisations, who may be under pressure to
show that their own research is contributing to the success of their corpo-
ration. As a consequence, they will play down the contribution by publicly
funded research. We may conclude that in the many studies that intend to
assess the economic benefits of publicly funded basic research, these ben-
efits are probably underestimated rather than exaggerated.
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Nevertheless, the rates of return associated with publicly funded basic re-
search found by these studies are very impressive. According to the nu-
merous publications analysed in the SPRU review, rates of return on pub-
licly funded research vary between 20% and 83%, depending on the sector
and industry. Moreover, in a study of one thousand of the largest US firms
during the 1970s, Z. Griliches found that corporations spending a larger
fraction of their R&D on basic research were more productive and had a
higher level of output in relation to their measured inputs.86  According to
the 2001 OECD study on the relation between research and productivity
growth in 16 OECD countries, an increase of 1% in public research gener-
ates 0.17% in productivity growth, whereas 1% more in business R&D gen-
erates 0.13% in productivity growth. The authors conclude that “the effect
of government and university performed research on productivity is posi-
tive and significant, and outweighs the cost of public research”.87
E. Mansfield has attempted to measure the rate of return on academic
research in the USA over a fifteen-year period. On the basis of a large
number of (debatable) assumptions, he concluded that this rate of return
is 28%.88  The real percentage must be even higher, because Mansfield
only investigated seven industries, a limited period of time, and benefits
within the United States and did not include indirect benefits such as
skills, the production of new tools, etc. Since this rate of return is much
larger than the rates of return generally expected from capital spending,
one might wonder why private corporations do not invest more in basic
research. The answer is to be found in the problem of unpredictability:
since the results of basic research are unpredictable, corporations tend to
underinvest in basic research, especially if they are obsessed with short-
term shareholder’s value. This is why I suggested that the problem of un-
predictability is one of the two pillars of a sound justification of public
funding of basic research.
4 It should be possible for a state, in principle, to determine the optimal
level of public investments in basic research according to the framework of
rational decision theory. But in fact, this is not what happens. Govern-
ments commit all of the mistakes I listed in subsection (a) above. In fixing
the budget, they are dominated by habit and invested interests, because a
very small percentage of the budget (around 1%) is open to re-allocation.
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As a consequence, most possible courses of action are not taken into con-
sideration. Deliberation on values and aims is often ad hoc and more at-
tuned to tactical considerations (elections) than to the long-term interests
of the country. Furthermore, it is surprising that the Dutch government
has never even attempted to calculate the rate of return on public invest-
ments in basic research in The Netherlands, in order to compare it with
the rates of return on other public investments, such as infrastructure.89
As a result, decisions on national priorities in economic politics, such as
the choice between investing in a privatised telecommunications company
(KPN), for example, and investing in research, are partly determined by
pressure groups and relations of political power instead of primarily by
long-term national interests.
It would be unrealistic to hope that politicians will ever make up their
minds according to the prescriptions of rational decision theory. For this
reason, I propose a rule-of-thumb model of sub-optimal rationality for de-
termining the proper level of investments in basic research that can be
handled easily by politicians. The structure of this model is that of justifi-
cation by competition, as explained in section 1. Let us assume that coun-
tries want to compete in terms of national wealth. Let us further assume
that, because of local spill-over effects, Griliches’s results for big business
holds for countries as well: if they spend more on basic research, they will
produce more wealth, other factors being equal.90  These assumptions
seem to be endorsed by the Dutch government, since it aims at transform-
ing the Dutch economy into a “knowledge-based economy”.91
According to the model, politicians first have to fix the economic tar-
gets for their country: how high do they want it to be in the world hierarchy
of economic performance? Given the second assumption, one may derive
a level of investments in basic research for the country as a whole from the
overall economic target, using research funding of relevant other coun-
tries as a benchmark. Third, the public part of these investments has to be
fixed. Finally, one corrects this public share as a function of non-economic
objectives. For instance, a country may want to maintain or develop a spe-
cific cultural trademark. France is a good example of such a country. If the
cultural aims of a country include a high profile in scientific performance,
the level of public investments in research should be adapted accordingly.
It is interesting to note that most governments do not even use a model
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of suboptimal rationality in order to determine the level of public invest-
ments in basic research. The SPRU review concludes from an analysis of
research policies of the US, Germany, France, The Netherlands, Japan,
and the Asian Tigers that: “there is no evidence that other countries [than
the UK] use systematic criteria in determining the level of funding for ba-
sic research. Certainly, there has been no attempt to link that level to the
magnitude of economic benefits that basic research generates”.92  Let us
now apply the proposed model of suboptimal rationality to The Nether-
lands.
The official ambition of The Netherlands is “to belong to the leading
group of Europe” in economic performance.93  The Dutch government ex-
plicitly draws the conclusion that it should aim at creating “an excellent
infrastructure for research” and at belonging to the “world top” in research
and innovation.94  This would imply, I suppose, that the Dutch overall lev-
el of investment in basic research as a percentage of the GDP must be
higher than the average level of the OECD countries (2.2%), say, at the
level of the US (2.8%). In fact, however, it is lower than the average level of
the OECD countries, as the Dutch government acknowledges. Gerrit
Zalm, the Dutch Minister of Finance, argued in the opening address of the
academic year 2000-2001 at the University of Leiden that the culprit here
is not so much the Dutch state, which finances a relatively high percentage
of the total investments in research (39.1 % against 35.6 % in Germany
and 30.6 % in the US), but private corporations, which invest only 1.1% of
the GDP in research, as against 2.1 % in the US. Although the government
intends to invest more in research over the coming years, the increase will
not even bring The Netherlands up to the average OECD level of invest-
ments in terms of percentage of the GDP.95
We may conclude that the Dutch government is promising more than
it is prepared to pay for, and this will harm the economic interests of the
country in the long run. The government is behaving irrationally in that its
actual choices do not accord with its official aims. Zalm’s argument to the
effect that the Dutch state invests enough in basic research and that private
corporations should do more is superficial in light of the SPRU review. In
the past, industries funded basic research in their home countries. Today,
however, there is a tendency to invest in countries with the best local re-
search facilities. Industrial underinvestments in research in a country may
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then be interpreted as a symptom of non-competitive national facilities. As
the authors of the SPRU review conclude, the key issue is not so much
whether the benefits from basic research are substantial – they are – but
“how best to organise the national research system to make the most effec-
tive use of them”.96
If The Netherlands really wants to create “an excellent infrastructure
for research”, it should design facilities in universities and other state in-
stitutions that can compete with the best infrastructures in the United
States. To this end, the government should investigate to what extent the
relatively low local level of corporate investments in basic research is due
to deficiencies of the Dutch research environment, and redesign this envi-
ronment accordingly. Since this is a huge task, which may require that the
Dutch abandon some of their dogmas in university politics (no entrance
examinations, an egalitarian system of institutions, a national system) and
increase their investments substantially, it is advisable that in the next gov-
ernment there will be a cabinet minister for scientific research. As I ar-
gued in subsection 2c, many problems can be solved only at the European
level, so that The Netherlands should effectively promote an international
European and hierarchical system of universities.
e The Scientific Attitude
One of the main non-economic benefits of training in scientific research is
that the trainee acquires a scientific attitude. I shall round off this essay by
arguing that a rudimentary version of the scientific attitude is indispensa-
ble to mature citizens of well-functioning democratic states. Acquiring the
scientific attitude should be one of the main objectives of education in
democratic countries.
In order to evaluate the democratic calibre of national states, it is useful
to distinguish between the institutional and the functional aspect. One
question is: to what extent does a country have democratic institutions,
such as a division of powers, free elections, an independent judiciary, and
so on. For each country, one might try to design an optimal set of demo-
cratic institutions, taking the history of that country into account. Quite
another question is: to what extent do the existing institutions function
democratically? For instance, there may be free elections, but if the elector-
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ate can be manipulated easily by clever advertising strategies, the democra-
cy in that country – the US, for instance, or Russia – is dysfunctioning. Or
if there is a gentleman’s agreement between the major parties of a country
not to fight elections over a specific issue that is crucial for the future of a
country, such as the issue of immigration in The Netherlands, this democ-
racy is not functioning well, however honourable the motives of these par-
ties may be (to prevent discrimination against immigrants). Countries
may be democratic from the institutional point of view and quite undemo-
cratic from the functional point of view.
My thesis is that a democracy cannot function well unless enfranchised
citizens and politicians predominantly adopt a scientific attitude when fix-
ing their beliefs.97  Only if citizens are able to make up their minds ration-
ally will politicians be motivated to discuss important issues in the open on
the basis of pertinent arguments. Without such a public discussion of po-
litical issues, decision-making by politicians will be neither optimal nor
fully democratic, and elections will be won on the basis of advertising strat-
egies instead of by political merit. The system of free elections presuppos-
es that voters are able to make up their minds and determine their stand-
point with regard to political issues. How do people do this? And how
should they do it?
Generally speaking, adult human beings prefer having a fixed stand-
point to being in doubt. Often, however, it is more pleasant not to think at
all about issues than either to doubt or to have a point of view. The reason
is that having a point of view involves the risk that one clashes with other
people who are of a different opinion, or with the facts if they are brought
to one’s attention. Psychologists call such clashes “cognitive dissonance”,
and they have discovered that people can bear cognitive dissonance only to
a limited degree. So we might raise the following question: what is the
optimal method for making up our minds, assuming that the cognitive
dissonance we are able to tolerate has an upper limit? Roughly speaking,
three strategies may be distinguished.
The first strategy is that of individual obstinacy. An individual deter-
mines a standpoint or has acquired it by education, and sticks to it whatev-
er may come. The advantage is obvious, for the discomfort of doubt is ex-
cluded. But the costs of this method in terms of cognitive dissonance are
huge: one easily clashes both with the opinions of others and with the
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facts. In order to reduce these costs, humanity has practised a second strat-
egy since time immemorial, the method of collective obstinacy. If every-
one endorses the same opinion on an issue, interpersonal clashes of opin-
ion are excluded, and a certain piece of mind is guaranteed. Whoever holds
a different view will be liquidated or converted to the common doctrine by
subtle or less subtle means.
This is the method of most so-called world religions and of all dictatori-
al regimes. What has been written in The Book or decided by The Party is
absolutely true, and doubting it is sinful. The Curia or the Politbureau has
the monopoly on interpreting The Book, and discussions on interpretative
issues cannot be public because a loss of authority will be the result. The
method of collective obstinacy also has more moderate manifestations.
Quite often, people adopt a view because their peer group endorses it.
Opinions may be articles of fashion, and they are acquired together with
other elements of a lifestyle, such as dresses with a prestigious label or
cigarettes of a specific brand.
Again, the advantages of this method are clear, because cognitive disso-
nance caused by differences of opinion between people is excluded. But
still, the costs are too high. The method is not truth-indicative, so that
clashes with the facts cannot be avoided and will occur unexpectedly and
unmethodically. There is a superior strategy on the market, that was in-
vented by the Greeks in Antiquity and practised by other civilizations dur-
ing short periods, and that has become dominant among the members of
the Western intellectual elite from the seventeenth century onwards: the
scientific method (in the minimal sense specified in subsection 1c). The
method of collective obstinacy may still flourish with regard to opinions
about other-worldly issues, where the facts, if any, are beyond human
grasp and have no causal power in this world. If more mundane matters
are at stake, the third method of the scientific attitude is to be preferred.
When we fix our beliefs by the scientific method, cognitive dissonance
is not excluded. Our opinions may clash either with those of others or with
the facts. But cognitive dissonance is made tolerable because clashes of
both types are subjected to methodical rules. Whoever has the scientific
attitude will consider his or her opinions as tentative hypotheses that are
fallible and have to be tested. If this is the case, it becomes interesting to
learn what others think, and one will try to test one’s views in critical dis-
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cussion. Furthermore, who is right concerning the facts cannot be decided
by counting votes, but only by investigating those facts. This is why in the
scientific tradition ever more sophisticated methods for factual investiga-
tions have been developed.
The scientific attitude involves specific virtues, such as curiosity, mod-
esty with regard to one’s own views, intellectual creativity and persever-
ance, methodical scepticism, and tolerance concerning dissenters. These
very virtues are vices according to those who prefer the method of collec-
tive obstinacy. Usually, the moral calibre of the world religions is praised,
even by agnostics and atheists. But one will not find these intellectual vir-
tues defended in their Great Books. On the contrary, Jesus said, for in-
stance: “Every plant which my heavenly Father has not planted will be root-
ed up” (Matthew 15:13), and in the Koran it is written: “Whoso believes not
in God and His Messenger, We have prepared for the unbelievers a
Blaze”.98  Because the intellectual virtues are essential to a well-function-
ing democracy, science and not religion should be regarded as the highest
spiritual good in a democratic state. It is no wonder that in countries where
the attitude of collective obstinacy prevails we find misery and cultural
stagnation, whereas economy and humanity flower in the democratic and
scientifically minded West.
I hold, then, that a democracy cannot function well unless the scientific
attitude prevails both in citizens and in politicians. This does not imply
that each citizen should fix an opinion on all issues by means of the scien-
tific method: nobody disposes of sufficient time to do this. Having the sci-
entific attitude enables citizens, however, to engage in critical discussions
if this is necessary and ask pertinent questions. Nor do I think that politics
can be reduced to science, for in politics, conflicts of interest and extrasci-
entific values play an important role. But even in determining our inter-
ests or in deliberating on values, a scientific attitude of open-minded dis-
cussion with dissenters is essential to the functioning of a democracy. Fi-
nally, I do not advocate that all citizens should aim at a career in research
or participate in scientific training at an advanced level. Yet it is necessary
for a well-functioning democracy that all citizens receive some training in
the scientific attitude at school and learn to discuss critically.
We may conclude that in view of the attitudinal benefits of scientific
research, scientists and scholars must be held in high regard in a democra-
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cy: they are supposed to excel in virtues which each citizen should possess
to some degree. Moreover, a democratic state ought not to fund religious
schools if in these schools the attitude of collective obstinacy is propagated.
Rather, the scientific attitude should be taught to pupils as early in life as
possible. Although in its sophisticated forms the scientific attitude can
only be the product of a prolonged training and experience in research, its
fundamentals can and must be part of high school education.99
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is niet gebaat bij collectieve koppigheid”, NRC-Handelsblad, 11 August 2001.
98 J. L. Heldring has argued (NRC-Handelsblad of 6 September 2001) that this quote
from Matthew (in the newspaper version of this section) does not demonstrate
Jesus’ intolerance because in the relevant passages Christ was criticising the
intolerance of the Pharisees and scribes. But the fact that Jesus criticised the
intolerance of his opponents does not prove that he himself was not intolerant.
The quote shows that he was, and Heldring’s argument is a non sequitur. See for
the quotation from the Koran, The Koran, translated with an introduction by
Arthur J. Arberry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 532.
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99 I am grateful to Drs. E. A. A. M. Broesterhuizen of the Dutch Ministery of
Education, who very generously provided me with documentation on Dutch
research policies, and to Dr. J. W. McAllister and Dr. W. Houkes for their
criticisms on an earlier version of this essay.
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Science and Democracy:
a difficult relationship1
‘An enlightened and elitist essay on an unresolvable problem’
Paul Schnabel
1
The ability to provide such inescapable answers in such penetrating and
clear English to questions which the author himself says can barely be
comprehended is given to but a few. Herman Philipse is one such, and I
read his essay with great admiration and generally agreed with it, but
sometimes also with a feeling of unease and even irritation. He resolves
the typical 18th century contest question of the Hollandsche Maatschappij
in a series of steps, ending in a notable Wahlverwandschaft of good politics,
real democracy and modern science. That is almost too good to be true and
leaves one feeling suspicious. The reality can only be less smooth than
suggested here. Is what appears here as a perfect outcome of logical rea-
soning not in fact this infamous piece of soap that slips from one’s grasp
when one tries to get hold of it?
2
The opening starts as an elegant bow to the long history of the Maatschap-
pij, turns soon into a harsh blow to the Dutch self-esteem. When the Hol-
landsche Maatschappij was set up as a learned society, the Republic of the
Seven United Provinces was still wealthy but no longer powerful. The
economy was in a drawn-out recession, and Philipse establishes a link
here with the failure of the Republic in the field of science policy. In con-
trast to Britain and France, no investment was made in research and devel-
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opment. While that may be true, as an argument is it not an example of
Whig history? In the Low Countries there was no question of a central
government; science was the pastime of wealthy citizens, who in 1752 were
not yet a leisure class in the traditional sense of the word. The first national
institutions were established in French times by Louis Napoleon. Without
him there would be no Rijksmuseum and no Royal Netherlands Academy
of Arts and Sciences. What was missing in the ‘Netherlands’ was a power-
ful national government. I do not share Philipse’s thesis that the Maat-
schappij was founded 100 years too late. In my opinion, it was the national
state and a central government that was long overdue. Just how important
the will and money of the government are was shown at the end of the 19th
century when the Netherlands, thanks to the success of the HBS (former
Dutch high school) system and the cautious modernisation of the univer-
sities, found its way back into the top ranks of the world academic commu-
nity. The question of whether that step was also of major importance for
the economy in a direct sense cannot be answered so readily. That strikes
me as largely a 20th-century effect, especially in the form of technology and
engineering. As far as I know, the link between the results of fundamental
research and the development of a commercially successful technology
remains to be properly established.
3
I always become a bit nervous when I read the question ‘What is science?’
I feel we can more profitably ask ‘Why is it science? When is it science?
Whence is it science and to whom is it science?’ To overcome any tendency
to overvalue our activities we may even ask the question ‘Who cares what
you would like to call it? For whom is this of any importance?’ On the other
hand, the absolute relativism of ‘science is what scientists do’ is the sort of
truth that gets in the way of interesting questions. Philipse does not fall
into the trap of ‘foundationalism’, as he calls it, but pilots the reader firmly
but gently with cogent arguments in the direction of A.D. de Groot’s theo-
ry of the scientific forum and the minimum methodology required for the
forum to work. The forum is ‘democratic’ in a fundamental sense of the
word: only arguments count, and the best arguments – or the best argu-
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mentation – win. Inevitably, this brings to mind the concept of the
‘herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation’ developed at the same time by Haber-
mas, but the underlying line of reasoning is nevertheless very different.
For Habermas the democratic consensus in ordinary life comes first – and
he extends this practice normatively to scientific discourse. De Groot re-
gards unanimity as the ideal of science – the best arguments should be
recognised and acknowledged by all – and, if I understand that rightly,
both he and Philipse are inclined to regard this unanimity rule as the polit-
ical rule par excellence. Then I see Plato’s republic of the wise rearing its
head again, and that’s something in which I have no confidence. I do, how-
ever, agree with Philipse’s ‘sceptical conclusion that there is not one sim-
ple answer to the question “what is science?”’ by saying that, at the same
time, it becomes impossible to formulate the ‘universal characterisation of
all branches of science and scholarship’ for which the competition asks so
hopefully.
4
‘Maximising the growth of science’ is the second subject of the essay. As
nearly always happens, science is equated here with the natural sciences,
and these in turn are taken as the model for all science. That takes place
not just on paper; it is also the reality of scientific endeavour in the univer-
sities. In the same way that psychiatry around 1900 had created a kind of
hospital travesty with a great display of white coats, gleaming equipment,
sharp knives and starched bed linen, the present turn of the century finds
itself dominated by imitation of the rules, rites and rituals of the natural
sciences. Although it repeatedly turns out that this is possible on only a
very limited scale and has only limited meaning, it simply goes on. The
arts and social sciences are consequently largely robbed of their individual-
ity – and hence also of their essential meaning; that also applies to technol-
ogy and the clinical disciplines. This also happens in Philipse’s case, and
with that the breadth that made the first part of his argument so attractive
is lost. I always wonder why it is that natural scientists are so much more
liberal in their attitude towards the best methodology for the sciences. Is it
because they know from first hand how big the difference is with the prac-
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tical methodology of actual empirical work or can they afford to be liberal
because no one will even challenge how they do their work? Is it insight or
confidence?
5
At the academic and organisational level, the introduction of the system of
the research school into the Dutch university system was the most impor-
tant innovation in the final decade of the last century. Not everyone is en-
thusiastic about this, and Philipse also very clearly points out some of the
anomalies that have been associated with the introduction of the research
schools. I do not agree with him when he says ‘it is debatable whether they
have contributed positively to the quality and output of research’. Less than
20 years ago the number of PhDs awarded by Dutch universities was very
low. This has now trebled to nearly 2500 a year. Not all of them are of
course brilliant, but they are nevertheless of a good standard and method-
ologically certainly much more sophisticated than they used to be. In cer-
tain disciplines there was in fact no question whatsoever of serious inde-
pendent scientific endeavour in the form of systematic research. The uni-
versity was of course always the centre of study and learning, but it is only
in recent times that scientific research has become the distinguishing fea-
ture of Dutch universities. In the social sciences, that did not take place
until after the 1970s and in the arts, even later. The number of PhDs
awarded in the legal sciences as well as in the arts and in philosophy re-
mains exceptionally small. Nevertheless, the dominant image of the uni-
versity is now that of a centre of scientific research, even though the
number of students is now so much higher than in the days the university
was mainly an institute of learning and teaching.
6
I agree with Philipse: the universities must raise their standards and be-
come more internationally competitive and also more exclusive from the
Master’s stage onwards. Privatisation is not the best or only path to that
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end, but can in certain circumstances be a good solution. The resistance in
the Lower House of Parliament towards the introduction of a relatively
expensive top-class Master’s Degree determined in part by the students
themselves is a rearguard action. Virtually all vocational training is now
conducted outside the universities or at the postgraduate level and has
long since ceased to be free of charge. That trend is continuing. This is not
of major importance for scientific work, but it is for the future of universi-
ties. The same applies to the internationalisation of scientific activity. As a
result of the introduction of the Bachelor’s/Master’s system throughout
Europe, the already extensive international exchange of students will be
strongly stepped up. The Dutch research assistant system is attracting in-
creasing numbers of graduates from other countries, and not just because
there are places to spare for want of Dutch interest. The international ori-
entation has been programmed in and the comparatively good funding of
PhD. Projects through the AIO/OIO-system of research assistantships did
the rest.
7
Yes, more money should be made available for fundamental scientific re-
search. The Netherlands is seeking to be a knowledge economy and a
knowledge country. That calls for good education as well as a good scientif-
ic infrastructure and thriving scientific activity. This is not solely a task for
government; the problem is that all the major companies in the Nether-
lands have greatly reduced (or in some cases closed down) their scientific
laboratories and made them more application-oriented. In part, this has
involved the pooling of laboratories at the international level, while in part
a gamble has been taken that interesting new research results will be pro-
curable in the free market. That has, however, turned out to be disappoint-
ing, and noises can now be heard that would suggest a strengthening of
independent scientific activity within the realms of industry. Since the
Netherlands hardly has a pharmaceutical industry of its own and brings up
the rear in the field of gene technology, it has become difficult to keep in
touch with these two highly prominent areas of research-based economic
activity. The smaller companies have never played a role of any signifi-
cance in the scientific field in the Netherlands.
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8
The essay concludes with a notable attack on religion and politics. Above
all – according to Philipse – these are areas in which the scientist encoun-
ters a great deal of stupidity and narrow-mindedness. However, scorn for
science is not productive. It is mostly seen as a sign of extreme arrogance.
Furthermore, it has been shown many times that science is not generally a
good promoter of its own interests. The scientific community is also much
too fragmented. A minister of science is not a solution for all ills, as this
will always be a minister without portfolio, lacking authority in the Cabinet
and having few possibilities for stimulating scientific research in practice.
It must be an ominous sign for every scientist that the call for more re-
sources for research and science is made so infrequently by others apart
from scientists. One point of light as far as that is concerned is the joint
call for a greater effort to be made in this field by employers and employees
together with the universities, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO) and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
(KNAW). It is now a matter of waiting for a new coalition agreement.
Note
1 Comments on Science and Democracy, by Herman Philipse.
227Epilogue
6 Epilogue
When attempting to sum up the essays, the comments of the discussants
and the exchanges in the Debate itself, two major themes would seem to
dominate today’s thinking and concerns:
– the blurring of disciplinary boundaries
– the need for social embedding of ‘science’
They become manifest in different disguises, such as:
– the need to rethink the organization of our universities and other scien-
tific research institutions;
– the evolution of and the increasing connection between the approaches
to investigation in the sciences and humanities;
– the financial needs of science on the one hand, and the business oppor-
tunities created by science, on the other;
– the many areas and activities in our societies in which education and
understanding of the sciences are crucial, including the limitations of
their claims to socially useful and relevant knowledge.
If we should like to draw some conclusions at this stage, it may be done by
fleshing out these last four points into broader statements:
– After two centuries of largely university-centred, monodisciplinary in-
stitutions, the future ‘scientific enterprise’ will comprise a fluid mix of
scholars with varying backgrounds. Compared to the past it will be con-
ducted much more outside, although often in close cooperation with,
academic and the other traditional centres of education, research and
development. Engineering and design activities may well constitute
the primary tasks of new entities concerned with both physical produc-
tion and non-physical services, but these will be intertwined inextrica-
bly with fundamental research.
– The area of information and cognition beautifully illustrates that to ar-
rive at ‘relevant’ knowledge – not just aiming at short-term economic
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or political gains, but appropriate to this uniquely human endeavour –
one cannot stick to separate disciplinary approaches or narrow re-
search traditions. This is not saying that anything goes, to paraphrase
Paul Feyerabend, but just continuing our ways from the past and in
isolation certainly will not do.
– Funding of ‘scientific’ activity will become ever more complex as inno-
vation and knowledge become broader and more widespread phenom-
ena. The traditional national GDP-related indicator for public and tra-
ditional enterprise financing of R&D will come to hide a much more
varied reality. There is the entrepreneurial nature of research in the
context of innovative organizations that will generate its own remuner-
ation. There is the increasing difficulty of defining and measuring in-
novative activities. The globalization of many new branches may entail
tight as well as distant participation in international networks rather
than hierarchies, making it more difficult and maybe less relevant to
squeeze efforts into national straightjackets. However, it will remain
important to base cooperative activity on units that maintain a primari-
ly independent financial basis.
– The future arrangements will derive their legitimacy and impulses
from tangible and intangible links between academia, industry and
government. Most importantly, there is a need for more than a passive
recognition of the importance of ‘science’ by the public at large, which
requires new ways of involving the public in science. The appropriate
metaphor is a quadruple helix with a variety of interactions, some
strong, some weak, but nowhere nonexistent. It is incumbent on all
parties to understand, to be informed, to participate and to support in
direct and indirect ways. Civilization implies deeply rooted culture, in
which wisdom can only be based on ever-growing knowledge. Thus,
science must be considered one of the most essential elements of our
cultural heritage.
That sums up the interactions reflected in the previous chapters and cul-
minating in the lively “Sciences and Arts Debate” of the Holland Society.
The Chairman of the Debate, Alexander Rinnooy Kan, in his closing re-
marks, pointed to one of the key elements society should be thinking of.
These were his words.
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“Ladies and gentlemen,
Just a small final observation as we close this meeting, let me speak for myself and say
that I believe that we have participated in a wonderful debate. It would be unforgivably
arrogant even to try summarizing an afternoon that had so many high-level discussions
and touched upon so many topics. We have heard many eloquent pleas to rethink the
role – the organization, the structure – of the scientific enterprise, away from traditional
boundaries. At the same time, many new classifications were proposed that clearly are
also subject to criticism. It will be an inherently tough job to resolve all controversy.
I think we have had excellent papers in, by the way, excellent English, with excellent
presentations and an excellent organization. Somebody once said that modern science is
largely practised by people who lack a flair for conversation. That is manifestly unfair –
we have seen many counter-examples here today. We have been very well served by the
laureates, by the reviewers and indeed by all of you who participated.
If there is one theme coming out of this meeting that links today’s discussion to the
history and the tradition of the Hollandsche Maatschappij and to the need for its
continuing role, it is the notion of ‘scientific literacy’. This is a very important ingredient
for a balanced and sustainable economy, for a vibrant democracy and for the cultural
whole that it needs to be part of. Implicitly or explicitly, all four prize-winning
contributions touched upon that crucial point.
The idea that a scientific attitude, a scientific outlook, a scientific perspective on the
major issues of our time is more than a luxury is a very important one to take along with
us when we leave this meeting. It seems to me to be an essential condition for a civil
society to be a truly civilized society.
There are many tools available to promote scientific literacy: newspapers,
magazines, television, the Internet and so on. There are also many institutions for
assisting in that role: the educational system at large, all the way up to and including the
universities. I very much hope – and I am sure that I am speaking on behalf of all of you
– that the Hollandsche Maatschappij will continue to appear on that list in a very
prominent position, because it seems to offer a unique mixture of traders and teachers –
if you will, ‘kooplieden en dominees’1  – with a unique and continuing opportunity to
live up to its motto, its raison d’être, which is to build bridges between science and
society.
Thank you very much.”
We can say that, again.
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Note
1 “Merchants and Ministers”, a traditional characterization of the Dutch, recently
referred to by the Mayor of Amsterdam when acting as magistrate for the




A The Holland Society of Arts and Sciences
The “Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen” (Holland Society of
Arts and Sciences) was established in 1752 by seven distinguished burghers
of the city of Haarlem, in the then Republic of the United Provinces of the
Netherlands, in order “to promote science”. It is the oldest learned society
in the country today and is constituted as a dual body comprising approxi-
mately 275 “science promoters” (known as “directors”) and about 325 ac-
tive scholars (known as “members”), drawn from the natural sciences, the
humanities and the social sciences. It has always maintained relationships
with scholars in other countries (the “foreign members”, currently num-
bering about 25).
Thanks to its unusual structure, the Society can act as an effective
meeting place for leading persons from within and outside academia. It is
also in an unique position to provide independent judgement in many
fields and does this by serving in the review process for a number of pres-
tigious awards and fellowships.
Since 1841, the Holland Society has resided in a majestic town house,
designed and built in 1794 by the municipal architect of Amsterdam, Ab-
raham van der Hart (1747-1820), for the young and immensely rich Cor-
nelia Catharina Hodshon (1768-1829), daughter of a linen merchant of
English descent. Information about the Society is available by access to its
website “www.hollmij.nl”, including a virtual visit to the Hodshon House.
Apart from serving as a forum for the dissemination and discussion of
scientific discoveries, the Society set out to promote the sciences and arts
by prize competitions. In the spirit of the mid-18th century, the themes
often concerned application of (useful) knowledge rather than challenges
to broaden theoretical insight. Over a period of 154 years, 1206 competi-
tion questions were set, but only 169 responses were ever considered wor-
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thy of the gold medal of honour. In fact, after the rush of the early years,
the interest in prize competitions waned. Other vehicles for promoting the
arts and sciences presented themselves. First, the universities took over
the role of the learned societies as centres of research and dissemination of
knowledge. Next, specialized journals replaced the societies’ transactions.
Finally, research began being sponsored and supervised by national coun-
cils and publicly funded academies.
Competition nr 1202 was entered by a single respondent, who only
received his award after submitting an improved report. After four more
failed attempts, the institution of the prize competition was abandoned.
That was in 1917. However, on the occasion of its 250th anniversary, the
Holland Society decided to revive its old tradition just once more. The sub-
ject was scholastic endeavour, itself.
Steering Committee Sciences & Arts Prize Competition and Debate
Ir M.C. van Veen, President Holland Society (chair)
Dr R.J. van Duinen, Chairman Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO)
Prof. B.P.T. Veltman, Chairman Advisory Council for Science and
Technology (AWT)
Dr P.A.J. Tindemans, Director Global Knowledge Strategies &
Partnerships
Dr R.P.W. Visser, Teyler Professor of History of the Sciences, Leiden
University
Dr A.A. Verrijn-Stuart, Emeritus Professor of Computer Science, Leiden
University and Secretary for the Sciences, Holland Society (secretary)
External member of the review committee
Prof. T.A.F. Kuipers, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Groningen
University
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B The Prize Competition (as posted on the website of the
Holland Society, December 1999)
Prize Competition and Science Debate on the occasion of the 250th
anniversary of the Holland Society of Arts and Sciences (est. 1752)
Introduction:
All over the world, scholarly endeavour in the arts and sciences appears to
be evolving in two directions. On the one hand, specialisation (“depth”)
progresses steadily. On the other hand, there is a tendency towards “broad-
ening” areas of interest, manifesting itself in multidisciplinary or other-
wise cross-area approaches. Both are facilitated by the opportunities for
varied and rapid exchanges with colleagues elsewhere, especially by Inter-
net communication.
Those dedicated to specialisation often accuse the “broadeners” of fun-
damental shallowness. After all, branches of the sciences and humanities
may only make progress in their chosen fields if this leads to greater depth
of knowledge or insight. However, one should not forget that innovation
often results from an unusual combination of views and techniques origi-
nating in disparate domains. In some instances – and in spite of resistance
from traditional disciplines – totally new and independent areas came
about. The primary gain in depth mostly consisted in the recognition and
solution of (“deep”) integration problems.
Undoubtedly, in the new century, both approaches will prove to be pro-
ductive. However, and maybe even more strongly than in the past, “broad-
ening” research may be hampered by “traditional” views and too rigid a
set-up of research regimes. Among other things, one may rightly question
the customary distinction: humanities, natural sciences, social sciences
(sometimes referred to as alpha, beta and gamma disciplines). Such no-
menclature will also lead to serious confusion in cases of more detailed
cross-area research.
Problem statement:
For the above reasons, the Holland Society of Arts and Sciences (“Holland-
sche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen”, which has always been dedicated to
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the promotion of the sciences and arts) intends to arrange a debate, to be
triggered by four essays on the following problem statement (“to present ... ”):
A universal characterisation of all branches of sciences and arts, such that a basis is
established for positioning and evaluating current scholarly activity, and,
additionally, an opportunity is provided to formulate new problem statements and
approaches, including any that would not fit currently fashionable scientific or
scholarly frameworks.
This characterisation – in essence a meta-description – shall not only contain a listing
of science and arts elements, but also indicate which interest groups and professional
categories would feel the closest affinity to any specific elements, so as to explain past
accomplishments as well as anticipate opportunities for and obstacles to future
developments. (*)
Paraphrasing, one may say that the required essays shall offer:
“insight into the nature of definitions of the sciences and arts, employing some meta-
description”, indicating “which elements might be helpful or, by contrast, obstructive
in guiding scholarly endeavour in the 21st century”, possibly including “a reasoned
rejection of the classical distinction sciences/humanities and other restrictive
classifications, replacing these by a more effective taxonomy”
The four authors will be selected through the following competition proce-
dure:
Prize competition:
The Holland Society of Arts and Sciences calls on potential authors of es-
says as referred to above to submit 1000-1500 word summaries, in which
they indicate the approach they would intend taking. Submissions will be
reviewed by a scholarly committee of members of the Society.
The four laureates will be commissioned to write a 10,000-15,000
word essay, for which they will be rewarded by a medal of honour of the
Holland Society and a prize amounting to EUR 5000.
Submissions should be addressed to the Honorary Secretary for the
Sciences of the Holland Society, Prof. A.A. Verrijn-Stuart, P.O. Box 9698,
NL-2003 LR Haarlem, The Netherlands, before 1st October 2000. The se-
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lection procedure will be completed by the year’s end. It is expected that
the four laureates will complete their essays before 1st October 2001 so
that they will be available in print well before the debate.
It is the intention of the Society to publish the proceedings of the de-
bate, including the full texts of the essays.1
(*) Re problem statement:
interest groups (government, business enterprises, academic institutions,
NGOs, professional organisations, etc.) are characterised by idiosyn-
cratic terminology and an (often hidden) “agenda”, which hamper mu-
tual understanding and positive interaction;
professional categories – a similar conceptual misunderstanding is not only
observed between various professional groups but even within organi-
sations, in particular between different task groups (management,
staff, advisors, specialists), each of which may be viewed as a local “pro-
fessional category”;
(opportunities for and obstacles to) future development – it is not intended
that a normative “science-and-arts-agenda” for the 21st century be pro-
posed – rather an objective path be shown for policy developers (espe-
cially in The Netherlands, but always in an international context).
Note
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